Volume I

SUMMA TOTIUS PHILOSOPHIAE

LOGIC & ETHICS

Abra de Raconis

SUMMA TOTIUS PHILOSOPHIÆ

LOGIC, ETHICS, PHYSICS, METAPHYSICS

A Comprehensive Compendium

VOLUME I
LOGIC & ETHICS

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the Most Reverend Father in Christ, **Henri de Gondy**, Cardinal de Retz, Bishop of Paris and Counsellor to the Most Christian King. The author consecrates this compendium of philosophy to him as a token of deepest respect and admiration for his virtue and dignity.

About This Work

The *Summa Totius Philosophiæ* is a comprehensive compendium of the four branches of scholastic philosophy — Logic, Ethics, Physics, and Metaphysics — drawn from Aristotelian tradition and adapted for use by preachers and students of theology. The work was composed over nearly six years of study and lecture, drawing on the author's teaching at the University of Paris.

Moral digressions drawn from both Ethics and Physics are appended throughout, composed especially for the use of preachers. The Logic section alone — the first volume presented here — covers Dialectics, the Organon, Universals, Categories, Propositions, Syllogisms, Demonstration, Science, and Sophistry, spanning 180 pages in structured scholastic disputations.

Contents of the Logic (Logica)

Prelude — Introductory Matters

- On the names of Logic
- On the existence of Logic
- On the nature and essence of Logic
- On the affections and properties of Logic

Part I — Universals (Pars Prima Organi Logici)

- Genus: name, existence, essence, and affections
- Species: name, existence, and essence
- Difference: name, existence, and essence
- Property (Proprium): name, existence, and essence
- Accident (Commune): name, existence, and essence

Part II — Categories (Categoriæ)

- Substance, Quantity, Relation, Quality
- Action, Passion, When, Where, Position, Habit
- Homonyms, Synonyms, Analogues, and Paronyms
- Opposition, Priority, and Simultaneity

Part III — Propositions & Syllogisms

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- On Sophistry and its captious fallacies

General Appendix — Instruments of Knowledge

- Division (Divisio)
- Definition (Definitio)
- Method (Methodus)

Ecclesiastical Approval

The work received formal ecclesiastical approbation (*Approbatio*) dated **21 February 1617**, in Paris, signed by Loppe and A. Lambert. The reviewers found nothing contrary to Catholic faith or religion, and judged the work highly elaborated and worthy of promoting both Philosophy and Theology.

"THIS, MOST ILLUSTRIOUS LORD DE RACONIS, MOST CULTIVATED BODY OF PHILOSOPHY, OR AUSPICIOUS OMEN OF ACADEMIC FATE, I ACCEPT AND ACKNOWLEDGE." *(by I. Rvaldus, Rector of the Parisian Academy)*

This was what, this the omen, often prayed for by vows, From whom the Pierian choir directs its scepters. Not better by the thundering of the liver split, by the thundering of tongues, By the pen serving as its quill, From the heart free of fear. Conquer, Academy, conquer. Do you see how prosperous signs the Dragon makes? At Salamis the fierce Medes were conquered by Pelasgi; At Zama, Scipio conquered the Sidonians. Alexander conquered the whole world (who would believe it?): Rome gave you Augustus the martial yoke. So these and those the Dragons drove forth; Before birth, before the trumpet, the Dragon prevails everywhere. Why then does the Academy cease to lay down its laments? Why not hope once more for joyful trophies? Why not go against the enemy, and bring back rich spoils? You have the signs of the Dragon not yet seen. They scarcely lived a day. This one sent down from Olympus Will equal your divine Sophia. By a lesser part of himself, they earned the name Dragon, This one by a greater. He is the whole eye.

(Greek epigram follows, praising Aristotle of old and Raconis of the new age, in the spirit of the Academy)

"IN PRAISE OF THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND MOST LEARNED MAN, D.F. D'ABRA DE RACONIS, GOLDEN LITTLE BOOK OF LOGIC OF THE DOCTOR OF THEOSOPHY." *(by Fed. Morelli, Royal Professor, Dean of Iambic Senate)*

What Sagacity is and what Cleverness (that Greek word which the learned Doctor uses) Let him who wishes to know read through the Abra de Raconis, He will know the learned Synopsis of the Art of Distinguishing. Nothing more sagacious, nothing more clever, And more clearly this can be written by Method; By which more acutely you will discern, O Dragon Episcopus, Which things are true, which false, which sophistic.

"TO CAROLUS FRANCISCUS D'ABRA DE RACONIS" *(by Franciscus Hallier, Professor of Cardinal Philosophy)*

How well you served Raconis, by the command of the Dragon, Which bore it, so that idle leisure might pay with death, To avoid leisure, the frequent congregation shows you, In light this book is now sent out. Voice moves, but writings teach: your congregation ignites minds, But your writings bear light; What was to be done, the hard law of the Dragon has established: But you, by examples, teach what is to be done.

(by Petrus Hallier, also Professor of Cardinal Philosophy)

He who mixed the useful with the sweet in a single point, No less than the one who joined the brief with the clear in a work, Among all these, if anyone will have added the sharpness of reasoning, He is rightly to be admired. Who among you, O Raconides, will not embrace you, Subtle and easy though your brevity pleases?

"IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORK OF D. DE RACONIS" *(by Geraldus Cordemoy, his disciple)*

Why seek through the ancients the scattered little books of writers? Whatever they have, this work has.

ANOTHER BY THE SAME: *Who envies all things seen rightly, be envious; Whatever things are here, are rightly here: be envious of these.*

(Greek epigram by N. Le Riche, his disciple — praising Aristotle and Raconis)

APPROBATION

We the undersigned Doctors have read these commentaries — which, like gems bursting forth from the felicitous and most gifted study of Aristotle's Philosophy, and circulated under the title: *An Accurate Explanation of the Logical Organon, by Carolo de Raconis, Professor of Philosophy and Bachelor of Theology* — and have found in them nothing contrary to the Catholic faith or religion; rather, we found very many things most carefully elaborated, which when published will not a little promote students of Philosophy and Theology, enlighten the advanced, and be of benefit to the Church.

Given at Paris, the 21st day of February, in the Year 1617.

LOPPE' A. LAMBERT.

AN ACCURATE EXPLANATION OF THE LOGICAL ORGANON

PREFACE

Just as nature imitates art, so art imitates nature. God, in His supreme work of creation, placed the highest excellence upon all creatures produced from nothing, and determined that man — the compendium of the whole universe, the supreme tablet and manifest expression of His divine artistry and perfection — should express as in the shield of the mightiest Minerva a living image of Himself. Nature, having brought forth and delivered offspring into the light, first produces something tender, unpolished, without distinction of parts and position, until gradually and in the course of time, endowed singularly by its own industry, it perfectly attains all those perfections. Art — that ape of nature — similarly, at first produces rough, unpolished, and unadorned works, then gradually polishes them, and at last, applying the supreme hand, brings them to that perfection in which the eyes find pleasure and the craft singular honor.

I therefore, as an emulator of nature and its most faithful observer, about to undertake and sketch the whole work of Dialectic, have first drawn ruder and briefer lines for the more unlearned with a brief and coarse brush; then more accurate and refined lines for the more proficient and subtle with a finer brush — that is, a general and accurate treatment — of the finest qualities.

Now this image of Dialectic that we are about to depict will be distinguished by three colors: **Simple Terms**, pertaining to the first operation of the mind; **Propositions**, directed toward the second; and **Argumentation**, which is the third act of the mind. But lest we seem to begin too abruptly, certain things about Dialectic must necessarily be premised.

PRELUDE I — On the Names of Dialectic

Rather than a lengthy periphrastic description of the names of this discipline, let us note that various names are used: **Logic**, **Dialectic**, and **Organon**. These are its proper and specific names, which more fully express its nature, and to which our subject is subjoined — Logic, Dialectic, Organon.

As for **Logic**: its origin is derived from the Greek name *logos*. But the precise way in which the word should be used is a matter of no small debate, and must be settled before all else.

The word *logos* is taken, first, for any discourse whatsoever, whether external — that is, vocal or written — or internal, that is, the discourse we form tacitly within the mind, as in Aristotle, *1 On Demonstration, ch. 4.*

In this sense Logic is not derived from the word, since what concerns external discourse per se does not refer only to internal discourse. From this it is also evident what the

perfect Logician is: one who, even if his tongue and hand were cut off, could nonetheless internally discourse, define, divide, and argue.

I say "per se," because by accident it can happen that Logic extends to external discourse — as when a Logician who had long reasoned in his mind afterward chooses to express it in external speech, either vocal or written, and thus to make his interior concepts known to others.

Second, the word is taken for the solar definition alone, as in Aristotle in the introductory works.

Third, for argumentation alone, as in *3 Physics, text 75*. From either of these two modes Logic is not properly derived, since it deals not only with Definition or Argumentation alone, but with both, and moreover with Division and Method, as will be clear from progress.

Fourth, the word is used for the intellect itself.

Fifth, and commonly, for any internal discourse, or operation of the intellect. In this sense we call it Logic, taking its name from that very word, since it reflects upon the intellect and its operations in all things, directing them toward the investigation of truth, as we shall demonstrate more openly afterward.

As for **Dialectic**: it is derived, as we said in the Compendium, from the verb meaning "to discourse."

The word is used in various ways. First, broadly, for all use of reason and the rational operation of discourse. Then, from this it is not deduced that Dialectic: since if one understands by it all discourse of reason, or all its operations, then Logic together with all other disciplines which use reason would come under it. Second, it means in Latin "to differ," so that it is the same as to dispute probably. Third, to signify disputing with probability, and even necessarily. Fourth, it signifies disputing both probably and also necessarily. From this word taken in these ways our Dialectic is not derived — for it does not intend only to hand over the mode of disputing, or to dispute probably or necessarily, but rather to define, divide, and prescribe the laws of discerning. Therefore the appellation comes from the verb not because it derives its force from the three modes assigned above, but because it takes from that word whatever makes the unknown known through the known — by defining, by dividing, and by arguing. For thus to discourse comprehends all that is treated in Dialectic or Logic, and the disputation may be excited from it.

The last name is **Organon**, by which our Dialectic is designated — and not without reason. For it serves the other sciences as an instrument in the most perfect way. Just as an instrument in mechanical matters is that which is fitted to the work of producing something — as a pen is fitted to forming letters — so Logic can be called the instrument of the other sciences, because it is used for making and comparing them, since it teaches the method of knowing, defining, dividing, and arguing, by which our minds are drawn into the sciences.

PRELUDE II — On the Existence of Logic

Whether Logic Exists — Chapter I

To be briefly repeated from the Compendium: Logic is twofold — **Natural** and **Artificial**.

Natural Logic is our very own intellect, common to all men, insofar as by its own virtue, without rules or precepts, it can define, divide, and argue. One who denies this is destitute of intellect and mind, making man comparable to brute animals in everything, which he in no way professes.

Artificial Logic, however, is a habit composed through study and much labor, containing many most useful precepts, by which our mind is directed in its operations, and protected from the innumerable errors of natural Dialectic. That this Artificial Logic exists is confirmed first by the experience of many illustrious men, who in seeking it have labored greatly, and in it have not wasted their oil and effort.

Reason also confirms it. What is the cause that in the crafts, arts are admitted for making works — for example, the art of painting for making images, the art of forming them — and that the same reason applies to the intellect, that its operations be placed under some aid, by which definitions, divisions, and arguments are rightly and conveniently made? Artificial Dialectic is precisely such: therefore Artificial Dialectic must necessarily be admitted.

It is further confirmed by the necessity of it for the other parts of philosophy: from this it follows that either one must admit Logic, or concede that to desire to be united with the other parts of philosophy is natural to it — which no one admits. But the truer reason for the necessity of Logic requires a longer and more accurate examination, and it is better to treat it distinctly in the following chapter.

On the Necessity of Artificial Logic — Chapter II

Note first: something can be necessary in two modes generally — first, simply and absolutely, because it cannot be defined or exist otherwise, as God the greatest and best; and from hypothesis, if you have supposed something, that thing follows necessarily — as if an animal is to sustain its life, having supposed that it wills to preserve its life, it is entirely necessary. So, speaking simply and absolutely, it is not necessary for animals to eat, but given the supposition that one wants to preserve its life, it is entirely necessary.

Note second: necessity from hypothesis is itself in two further differences: that which is absolutely and simply necessary to sustain life, such as to eat and to drink; and that which is only in a certain respect necessary, and, as they say, to do better — as a more convenient journey by horse.

Note third: sciences can be considered in two states — the **perfect state** and the **imperfect state**.

The **perfect state** of sciences is that in which nothing is lacking that might perfect them — as Physics, if one had all its conclusions so thoroughly explored, with such certainty and evidence, that he could in no way doubt any of them.

The **imperfect state** of sciences is said to be that in which not all conclusions are perceived with sufficient certainty and evidence to drive all doubt from the mind — as Physics in an imperfect state, if only certain of its conclusions, and not all, were understood, or with such little certainty that one could still doubt their truth.

These things being noted, certain things are first established. First: Logic is not simply and absolutely necessary, but only from hypothesis, so that other sciences in the perfect state may be compared to it.

The reason is clear: because if someone who strove for other sciences did not need Dialectic, it would not be necessary for it — but Logic's aid is such that no one by its means can perfectly obtain sciences in the perfect state. Therefore through such means it is not absolutely necessary.

Second: it is clear that Logic, from what has been said, is not simply and absolutely necessary, but it is necessary from hypothesis, so that the sciences may be compared in the perfect state.

The reason is the same: this discipline is useful for advancing to the sciences, which teaches the method of knowing, reasoning, and defining; but Logic, from the aforesaid, furnishes precisely this — therefore it is to be estimated as useful for the other sciences in the perfect state to be added to them.

There remains the difficulty: whether Logic, among the remaining sciences in the perfect state, is a necessary means, such that they may in no way be obtained in such perfect perfection without it.

Javellus in his first treatise of Logic, and in his first Metaphysics, along with several others, propound the negative position.

Others, to the contrary, affirm more probabilistically and at length that Logic is simply and absolutely necessary to be compared to all sciences in the perfect state.

The argument of our position is taken first. No one can perfectly compare sciences to themselves, unless he rightly holds the method of arguing — since sciences are produced through demonstration, which is a species of argumentation — but no one rightly holds the method of disputing and arguing without Logic: therefore no one can compare sciences to themselves perfectly without Logic.

The second argument: A science in the perfect state is credited to no one adept, unless he has known it with such certainty and evidence that he cannot be detained in any doubt about it — but no one without Logic can assign the mode of knowing: therefore no one can attain sciences in the perfect state without Logic.

The third: if it were not imperfect without Dialectic, Logic would be made simply and absolutely necessary to itself — which is absurd — because if Logic were simply necessary for all sciences in the perfect state, it would seem absurd that Logic would be simply necessary to itself. I respond: Logic can be its own accessory in two different parts, as it conducts one to another, so that definition conducts to division and to argumentation — just as the eye assists the hand, the hand the foot, and so the other members of the body perform their mutual offices.

I respond second, to the greater: Logic to those sciences perfectly acquired being simply necessary, whose instrument it is, and which it precedes in the perfect state — but that itself being in this mode not an antecedent in the perfect state, it is simply not necessary to itself.

It will object: the other sciences precede Logic, since they precede it in the imperfect state — therefore from what has been said, the posterior response, which supposes the contrary, is empty. Antecedent has this ratio probably: every habit of direct action and acquired through direct action of the intellect is prior — but the other sciences are habits direct and acquired through direct action of the intellect, Logic however reflexive, and acquired through reflexive action of the intellect — therefore the other sciences precede Logic.

I distinguish: the other sciences precede Logic, in the imperfect state, concede; in the perfect state, deny. For proof one must say, sciences indeed to be compared to through direct action, in the imperfect state — not however to be perfected, unless they have accepted the benefit of Logic's reflexive action: as when one has made some definition, to know whether it be legitimate and the rules of the art conform, is above to return to examine it, and this examination being repeated many times, to hand over the general

laws of defining, and finally to acquire science. Therefore it follows that the perfection of the other sciences always demands the reflexive action of Logic, and that they in the perfect state are always to require Logic and not precede it.

First argument. Dialectic is useless and pernicious — first because with the multitude of precepts it obscures the mind; then because it injures many and in error draws them — from the first objection; and second objection comes from Aristotle.

Responding to the first of the first objection, I say that Dialectic rather confirms the mind through its precepts, and prevents it from straying.

To the second, I say that Dialectic does not lead men into error, but rather teaches how to extricate themselves from the snares of errors, by which the sophists seek to entrap the unwary.

Objection second: The other sciences have their own definitions, divisions, and argumentations — therefore Logic is not necessary for all of them, since it is only used for definitions, divisions, and argumentations.

I respond to the antecedent: the sciences have a matter from which definitions, divisions, and arguments arise, but not a mode by which they are made — and this mode they must borrow from Logic.

Objection third: The operations of nature are more perfect than works of art; likewise they are more certain — but natural Logic suffices by itself to compare sciences in the imperfect state: therefore more readily will we compare sciences in the state of perfection through natural Logic, than through artificial.

I respond to the antecedent: that things made by nature are in the same way always determined to one effect, as the warming action of fire, the circular motion of the heavens, and so on, are always thus; other things that are intermediate, as the action of writing, of eating, of depressing — the action of appetite, which now in one, now to the other part turns; the intellect itself, which now perceives things well, now frequently errs. Now as for those things that are made by nature, certissimum est that their genus is more certain than those which arise by art, because they can never be deflected — whereas through art they are sometimes deflected and degenerate.

SECTION PRIMA — On the Reason by Which Logic Was Invented

On the Origin of Logic — Chapter III

Note first: for the invention of any art, two principles concur — admiration and experience. **Admiration** is when something new and unexpected occurs to the mind, and it is immediately struck with the greatest admiration, and from there proceeds to diligent investigation of it. **Experience** is when, having been roused by such admiration, the mind tries to experience what it observed, and if having tried it with many and repeated attempts it has succeeded, and having met with the same outcome, it will always compose a general proposition, from which it may be compared to a science.

An example: those who first experienced an eclipse of the Moon were immediately struck with great admiration, from which they diligently inquired into its cause, and finally from many experiments they learned that it occurs by the interposition of the earth between the Sun and the Moon, and then truly they received this universal proposition wholly certain and necessary: the Eclipse of the Moon arises from the interposition of the earth between the Sun and the Moon.

From these it is easy to understand that admiration is only a remote principle of sciences being invented, and experience is proximate — since unless after admiration experience follows, from which a certain science arises, science will not be obtained. But experience itself is the proximate, because if one first accesses it, a general proposition arises from it immediately, which is constituted as a science.

Objection: experience frequently deceives us, as when we judge the sun to be only a foot in width, while yet the whole mass of the earth many times surpasses it — therefore experience cannot be the principle of sciences.

I distinguish the antecedent: experience leads us mostly into begun and imperfect cognition, I concede; perfect and formed from long usage, I deny. And this is the principle of our sciences which we establish.

Note second: the action by which any art or science is acquired is double — one **direct**, the other **reflexive**.

Direct is called that, by which we proceed directly to the thing — as when we define man: *man is a rational animal*, directly in the man we are said to act.

Reflexive is the examination of the prior, of the direct action — when we return above ourselves curiously, and examine whether our action, for example a definition, is true or false. In these two modes we explain the entire double proposition.

First proposition: Logic was not from the beginning found by human industry, but was first infused by God into our first parent.

This proposition is admitted by all philosophers and theologians, and is shown by this easy reasoning: it was fitting that the first man be most perfect from the beginning — therefore together with Logic and with the perfection of man it was fitting that he exist from the beginning, and therefore it was necessary that it be infused into him from God.

Second proposition: Whether through the sloth of men, to whom from our first parent it was transmitted almost by hereditary right along with the other sciences, this whole Dialectic was corrupted — either all of it was corrupted, or at least some of its parts — the restoration being made by this reason. When the first men began to define, divide, and argue, they recognized that they never quite rightly define and never quite rightly divide, never err — hence arose that admiration, which prompted the study of inquiring: because as they explored the reason, they were easily able to judge the legitimate definitions, and similarly in the same way in division and argumentation. Thus these have come about — that the good definition must consist of proper and immediate genus, proper difference (as we shall say elsewhere in its place), and from these they arrived at a completely certain and universal general proposition, and thus compared the science of that matter.

It is therefore established that some parts of the whole invention of Logic existed before Aristotle, both those which after the first man remained whole, and those which were not at all extinguished, and that from others they were restored, such as by Zeno, Plato, and from others — but it is most to be considered that Aristotle is the legitimate parent and restorer of Dialectic, both because more things which had lain concealed in the depths of Logic's teachings he restored by the singular acuity of his genius, and what from others had been scattered and disorderly he put into easy order, and composed from all those things the art which we call Logic, as is easily understood from his most learned books.

PRELUDE III

On the Nature and Essence of Logic

What Logic Is — Chapter I

The principal question is: what habit of the intellect is Logic? For its explanation, note briefly:

Note first: a habit is nothing other than some facility acquired through operation — for example, the habit of the intellect is nothing other than a strength and quality inhering in the intellect itself, by whose benefit the intellect acts promptly and easily in operating, where before it had some difficulty. Logic is altogether such — it is that which resides in the intellect, and confers facility on the intellect for performing its functions.

Note second: habits of the intellect are some always true, some always false, some finally intermediate, which can be either true or false.

The first genus has five: **intelligence, wisdom, prudence, art, and science**.

Intelligence is nothing other than the cognition of first principles — as: the whole is greater than its part. This is entirely true.

Wisdom is that which attains to knowledge of the highest things, such as of God and the Angels.

Prudence is the rule of the will, directing it in particular transactions.

Art is the habit concerned with external things.

Science finally is commonly called the certain cognition of a thing through its cause.

Habits always false are two: **error and heresy**.

Finally, the intermediates are certain probable opinions, and they are called habits of opinion — not to be confused with Faculty — they are taken for that habit by which one can argue either side of a contradiction with equal force, which those who hold Logic to be a Faculty contend.

Note third: that Logic is commonly spoken of in two modes — **teaching** and **using**.

Teaching hands down the mode of defining, dividing, and arguing, though not mixed with other sciences, and so is called auxiliary.

Using inclines us to the same things to be performed, but in the matter of other sciences, such as Metaphysics or another — to define, divide, or argue absolutely, or in Logical matter, and to define, divide, and argue in the matter of another science, are not diverse difficulties — just as to build absolutely or in Paris according to the precepts of the art of building, and to build in other places, are not diverse. Therefore teaching Logic and using Logic are not different species or essentially distinct habits.

Note fourth: that the name Art is used in two broad and improper modes. The first broadly and improperly for any collection of many precepts leading to some useful end, in which sense art is almost the same as science. Second, strictly and properly: for that habit which per itself occupies itself about some external material. Concerning this last usage note: it produces by two modes — first, some permanent work which remains and is perceived by sense after the action ceases, as the art of building leaves a building after its action; second, leaving no work behind after the action ceases, as the art of jumping, because after its action is completed nothing remains which is perceived by the senses. The former art is called *effective*, the latter *active*.

From this you understand how it is possible to distinguish between effectuation and action, and that which after external effectuation some work follows — as in the first example given — after the action of jumping, nothing remains — as in the prior example. However Aristotle does not so religiously observe this, but many times indifferently accepts effectuation and action — so it often happens that arts of action are confused with arts of effectuation. If such should occur to you, do not be disturbed, but immediately respond that Aristotle did not properly use the names of action or effectuation, but accepted them indiscriminately and improperly.

Note lastly: the name Science is similarly used in two broad modes. First broadly and improperly for any cognition whatsoever, whether it be necessary or only probable: in which sense Grammar is called a science, because it is cognition of some sort. Second, it is used properly for the certain, necessary, and evident cognition of some thing through its cause, and the faculty of admiring by reasoning its potentiality, which is that cause. With all these noted, the following is established:

First Proposition: *Logic is a habit of the intellect.*

Proven: a habit of the intellect is nothing other than a strength and quality inhering in the intellect itself, by whose benefit the intellect performs its functions more expeditiously and grasps anything more easily. But Logic is wholly such — it is that which resides in the intellect, as in a first subject, and confers facility to the intellect for carrying out its functions: therefore Logic is a habit of the intellect.

Second Proposition: *Logic is not intelligence, nor wisdom, nor prudence.*

The reason is clear: Intelligence must converse about first and most noted principles; Wisdom about God and the Angels; the function of Prudence is to govern the will — and Logic performs none of these things, being occupied only about the human intellect's operations, directing them toward the investigation of truth, as we shall teach below. Therefore Logic is not intelligence, nor wisdom, nor prudence.

Third Proposition: *Logic is not a habit always false, such as error or heresy.*

From the first part no one doubts; the latter will be confirmed by those reasons by which below we shall prove that Logic is a science, or a certain and necessary cognition.

Fourth Proposition: *Logic can improperly be said to be an art.*

Proven: art improperly taken is said to be that which gives various precepts useful to human life. But Logic gives various most useful precepts to human society: therefore it is an art improperly taken.

By equal ease you will have proven Logic to be at least a science improperly taken, since science accepted in this way is nothing other than the cognition of our intellect, whatever it might be, as is our Dialectic.

Objection: Aristotle in *1 Rhetoric, ch. 4* asserts that Dialectic has the nature of a Faculty. But a Faculty is other than what it is said to be.

I respond that in that passage Aristotle did not use the word Dialectic properly for the discipline which hands over the mode of differing, but improperly for that capacity which anyone can compare for himself to dispute probably about any material, conformably with the precepts which are in the Logic teaching, especially in the books of the Topics, concerning the ratio of disputing probably.

Fifth Proposition: *Logic teaching does not properly have the name art.*

Proven from what has been said: art properly taken occupies itself about external material — it leaves a work behind after its action, or does not. But Logic in no way occupies itself about external material, but about the internal operations of the human mind, as will be said afterward: therefore Logic is not an art properly taken.

Objection: Clement Timpler in *1 Logic Systems, ch. 10, quest. 3*, says it is proper to art to perfect a nature, and what it supplies to that effect, by the authority of Aristotle, *7 Politics, ch. last*. But Logic perfects nature, and what it supplies to that effect: therefore Logic is properly an art.

I respond first, denying the conclusion — since the syllogism is not in form, because it is in the second figure from pure affirmatives, which fights against the laws of the second figure, as we teach in the Compendium.

I respond second, denying the greater if it is said to be proper that what only in one thing has the nature of art competing with it: for though it is convenient for arts to perfect nature, not however for arts alone, because many modes of the mind also perfect it — of the number of which Logic is immediately to be proven.

Sixth Proposition: *Logic teaching is not properly an art.*

Proven from what has been said: art properly taken occupies itself about external material — it leaves nothing behind. But Logic in no way occupies itself about external material, but about the internal operations of the human mind: therefore Logic is not an art properly taken.

Objection first: Logician is truly and properly an artificer — therefore from joined terms, Logic is truly and properly an art.

I respond, denying the antecedent — just as indeed Logic improperly is called art, so too the Logician only in improper signification may be called artificer.

Final Proposition: *Teaching Logic is entirely and properly called science.*

This proposition is easily deduced from what has been said: since it has first been established that five only are the true habits of the intellect — Intelligence, Wisdom, Prudence, Art, and Science. Further it has been concluded that Logic is not intelligence, not wisdom, not prudence, not art properly taken — therefore what remains is that it be science truly and properly said.

Reason also confirms it: Logic is the certain and necessary cognition of a thing through its proper cause, which is the definition of science — therefore it is truly and properly science. The antecedent is proven: Logic certainly recognizes the definition hidden in the nature of a thing — since it explains all its parts, removes the confusion of division, generates demonstration, and produces the science which consists of necessary propositions: therefore Logic is a certain cognition of a thing through its proper cause, and therefore science.

Objection first: the mode of knowing is not a science, according to Aristotle, *2 Metaphysics, ch. 5* — but Logic is the mode of knowing: therefore it is not properly science.

Whatever is made of the greater, I deny the minor. For it is not properly Logic that is the mode of knowing, but it rather hands over that mode of knowing — the definition, division, and argumentation — by which knowing is made.

Objection second: science must have a determinate object, from Aristotle, *1 Posterior, ch. 2*. But Logic does not have a certain and determinate object — it wanders through all the sciences: therefore it is not properly science.

Granting the greater, I distinguish the minor: Logic teaching does not have a determinate object, concede for using; deny for teaching, which in fact has the operation of the intellect as its determinate object, directing it by precepts of discerning — though it does not itself intend to apply these to all sciences as using does.

Finally objection: science must be of things necessary, from Aristotle, *1 Posterior, ch. 2*. But Logic at least in part is not of necessary things, because it deals with probability in the topics, and with false things in the books of refutation: therefore at least in part it is not science.

I respond to the greater — it suffices that science be of necessary things, or according to itself, or according to the mode in which they are considered — the things of topics and sophistical matters are necessary, the mode in which Logic treats of them, namely to derive the topical syllogism generating opinion, and to recognize the sophistical error, is necessary.

WHETHER LOGIC IS ONE SPECIES OF SCIENCE

Chapter II

Note first: triple unity is given — first numerical, by which some one singular and individual thing is said to be one, as Peter; second specific, by which all singulars of some species are said to be one thing, as all singular men are said to be one in species; third generic, by which all species of some genus are said to be one, as all species of animal are said to be one in animal.

Now here we do not deal with numerical unity of Logic — since it suffices that Logic can be multiplied by multiplicity of subjects, or of the intellect, in which it is found — and so the Logic which is in Peter is numerically distinct from the Logic which Paul has been instructed in, and so of the others. The only question is whether to Logic itself specific unity is to be attributed, so that Logic is only immediately divided in species just as man in singular men who are only numerically discrepant — or whether generic unity, so that Logic must be distributed in distinct species just as animal, which is one in generic unity, is immediately divided into various species, into man for instance and beast.

Note second: the specific or generic unity of sciences is to be derived from the formal object, such that that science is said to be one in species, whose formal object is one in species — and those are said to be one in genus, whose formal object is one in genus.

Now because it is not clear what should be understood by *formal object*, it must briefly be explained. The object of any science is double, **material** and **formal**. Material is the thing in which the science itself is occupied, as the material object of medicine is natural body, formal however is the mode or reason by which that material is considered, as in the same Physics, *natural body insofar as it is natural*.

Note third: the object is also double — one **total**, around which the whole science is occupied, and beyond which it cannot proceed, as natural body in Physics; another **partial**, which is only a part of the total object, as heavenly body, the partial object of the same Physics. And this partial object is further double — *primary and chief*, which is the principal part of the total object, as God in Metaphysics; and another *less chief*, which is the less principal part of the same total object, as intelligence with respect to the aforesaid Metaphysics.

Note lastly: five most powerful conditions are required for the object of any science. First, that it be **certain and necessary**, since science must be of certain things, and this is sufficiently understood from its definition.

Second, that it be **not singular**: for according to Aristotle, *of singulars no science is had, nor can be had*. This condition is not to be understood of any whatsoever singular, but only of that which is subject to mutations: because God is indeed immutable, and is the object of true sciences, both Metaphysics and Theology, and thus of it true science is held.

Third, **that it truly have principles, and properties which may be demonstrated of it**: in the way that natural body has for principles, matter and form, and for its proper attributes Quantity, Motion, Location, and Time.

Fourth, **that all things which fall under the consideration of science be recalled to it**: which condition is of the total and adequate object only, not of the partial and inadequate to be understood.

The last condition is that the **object be one, and that it may be defined by a single definition**, as the aforesaid natural body, which is commonly defined as: *a complete substance composed of matter and form*.

With all these noted, the question is briefly answered: Logic is one species, or one specific unity of science.

Proven: science, from what has been said, in the same way and by the same unity as the formal object is one. But the formal object of Logic is one in species — it is that very reason according to which it considers the operations of the mind, namely insofar as they may be directed toward the investigation of truth. Therefore Logic is one species, or one specific science. But it is called one specific unity not only in Logic, but also in other

sciences — whether it is simple, by aggregation, the question is in the disputation on Demonstration to be discussed.

WHETHER LOGIC IS A PART OF PHILOSOPHY

Chapter III

The full explanation of this question depends on the knowledge of Philosophy, and so before proceeding further, some things about Philosophy in common must be premised.

To be briefly repeated from the Compendium: various descriptions of Philosophy exist. The first is taken from the notation of the name, according to which *Philosophy* is said from the word philosopher, and from its conjugates, *philosopher — a friend of wisdom*.

The second describes it as *a meditation upon death* — not indeed natural, or of the separation of the soul from the body, but moral, or an extension of the will and desires, so that as the philosopher meditates upon death itself it is the same as to be separated from a small life, and freed from the chains of vices to apply oneself to the meditation of truth.

The third description is: Philosophy is the science of divine and human things, whereby through divine things, spiritual and incorporeal things are understood, and through human things, corporeal and material things are commonly understood.

The fourth and most convenient description of Philosophy is handed down in these words: *Philosophy is the cognition of things, that is, through causes*. It is taught by Damascenus in *4 of his Dialectic*, and as Aristotelian is proven by Ammonius at the very beginning of the *Predicables*, and has this confirmed for so many reasons. From this reason it is said that Philosophy — since men began to be philosophers. But men are said to be philosophers since they began, through the search for the latent causes of things, to assign them — therefore from there Philosophy is derived, because it is the cognition of things through causes.

Furthermore, to be repeated from the aforesaid Compendium, Philosophy is double — one **Speculative**, which rests in the contemplation of its object, and does not pass to action: under which are contained Physics, Metaphysics, and Mathematics — another **Practical**, which refers its cognition to action, and hands down the rules of operating: under which Logic and Ethics are comprehended, as we shall teach in its own place.

That there are only two such parts of Philosophy — Theoretical and Practical — from several most probable reasons others show — but these two are the most powerful.

The first: the universal number of parts of Philosophy is how many are the ends for which men began to philosophize. But that universal end is double — a prior, which is

the bare cognition of things, which we cannot attain to by direction, as God and the Angels — a posterior cognition of things, which can be done by us, such as the acts of virtue, definitions, divisions, and arguments: therefore double in universal will be the parts of Philosophy, **Theoretical and Practical**.

The second reason: intelligence is double — one **speculative**, another **practical**. The speculative is that which proposes to itself the knowledge of truth alone, and does not direct other faculties toward acting — the practical, however, which not only serves itself, but also consults other potentialities, not in the bare contemplation of truth alone, but directs other faculties, and itself toward the composition of some illustrious work: in words for example, not only to know what virtue is, what definition, what division, what argumentation, but further to direct the will toward virtue to be pursued, and itself toward defining, dividing, and arguing — and as the eye is first theoretic, while it discerns flowers by nature, and then practical as it directs the hand to gather them, and by reason it is called theoretic, while the hand directs to the operation of writing, and to forming letters, and to the directing of intellectual operations, and insofar as by precepts of defining, dividing, and arguing it directs toward the investigation of truth: therefore to this double intellect there will correspond only double parts of Philosophy, **Speculative and Practical**.

That it is Practical in the highest degree: it is a practical science, which with the cognition of its object proceeds to action, and hands down rules of acting. But Logic is altogether such — therefore it is a practical science. The major is certain. Logic hands down precepts of definition, division, and argumentation, and by these three operations the mind is directed — therefore it does not rest in contemplation of its object, but passes to action.

The authority of Aristotle is added, who in *6 Metaphysics, ch. 1* enumerating theoretical sciences, makes no mention of Dialectic, but mentions only Physics, Metaphysics, and Mathematics — wherefore since it is not a medium between practical and theoretical, Logic, from the mind of Aristotle, is a practical science.

However, so that the whole matter may be more fully explained, and so several objections may be met both from Aristotle and from reason, the following are noted:

Note: Praxis, from which a science is said to have praxis, is in two differences — one **moral**, another **artificial**. Moral praxis is a voluntary act, insofar as by nature it can be directed to good, through well instituted precepts — artificial praxis is that action, insofar as it is directable by the rules of art, as the manual action insofar as it can be directed toward the art of writing letters, and also the intellectual actions insofar as by precepts of defining, dividing, and arguing they can be directed toward the truth.

From this it is easily explained why Aristotle, when he seems to deny that Logic is practical — it must be said that he speaks of moral praxis: Logic however, artificial — Logic is practical only by artificial praxis, not by moral.

From the same foundation it is easily also solved by those who deny that Dialectic is practical, because the actions of the intellect, in which it deals, cannot be praxes — this

plainly from what has been said must be denied, and it is only to be conceded of moral praxis, not however artificial.

FINAL PRELUDE — On the Affections or Properties of Logic

On the Object or Matter of Logic — Chapter I

Note first: matter around which (that is, the subject-matter) and the object are in every art and science the same.

Note second: although frequently, indeed very often, *subject* and *object* are indiscriminately taken, they are nevertheless not always the same but sometimes greatly differ. For *subject* is said to be that which generically receives something from itself, and the intellect knows — *object* is that around which a faculty, or habit, or art is occupied — as natural body compared to Physics, and number with respect to Arithmetic. These two are distinct, for both Physics' subject is the intellect and its object is the aforesaid natural body.

Note third: the object of any science is double — **material and formal**: material is the thing in which the science itself is occupied — as medicine's material object is natural body — formal however is the mode or reason by which that material is considered, as in the same Physics: *natural body insofar as it is natural.*

Note fourth: the object is also double — one **total**, around which the whole science is occupied, and beyond which it cannot proceed, as natural body in Physics — another **partial**, which is only a part of the total object, as heavenly body, the partial object of Physics. And this partial object is further double — **primary and chief**, which is the principal part of the total object, as God in Metaphysics; and another **less chief**, which is the less principal part of the same total object, as a lower intelligence with respect to the aforesaid Metaphysics.

Note fifth (which we shall afterward more fully explain): of any science the object is double — **material and formal**. Material is the thing in which the science itself is occupied. To know what the formal object is — so as to avoid the obscurity of this phrase — note that the formal object is that mode, or reason, by which the material is considered: as in Physics, *natural body insofar as it is natural.*

Furthermore, it must be observed that any science's object is also double — **total** and **formal**. The total is that around which the whole science is occupied, as natural body in Physics. The *formal* is the mode by which that material is considered, insofar as it is natural.

Note lastly: five most powerful conditions are required for the object of any science.

First, that it be **certain and necessary**, since science must be of certain things, and from its definition is sufficiently understood.

Second, that it be **not singular**: for according to Aristotle, of singulars no science is had, nor can be had. This condition is not to be understood of any whatsoever singular, but only of that which is subject to mutations — because God is indeed immutable, and is the object of true sciences.

Third, **that it truly have principles, and properties which may be demonstrated of it**: in which mode natural body has for its principles, matter and form, and for its properties Quantity, Motion, Location, and Time.

Fourth, **that all things which in a science's consideration fall be recalled to it**: which condition belongs to the total and adequate object, not to the partial and inadequate.

The last condition is that the object **be one, and that it may be defined by a single definition**, as the aforesaid natural body, which is commonly defined as: a complete substance composed of matter and form.

Section II — Whether the Being of Reason is the Object of Logic

Among the various opinions about the object of Logic, there first occurs what Averroes says in *4 Metaphysics*, D. Thomas in the same, and others — that **the being of reason** is the object of Logic.

Since it is not yet clear what should be understood by the being of reason, and lest we tarry in ambiguity, certain things about the being of reason itself must briefly be explained.

Article I — On the Name and Various Acceptations of Being of Reason

Being of reason, as the name indicates, is derived from mind and reason — as if you said an entity of reason — because it constitutes a multiple order, which it holds with respect to reason or the mind.

1. It is that which exists in the mind, **subjectively as in a subject**, so that it inheres in it — since all true accidents, being truly accidents, postulate to inhere in the intellect. This acceptance of being of reason is very improperly taken.
2. It is said to be being of reason that which is **effected by the intellect as its efficient cause** — in the mode in which all actions of the intellect are true and real entities, not entities of reason.
3. Being of reason is commonly taken for **that which the intellect perceives as an object**, and in that thing is its object — when that perceived object exists outside the intellect either in real things, or when existing outside the intellect it nowhere really exists, as a chimera. These two modes in which being of reason is taken — by the prior mode for that which is founded, as they say, in things in fact, and generally all fiction of the intellect, as man conceived through reason. By the second for that which is conceived as something existing in real things, but nothing in reality exists — as a golden mountain.

Furthermore: being of reason is taken doubly — by the first for what is in fact, and what is citra all fiction of the intellect, and all fiction of the intellect — as man by reason conceived. By the second for what someone conceives as existing in real things, but nothing existing in reality, such as a golden mountain. And in the prior mode being of reason is very improperly taken, since according to this mode, the most truly real entities, such as a man who really exists, would be called beings of reason — because

they are more truly real entities. In the further posterior mode, only we shall afterward speak of it.

Noting further: being of reason is taken doubly — first, for that which the intellect feigns — for example, to be seen in a wall, from the vision itself, which in fact and really in it does not exist, but is only thought to exist and for that reason is called being of reason, as a vision. Being of reason furthermore is taken in two ways — first, for what the intellect feigns; second, for everything which is a medium between real being and nothing.

First Proposition: If being of reason is taken in the prior mode, external denominations — such as to be seen, to be heard — are not beings of reason.

Proven: those external denominations convene to things with no one thinking — for example, to be seen by a wall, with no one thinking about the wall, even though it be perceived by the eye from afar, nobody thinking about it, therefore those external denominations are not beings of reason, if being of reason is taken in the prior mode — for what is only feigned by the intellect.

Second Proposition: If being of reason is taken in the posterior mode — for that which is a medium between real being and nothing — without doubt external denominations are beings of reason.

Proven: those external denominations are neither properly real entities, nor even nothing — therefore they are beings of reason in the accepted name of being of reason in the posterior mode, for that which is a medium between real being and nothing.

Proven: the antecedent, as to the prior part — that external denominations are not real entities — an external denomination, for example to be seen in a wall (which judgment about other denominations is the same) convenes to the subject, namely the wall, even if nothing real has accrued to it, because it was perceived only by the eye — therefore an external denomination is not real.

Proven also as to the posterior part — that an external denomination is not nothing: between two nothings there is no difference, but between two external denominations — for example between to be seen and to be heard — some difference intervenes, for we rightly say that sound has been heard, not similarly seen — therefore external denominations are not nothing, and consequently with the other part they are not real entities, they are rightly called beings of reason in the posterior mode, for that which is a medium between real being and nothing.

Article II — On the Existence of Being of Reason, or Whether It Exists and What Things Are Contained Under It

Experience makes it evident that beings of reason are given, because many things are daily feigned by our intellect.

The difficulty is only about external denominations and second intentions, whether they are properly beings of reason.

As for external denominations — they can be better understood if from some loftier beginning the discussion is started, and so:

Note first: denomination is universally double — one **intrinsic**, another **extrinsic**.

Intrinsic denomination is that which is derived from some real form inhering in the subject really, as to be white in a wall, from the whiteness itself really residing in it.

Extrinsic denomination however is that which arises from some form, which qua form is not in the subject, but is only thought to be so in the thing — as to be seen by a wall, from the vision itself, which in fact and really in it does not exist, but is only thought to exist.

Note second: denomination universally is double — one **active** or formal, another **passive** or, as they colloquially say, material.

Active or formal intention is the action itself, by which the object is perceived, as the action of the faculty of perceiving, and its nature is expressed.

Passive or material intention is the thing itself as it is conceived in the mind.

Note third: that passive intention is double — **first** and **second**.

First is the thing itself, which is first cognized.

Second is that which is secondly intelligized. To illustrate with an example: when I know the subject of this proposition, *Man is an animal*, it is said to be the first passive intention — because it must first be intelligized, as the subject — the second indeed, because when the intellect first perceives the nature of man, it returns above itself and examines the aforesaid proposition, *Man is an animal*, and understands man to be the subject.

These being constituted, there is controversy among philosophers about what second intentions are.

Some will have beings of reason to be second intentions — we distinguish: there are indeed some second intentions, which even though perceived secondly, however convene to things without anyone thinking, as to be universal, to be species, to be predicate — and these we do not deny to be beings of reason, since they are taken from the intellect secondly; but they convene to things with no one thinking. There are however others truly that secondly only and not from things convene to them, and cannot, except through the benefit of the intellect, convene — as to be subject, to be predicate, which always follow the operation of the intellect, and these properly are beings of reason.

To this, about the existence of beings of reason also — the part that belongs to the question of the efficient cause of them — it was asked whether not only the human intellect causes them, but also divine and angelic intellects, divine will, and even created sensory faculties, can be efficient causes of beings of reason. Those who hold the negative deny it, some from the contrary affirm. We add, composing the whole matter from the following two double propositions:

Third Proposition: The divine intellect, and likewise the angelic, divine will, and other sensory faculties, cannot be efficient causes of fictitious beings of reason.

Proven of the divine intellect: the divine intellect in fact does not feign to exist what does not truly exist and does not exist — therefore the divine intellect cannot be an efficient cause of fictitious beings of reason.

Of the angelic intellect the same proposition is demonstrated: the angelic intellect, being most perfect, apprehends things in the mode in which they have being from the part of the thing — therefore it is not an efficient cause of fictitious beings of reason.

Finally of the will — since divine, then created, and other sensory faculties, the same position is shown perspicuously: will, whether created or uncreated, sensory faculties, such as vision, hearing, and the like, feign nothing — because feigning belongs to the intellect only — therefore neither will created nor uncreated, nor created sensory faculties, can be efficient causes of fictitious beings of reason.

Fourth Proposition: If being of reason is taken for what is a medium between real being and nothing, not only the human intellect, but also divine and angelic, divine will, and also sensory faculties, can be efficient causes of beings of reason.

Proven: external denominations, from what has been said, are beings of reason thus taken — therefore what will be an efficient cause of external denominations, will also be an efficient cause of beings of reason, in this mode taken. But not only human intellect, but also divine and angelic, divine will, angelic, created and uncreated sensory faculties, are efficient causes of external denominations — because just as a thing is denominated through human intellect as *intellectum* (understood), so through divine intellect a thing

is denominated understood; through the angelic understood; through the will, whether created or uncreated, *volita* (willed); through vision *visa* (seen), through hearing *audita* (heard), and so of the others. Therefore not only human intellect, but also divine and angelic, created and uncreated will, omnesque sensory faculties, can be efficient causes of beings of reason.

Article III — On the Essence of Being of Reason, or Whether It Is Something

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Here some do not doubt, and sustain the negative part absolutely.

But on the contrary, and with much greater probability, the affirmative party is embraced — that beings of reason are in fact something, not pure nothing.

Proven from the reason which we adduced above: among two nothings no difference at all can be assigned, but beings of reason have in beings of reason a place — as in this proposition, *Man is an animal*, we assert man to be the subject, and deny it to be the attribute — and in this proposition, *Man is an animal*, from what has been said, the beings of reason are something, and not pure nothing.

Furthermore, beings of reason are the object of intellect participating truth and some essence, since no truth is without essence — nothing true which is not a being — therefore beings of reason are something.

Objection: whatever is, must somewhere be — but beings of reason are found nowhere — therefore they are nothing.

I respond to the greater: everything in the way in which things are, must somewhere be — therefore since beings of reason are not except through reason and the intellect, they are objectively in the intellect.

Article IV — On the Affections of Being of Reason

All affections of being of reason come from its end. Therefore concerning the end of beings of reason, we must here briefly treat.

It is certainly clear that beings of reason have never properly been instituted by nature for any end, but by the arbitration of men they are referred to diverse ends — and so it is an external denomination, which is an entity of reason, whose end is varied. The end of

the Republic for example is the fictitious beings of reason — or the end varies by the men who think of them — either the fuller intelligence of real things which is obtained through comparison with beings of reason, just as white is better and more fully cognized when compared with black, than if it were looked at separately. Concerning beings of reason.

Furthermore, it is to be established in this way: whether beings of reason is the object of Dialectic, which the whole Thomist school propounds, or not — which the remaining philosophers with great consensus defend. We add, joining our own vote, concluding: **beings of reason can in no way be the legitimate and constituted object of Dialectic.**

Proven: it cannot be the object of Dialectic, which is not intended by Logic per itself — but being of reason is not intended per itself in Logic: therefore being of reason is not the object of Logic. The minor is proven: being of reason per itself is not intended in Logic, because another thing is intended by it, just as it is done to be used; but being of reason, as being of reason, is intended by Logic to another — therefore being of reason per itself in Logic is not intended: therefore being of reason is not the object of Logic.

Confirmed by the reasons by which we shall below prove: operations of the intellect, as directable by precepts of differing, are legitimate and adequate objects of Dialectic. If this is so, since a double object is not given in a science that is adequate, it is easy to conclude that beings of reason cannot be assigned as the object of Dialectic.

Section III — Whether the Mode of Differing Is the Object of Logic

Many of the more recent, particularly pertaining to Conimbricenses in their preambular Logic questions, allege and assert that the modes of differing — definition, division, and argumentation — are the legitimate and adequate object of Dialectic.

Definition, division, and argumentation however are said to be diverse modes of differing, because differing consists in making the unknown clear from the known — as was annotated above — and this happens both through definition, by which the essence of a thing is opened; through division, which exhibits the parts of a thing; and finally through argumentation, by which the properties of things are explained.

Others however differently explain the mode of differing — they wish it to be nothing other, besides the rules and precepts, by which the mind instructed in things differs, defines, divides, and argues. From this how little they differ from our opinion stated below, namely that the actions of the intellect, as they can be directed according to the aforesaid prescribed precepts, are the adequate object of Dialectic — they are concerned in that thing only, that those who investigate the object of Dialectic, dwell in those modes of differing themselves and the precepts, which make the operations of the intellect concur — we however go further beyond to those very actions of the intellect, to which the prescribed precepts of directing are referred. So that all this truth may be more fully understood, the following is established:

First Proposition: *The modes of differing — definition, division, and argumentation — are not the legitimate object of Dialectic.*

Proven: that is not the legitimate object of Dialectic, which is not primarily intended by Dialectic from its end — but definition, division, and argumentation are of such kind — therefore they are not the legitimate object of Dialectic. The greater is admitted by all. The minor is shown: definition, division, and argumentation are not primarily intended, but only secondarily — since without them Dialectic cannot attain its end — but definition, division, and argumentation are of such kind — therefore they are not the legitimate object of Dialectic.

The minor of the syllogism is proven by this sole argument: Dialectic attains the end which it primarily intends, when the one learning has been rendered perfect and absolute in all respects, which is how prudence says it achieves its primary end — when virtue has made the man perfect. But by definition, division, and argumentation Dialectic renders the perfect Dialectician, provided he be able to define, divide, and argue when he wills — therefore by definition, division, and argumentation Dialectic

attains the end it primarily intends — and therefore they are not the primary but secondary end of Dialectic.

From these things the first adversary objection is dissolved — who say that definition, division, and argumentation, as the operations of Logic, or the operation of the logical work, obtain all the conditions of a legitimate object, namely that the object has simple terms, parts, the definition, genus, and difference — and argumentation, propositions, and also properties, such that the definition is reciprocated with the defined, argumentation generates probability or certainty, if it be probable or demonstrative — therefore they both obtain all the conditions of a legitimate object — which however is not accurately expended, because in this they chiefly fail that argumentation is not the proper object of Dialectic, since definition, division, and argumentation are accurately expended — what is not here accurately expressed.

Moreover the adversaries object: the other practical arts have works for their objects, as the art of building has building a house, the art of painting images — and Logic, which is the practical discipline of differing, has a work for its object — namely definition, division, and argumentation.

Whatever is made of the consequence, I respond doubly: first it is constituted that Logic is double — one **teaching**, which hands over the modes of defining, dividing, and arguing — another **using**, which uses those very modes also in other practical arts and fittingly. Thus Architecture can be constituted as double — one teaching, *the art that hands down the precepts of building*, by which the intellect is cultivated and the hands are instructed to construct a house — and using, *that which by those precepts in fact constructs* — the Logic teaching however does not recognize the definition, division, and argumentation for its object — therefore argumentation is not the adequate object of Logic.

Meets the Aristotelian objection: since definition and division can be referred to argumentation, so as to be parts of it from which it consists, since propositions, from which all argumentation is built, are the argumentation parts, and in Logic besides argumentation, definition and division are dealt with — therefore argumentation cannot be the adequate object of Logic.

I respond to the antecedent: definition and division can be taken in two modes — first, insofar as they are only components entering into argumentation, as parts of it, which are propositions, from which all argumentation is built — and of these we concede that they are referred to argumentation; second, insofar as they are distinct instruments of knowing, by which the sciences are differently generated — definition from the cognition of the essence of the thing — division from the cognition of the parts — argumentation indeed generates the conclusion from the premises — and in this mode what is always in our Logic treated, and by obtaining which Dialectic has acquired all it sought, and need not per itself aim at anything else — therefore the operation of the intellect in Logic is referred, and nothing besides it per itself in Logic is intended: since Logic explains nothing, what is not immediately for directing the operation of the intellect, whether of the first, of the second, or of the third — and having followed this direction, it has, and

conquered, and need not per itself aim at anything else — therefore the operation of the intellect is the object of Dialectic.

Confirmed: the chief fruit which Logic brings forth, and to which it was invented, without doubt is that illumination in its operations — the directing of the intellect — by which the mind thus made straight obtains, in operating, neither to fail nor to fall into error — therefore the operation of Logic will be without doubt the operation itself of the intellect, insofar as directable, which is the legitimate object of Dialectic.

Second Proposition: *The rules and precepts for making modes of differing are not the legitimate object of Dialectic.*

Proven: that is not the legitimate object of Dialectic, which by its own nature, and from the primary intention of it, is referred to action — but the precepts for making modes of differing are of such kind, since by its own nature they are referred to actions of the intellect, around the truth of things — therefore the precepts for making modes of differing are not the legitimate object of Dialectic.

Section IV — Some Minor Opinions on the Object of Logic Explained

Those opinions, which we have so far reported on the object of Logic — chiefly among those which are usually recalled here — there are others which must be briefly described.

The first is of Albert the Great, in *treatise 2 in Porphyry* — that argumentation alone is the adequate object of Logic.

But it is refuted first, because in no way the modes of differing (of which argumentation is the chief) are the legitimate object of Dialectic, but the actions of the intellect — and therefore not argumentation.

Second: in a science nothing should be dealt with beyond the adequate object, to which it is not referred — but in Logic beyond argumentation, other things are dealt with, namely definition and division — therefore argumentation cannot be the adequate object of Logic.

Albert the Great meets us: definition and division are referred to argumentation, as parts of it making up the whole — for they are propositions, from which all argumentation is built, and consists in Logic — therefore argumentation, nothing is considered in Logic, unless it be reduced to argumentation, which alone is required for the adequate object.

I respond to the antecedent: definition and division can be taken in two modes — first, insofar as they are only propositions entering into argumentation as parts of it, from which it consists — and of these we concede that they are referred to argumentation — second, insofar as they are distinct instruments of knowing, which are different modes — and in this mode they are dealt with in Logic, and argumentation cannot be the adequate object of Logic.

The second opinion is of Nominalists — that **bare words** are the proper object of Logic. But this equally falls far from the truth: since Logic deals with things themselves — definition, division, and argumentation — not of words and names only — therefore words cannot be the proper object of Logic.

Confirmed: no science is of uncertain things, and what can have diverse being in the world; but words are like chameleons, more mutable — not only for diverse nations, but in one, and the same for diverse times, as experience makes clear, notably in our France: therefore Logic, which we count among sciences superior to bare words, cannot be: and therefore bare words are not the proper object of Logic.

Final Section — What Finally Is the Object of Dialectic

I respond: it is **the operation of the intellect, insofar as it can be directed toward the investigation of truth, through precepts of differing**. This response is manifestly clear from the other positions rejected — for nothing remains which can be the object of Dialectic unless this very operation of the intellect, as directable, and therefore it is properly constituted.

So that this proposition may be more easily explained, and better confirmed — the following are noted:

Briefly to be repeated from the Compendium, that the action of the intellect is triple.

The first is called **simple apprehension** — the bare apprehension of a thing, without affirmation and negation — as if you say, behold good.

Second is **judgment** — one affirming or denying of another — as man is animal, man is not horse. Which is called composition because it joins one with another and connects them — as animal with man; or division because it denies one from another and separates — as horse from man.

Finally third is **discourse** or **reasoning** — one deducing from another, by means of which man is capable of the discipline of Logic.

These being premised, that the action of the intellect as directable through precepts of differing is the legitimate object, is proven. That it is the legitimate object of Logic to which all things that are treated in Logic and can be explained refer, and by obtaining which it conquers, and nothing per itself beyond it advances — but the actions of the intellect in Logic are all referred, and nothing besides that per itself in Logic is intended: since Logic explains nothing, what does not immediately serve for directing the operation of the intellect, whether of the first, of the second, or of the third — and having followed this direction, it has, and conquered — therefore the operation of the intellect in Logic is referred, and nothing besides per itself in Logic is intended — and it is the adequate object of Dialectic.

On the End of Logic — Chapter II

From the many divisions of ends, which we shall somewhat more fully explain elsewhere, we here select those only pertaining to our institution.

1. There is the end of the operator or artificer, and the end of the work or art.

The end of the **operator or artificer** is that which the operator and artificer intends — as the honorable and acquisition of wealth, in the philosopher who publicly professes Philosophy for the sake of honor and wealth.

The end of the **work or art** is that which the art itself intends, as health in medicine, and the directing of intellectual operations in Logic.

2. Division: the end, or rather subdivision, is the end of the art *for whose sake*, and the end of the art *for the sake of itself and its own favor*.

The end **for whose sake** is that, in whose utility the art itself is turned — as the health of man, not however only in the mode by which Logic is referred; but also of all other sciences, since to their utility it contributes, and for their sake has been instituted.

The end truly **for its own favor** is called that, because of which the art itself was invented, and toward which the art itself tends — as in medicine the aforesaid health, in Logic the directing of intellectual operations.

3. The end of art for its own favor is divided into **proximate** or **immediate**, and **remote** or **mediate**.

The **proximate** or **immediate** end is that which proximately and with no other intermediary is primarily intended in the art itself — as in medicine the aforesaid return of health to the sick.

The **remote** indeed, and **mediate**, is that which most proximately and with no other intermediary cannot be held in the art — as in medicine that health, which cannot be restored after cognition of the remedies.

Lastly the end of art for its own favor is divided into **total** or **adequate**, and **partial** or **inadequate**.

The **total and adequate** end is that, by the sole favor of which the art was invented — as in Physics the cognition of the whole natural body.

The **partial and inadequate** end, whose favor only partly and not wholly the art was invented — as in Physics the sole cognition of the heavens.

These being posited, the true end of Logic is established:

First Proposition: *The proximate end of Logic is to know the actions of the intellect, and how they can be directed — the remote is to direct them.*

Proven: above all things Logic must know the actions of the intellect, and how they can be directed toward the investigation of truth, then with these known to direct them — therefore the proximate end of Logic will be, to know the operations of the intellect, and how they can be directed — the remote however, to direct them itself.

Second Proposition: *The partial proximate end of Logic is the cognition of this action of the intellect, and how it ought to be directed.*

Partial, because not only this action of the intellect is intended, but the other actions also of the intellect are to be cognized. Proximate however, because from the preceding proposition it follows that to know the actions of the intellect, and how they can be directed, is the proximate end of Logic.

Final Proposition: *The remote partial end of Logic is the directing of this action of the intellect.*

Remote because Logic remotely only intends the actions of the intellect in directing — namely the partial, because it does not only intend, as is clear from what was said. This end is also the final Prelude of Logic.

PART I OF THE LOGICAL ORGANON

On Simple Terms Pertaining to the First Operation of the Intellect

PREFACE

Just as the concert of strings in music produces the first harmony from the variety and skillful blending of different and dissimilar sounds — so in our Dialectic, from the varied cognition of many things (which will be explained with the favor of God), a gratifying harmony of the most refined things is born to the ears of the mind.

The first concert will be around the primary operation of the mind, which the accurate contemplation of **Universals** and **Categories**, or simple terms, will effect.

The second will be around the second act of the intellect.

The third, most agreeable of all, will arise from the ordered variety of argumentation, and will gratify with a singular pleasure the single operation of our mind.

And so the whole of our Dialectic is three-fold:

- First, **on simple terms**, pertaining to the first operation of the intellect.
- Second, **on the proposition**, or second act of the mind.
- Third, **on argumentation**, or the third operation of the intellect.

And because the doctrine of this first part is the amplest (since it comprehends what the Introduction of Porphyry and the Book of Categories contain), for the sake of ease, as the proper order requires, we shall treat it in treatises, treatises in disputations, disputations in sections, and so descending, divide.

Moreover, because the text of both Porphyry and Aristotle has been explained in so many ways and so fortunately that nothing seems able to be added, we shall set aside our own commentaries and set forth our method, totally abandoning that nearly useless lengthy interpretation we taught in our schools, and omitting nothing of those things which in our context can be accommodated.

TRACTATE I

Prior Tractate of This Part on Universals

First Disputation — On Them in Common

Section One — On the Name of Universal and the Various Acceptations of Its Name

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Universal, from the force of the word, signifies something common to many — as Horse, which nature is common and equally convenient to all singular individuals.

Universal is called **complex** or **composite**, which is a certain general proposition — as *all man is animal*; another **simple**, which is a simple term convening to many — as *man* universally.

The simple universal is further called:

- **Universal in causing** — that which produces various effects in nature, as God, the sun, and other universal causes.
- **Universal in signifying** — that which many things signify, as the word dog, which signifies the celestial dog, the terrestrial, and the marine.
- **Universal in representing** — that which has the power of representing many things, as the idea of a house in the mind of the architect, representing stones, timber, magnitude, figure, and all other things necessary for building.
- **Universal in being** — that which communicates one essence to many, as the Platonic idea, which like a seal of many things was supposed to concur in one common nature; but of this universal more will be said later.
- Finally, **universal in predicating** — which is ours, and to be explained in this tractate — that which is taken up to be predicated of many, or attributed to many, as *man* to the singular men who are truly denoted by the name man, and are properly men.

Section II — On the Existence of the Universal in Predication

Question I — Whether the Universal Is Given in Fact

Democritus and others, whom Aristotle cites in *1 Metaphysics, ch. 6*, following the judgment of the senses, and believing that nothing except the singular falls under the senses, plainly affirmed that no universals are given.

But the whole Peripatetic family rises against them, constituting universals with the greatest consensus.

Proven first: natural sciences are given, as we shall prove in treating of demonstration, and it is sufficiently clear from the innate desire of knowing in us, which must not be vain — therefore universals are given.

The consequence is shown: natural science is only universal, since first because Aristotle teaches it in *1 Posterior text 8*, then because science is only of things necessary and permanent which can never be otherwise — but things only universal are necessary and permanent; singular things are fluid and perishable, they come into being immediately and immediately perish — therefore if natural sciences are given, universals must also be admitted.

Proven second: some nature common to many is given in nature, as the axiom of natural experience: potentiality precedes act, and from the experience of others it is confirmed — it is earlier that something can be done than that it be done in act, and thus in nature is given aptitude to existing in many before the singular existence of them.

Objection: whatever is perceived in the world is singular — therefore nothing universal is given.

Proven antecedent: whatever exists is singular, as all admit, and what exists in the world is singular — therefore whatsoever is perceived in the world is singular.

I distinguish the antecedent: whatever exists in singulars, in those exists — that is singular which exists per itself, and in those things themselves, I concede; that it exists merely per aliud, and in a sign, I deny. Now I say universals indeed exist, not per themselves, and in direct act, but only in singulars and through singulars — and therefore only exist in singulars, not per themselves, and only exist in singulars in direct act — not in a sign. Now the truth is that in this world, if universals exist, they exist in singulars per themselves; in a sign, however, they are everywhere exercised and are the objects of universal exercises — but by singulars, by Petrum, Paulum, and others, only thus their truth which is universal exists.

Question II

Whether the Universal Is Formed by the Operation of the Intellect

This is that most celebrated and much-debated controversy in the schools of Philosophers, namely whether the universal nature is rendered universal only through the benefit of the intellect — that is, whether it separates the common nature from singulars, considering it without particular conditions — or whether human nature which exists in these particular men becomes universal before all operation of the intellect.

The first opinion on this matter is that of D. Thomas and all Thomists — that Nature is not universal unless through the operation of the intellect abstracting it from singulars. For example, human nature is not universal in Peter, unless through the operation of the intellect abstracting it from Peter himself, and considering it without the proper differences of Peter himself. For thus the intellect conceives the concept of Petriety, and nature begins to be universal, since the intellect thus conceives it that both humanity and Petriety in Peter can be distinguished from each other — not from the part of the thing, but are one and the same most intimately, only distinguished by the intellect.

The second opinion, diametrically opposed, is that of Scotus and all Scotists — that nature itself is universal in singulars, with every operation of the intellect removed. For example, human nature in Peter and Paul, before any operation of the intellect has conceived it, is, as it were, already abstracted from those — thus Scotus says the universal nature in Peter is not to be abstracted from Peter by the operation of the intellect, but the intellect rather receives it from Peter and Paul already abstracted.

Our third opinion partly agrees with the second, partly disagrees — it agrees because it acknowledges the universal nature in singulars before the operation of the intellect; it disagrees because it holds that universal nature is stated in singulars before the operation of the intellect, but not before the singulars themselves.

These sentences being put forward more distinctly, certain things must be noted.

Note first: the universal can be composed of two things — from **nature**, which is called universal nature (such as human nature), and from **universality**, or aptitude to existing in many, by which nature itself is said to be universal. Just as white is composed of the thing itself and of whiteness, from which it is denominated.

Hence the universal can be considered three-fold. **First**, the nature formally considered, called universal materially. **Second**, the formal universality itself, through which such nature efficaciously exists as universal, called formal universality or the form of

universal nature. **Third**, from the aggregate of nature and universality, called the aggregate universal — just as white can be considered as the wall itself, denominated white (material), or the whiteness through which the wall is denominated white (formal), or the aggregate of wall and whiteness (aggregate).

Note second: that aptitude of universal nature is not to be understood as real Physical aptitude, which must naturally be able to be actualized — but aptitude of not repugnance, by which the nature itself is understood as able to be communicated to many inferiors. This observation is clear — because the nature of the Sun is rightly said to be universal, although it has no real and Physical aptitude to be communicated to many Suns, since this is only because it has no repugnance, if several Suns were found in the omnipotent hand.

Note third: the Universal in triple state can be considered — **before things** or singulars, **in things** or singulars, and **after things** or singulars.

The universal **before things** is the nature according to itself, apt to inesse to many, before it exists in those — like human nature, according to its own essence, is universal insofar as it is apt only to existing in singular men, before any intellect has conceived it in the existing things — as bare, existing naked, like the naked child just born who has not yet received the first garment.

This state of nature before things is distinguished from that state which the Thomists constitute in **natural indifference**, prior by nature's order, which is contracted to singulars. For that state of indifference of the Thomists says nature is not simply indifferent to various inferiors and singulars, but simultaneously to both universality and singularity, and supposes it stripped of every mode, with the sole essential grades — for example, human nature with the sole grades of entity, substance, body, living, sentient, rational — not with the aptitude of existing in many, or singularity, or determination to any one individual. Whereas our state, which we constitute in nature before things, says nature has in itself a total aptitude to existing in many, which constitutes the essence of universal nature, and not yet singularity vested, which is contracted from inferiors.

Hence a double difference can be observed: first, that our state truly comes to be, in which nature is universal and not contracted to singulars — as will be confirmed below. The Thomist state however never comes to be in reality itself, in which nature is neither singular nor universal — since the intellect alone, abstracting everything, can conceive it purely stripped, without singularity and without universality, only looking at its essence.

The other difference is that in our state the nature truly comes to be universal, and does not contain singularity — whereas the Thomist state never truly exists, since nature in that state is neither singular nor universal — but that is only an intellectual abstraction.

The universal **in the thing itself**, or **in singulars**, is the same nature, but existing in singulars — as nature truly exists in Peter, Paul, Socrates, and other singular men, and is called universal nature in singulars vested with singularity, just as the vested child who has put on a garment.

The universal finally **after things**, or **after singulars**, is the universal nature itself, considered by the intellect separated from particular conditions with which it is conjoined — as human nature considered by the intellect without the particular differences of Peter and Paul — namely Petriety and Paulinity — with which it is conjoined. Either inwardly necessary, so that it is rendered universal, or only so that it may be cognized as universal — and is called nature denominated as human, stripped by the pure operation of the intellect of singularity. Although it is less properly said that the pure operation of the intellect strips nature of singularity — since singularity is not removed from it, neither really in the singulars, nor by reason and cogitation, since with no one thinking it is distinct from singularity, and truly universal, as will immediately be proven — but only improperly, insofar as the intellect conceives it without the external vestige of singularity, with which it could consider it — just as it is said to denominate the wall with whiteness, not because it causes the distinction of the wall from whiteness, but because it conceives the wall itself without whiteness.

Question III

How Many Kinds of Universal There Are

Note first: triple unity is given — the first **numerical**, by which some one singular and individual thing is said to be one, as Peter; the second **specific**, by which all singulars of some species are said to be one, as all singular men are said to be one in the species of man; the third **generic**, by which all species of some genus are said to be one, as all species of animal are said to be one in animal.

Now here we do not deal with numerical unity of Logic — since it suffices that Logic can be multiplied by multiplicity of subjects, or the intellect in which it is found, and so the Logic in Peter is numerically distinct from the Logic Paul has been instructed in, and so of the others. The only question is whether to Logic itself **specific** unity is to be attributed — so that Logic alone is immediately divided in the species, as man in singular men who are only numerically discrepant — or indeed **generic**, so that Logic must be distributed in distinct species.

Note second: the specific or generic unity of sciences must be derived from the formal object — so that a science is said to be one in species, whose formal object is one in species; and those sciences are said to be one in genus, whose formal object is one in genus.

Note third: of any science the object is double — **material** and **formal**. Material is the thing in which the science itself is occupied. Formal is the mode or reason by which that material is considered — as in Physics: *natural body insofar as it is natural*.

Note fourth: the object is also double — one **total**, around which the whole science is occupied and beyond which it cannot proceed, as natural body in Physics; another **partial**, which is only a part of the total object, as heavenly body. And this partial object is further double — **primary and chief**, which is the principal part of the total object, as God in Metaphysics; and **less chief**, which is the less principal part, as a lower intelligence with respect to Metaphysics.

Note lastly: five most powerful conditions are required for the object of any science. First, that it be **certain and necessary**. Second, that it be **not singular**. Third, that it **truly have principles and properties demonstrable of it**. Fourth, that **all things in the science's consideration be recalled to it**. The last condition is that the **object be one, and definable by a single definition**.

With all these noted, the question is briefly answered: **Logic is one species, or one specific unity of science.**

Proven: science is of the same unity as its formal object is one. But the formal object of Logic is one in species — it is that very reason according to which it considers the operations of the mind, insofar as they may be directed toward the investigation of truth. Therefore Logic is one species, or one specific science.

Section III — On the Essence of the Universal

Question I — On Its Definitions

Among the many definitions given by Porphyry and others, the most commonly received is: **a universal is that which by nature is apt to be in many and to be predicated of many**.

Note from this: **being in many** pertains to its existence, and **being predicated of many** pertains to its signification. For a universal, as universal, must both exist in many things, and be able to be spoken of many things.

These two however differ — for something can be in many without being predicated of many, as the soul is in many parts of the body but is not predicated of the parts. And something can be predicated of many without being in many, as an equivocal name. But the universal must fulfill both conditions.

First proposition: the definition of the universal given by Porphyry is to be accepted.

For the universal, truly taken, must both be apt to be in many — that is, to exist in many — and to be predicated of many. And this Porphyry's definition captures: it is that which by nature is apt to be in many and predicated of many.

Question II

On the Existence of the Universal

As to whether universals exist — we have already treated this above in Section II. Here we ask specifically about their **essence**: what precisely the universal is, as it exists in singulars.

First proposition: universal nature before the existence of singulars has its whole essence, because it has the single aptitude of existing in many, which is the essence of universal nature. Therefore it is truly, in that state, universal.

Proven second: sciences are only of eternal things and perpetual truths; but only of universal things are sciences — therefore universal things are eternal — therefore they precede the existence of singulars.

The adversaries respond that universal things are indeed eternal, but not as to what is real.

But against this: if universal natures are not eternally real, then in reality they are nothing — which the false consequence shows: since sciences are of universals as of real things, those universals must be real and eternal, and therefore must antedate the existence of singulars in real things.

Objection first: No total can be without its parts. But the universal, as a total, contains singulars as its parts. Therefore the universal cannot be without singulars, or before them.

I respond, conceding the greater, and distinguishing the minor: the universal is a total containing singulars potentially — that is, which it must be able to contain by its power — I concede; actually — that is, which it must actually contain — I deny. Therefore the universal can exist before actual singulars exist.

Objection second: if universal nature is admitted before the existence of singulars, it will be the Platonic idea, separate from singulars — which we reject — therefore the universal is not to be admitted before the existence of singulars.

The consequence is to be denied — for the Platonic idea, which we shall reject below, was posited before the existence of singulars both according to essence and according to existence. We however constitute the universal nature before singulars only according to essence, not according to existence.

Objection third: if universal nature is given before the existence of singulars, then God will be admitted from it.

Proven: whatever is being by itself and independent is God. But that universal real nature before the existence of singulars, if given, must be being by itself and independent, because it would depend on nothing from which it received its origin — therefore such a universal nature, real before the existence of singulars, if given, will be God.

The antecedent is to be denied. To the proof, the greater must be distinguished: being by itself and independent is God, if it truly exists in act, I concede; if only by formal essence, I deny. For we state the universal natures to be before the existence of singulars only according to essence, not according to existence in act.

Furthermore, it can be said with greater probability: that universal essence, though it not depend as such per itself, yet to exist, it depends through another on God — because it does not exist, nor can it exist, except in singulars and through singulars produced by God as from a first cause.

Objection fourth: that essence of universals is either created or uncreated: if created, therefore existing, because creation terminates at existence and confers it, therefore singular, therefore not before the existence of singulars. If uncreated, since only God is uncreated, therefore it is nothing, a mere fiction.

I respond by denying the antecedent. Properly speaking, that essence of the universal which we acknowledge before the existence of singulars is neither uncreated — since truly it is not created, because it is not in fact created — nor yet is it properly actually existing. But it is an entity in act. You marvel at the distinction between *being actually* and *being in act*. Let me explain: to be an entity in act is to be without fiction and without operation of the mind — as a rose in winter is an entity in act, having its essence, and can be defined by its essential definition. To be actually however is to be in another state, differently — namely outside the power of causes: for when a thing exists only in the power of causes, before it exists, with the beginning of its existence it is placed outside the power of causes — and so it is in another state, and so differently, in one word: *actually*.

Hence two things follow. **First:** to be in act is wider than to be actually — for though whatever is actually exists in act, not however whatever is in act actually exists — but to be in act is like a common genus to those which exist and are actually, and to those which do not exist and are not actually, but yet can exist and be actually, as our universal essences before the existence of singulars.

Second following: this mode of speaking is not convenient — *existence is the mode constituting a thing actually* — but in place of the particle *actually* is to be substituted the particle *in act*, by which two things are said to be in act: one from the act they participate, and from the act of essence, and the other from the act of existence — but since only *actually* is said from actuality, which is proper to existence alone, properly through existence it is said to be actually.

Third Proposition: *Nature existing in the singulars themselves — for example, human nature in Peter and Paul — is truly and formally universal before all operation of the intellect.*

This is the position of Scotus and all Scotists, against D. Thomas and his disciples.

Proven first: nature existing in singulars — for example, human in Peter and others — is distinguished from the part of the thing, and outside all operation of the intellect, from the proper conditions of the singulars themselves, from their own individual conditions — namely Petriety — otherwise Petrus would be of the essence of all men, and so every man would be Petrus, which is altogether absurd. Therefore nature existing in singulars is distinguished from the part of the thing and outside all operation of the intellect from the individual conditions and differences of singulars.

The consequence is clear: because if nature, even existing in some particular, is distinct from the part of the thing — that is, apart from all cogitation of the intellect — from the particularity itself, then nature in Peter is universal, since the sole identity of common nature with individual differences impedes universality.

The antecedent is shown: nature existing in singulars — for example, human in Peter — otherwise Petrus would be of the essence of all men, and so every man would be Petrus, which is altogether absurd — therefore nature existing in singulars is distinguished from the part of the thing, and outside all operation of the intellect, from the individual conditions and differences of singulars.

The common response is to deny the antecedent — and to its proof, to say that nature abstracted from singulars, does not include in itself any cogitation of singulars — for example, human nature abstracted from Peter does not include the cogitation of Peter himself — yet it is so intimately conjoined with it, that if it be abstracted, even through the mind nothing more in that singular remains intelligible — abstracted not from the part of the thing, from the singulars, but only through the benefit of the intellect.

But against this: beyond the common grade of humanity, Peter says something real from the part of the thing, by which he differs from Paul and other men — just as beyond the common reason of animal, man still includes some degree, namely rationality, by whose benefit he is distinguished from other things. And no legitimate reason can be assigned why in man, beyond the common grade of animal, some peculiar degree is included by which he differs from brute animals, but not in Peter, beyond the common grade of humanity, some peculiar degree is included by which he is distinguished from other particular men.

The common response is, that that difference of particular and individualizing of Peter — just as rationality is the specific difference of man — is difficult to say what it is, and so the philosophers do not easily explain it.

I respond — that the difference of particulars and individualizing of Peter is to be a certain real entity, from the part of the thing, added to the common nature, and such

that it makes human nature in Peter contract and determined to Peter — similarly to the way in which rationality adds something real beyond the common grade of animal, and so makes it determined to man specifically.

And Peter differs from Paul and other men — just as man is distinguished from brute animals by the specific difference — by this individualizing of Peter, which is a certain real grade, by the part of the thing, contracted and making human nature determined to Peter singularly — and not difficult to understand, nor requiring proof more than the difficulty of the matter admits.

Section IV — On the Affections of the Universal

Question I — Whether Universal Nature Is Really Separated from Particulars, or Is a Platonic Idea

This section is to be briefly resolved.

First proposition: universal nature before the existence of singulars is not really separated from singulars, as the Platonic idea.

This is shown: if universal nature were really separated from singulars and existing before them, it would be a Platonic idea — but the Platonic idea is rejected by all — therefore universal nature is not really separated from singulars.

The Platonic idea is rejected because: such an idea from Peter and Paul abstracted, does not include in itself the cogitation of man — this is granted; thus however conjoined with it inwardly, that if it be abstracted even through the mind, nothing more in the singular remains intelligible — it is not abstracted from the part of the thing from singulars, but only through the benefit of the intellect.

Furthermore: the universal nature before the existence of singulars is not created, because truly it is not created — nor uncreated, since only God is uncreated — therefore the universal nature before singulars truly exists not as a Platonic idea.

And: if the universal natures are not real and eternal, then nothing exists — false consequence, since the sciences which are of universals would be of nothing — therefore universals must be real and eternal, though not as Platonic ideas separated from singulars.

Objection: the universal, as any total, contains singulars as its parts — therefore the universal cannot be before its parts.

I respond, distinguishing: the universal contains singulars potentially — that is, it must be able to contain them by its power — I concede; actually — that is, it must actually contain them — I deny.

Second proposition: universal nature is truly and properly universal, before all singular existence.

Proven first: for the reason of the formal universal, two things are required: aptitude to existing in many, and unity of essence. But in nature before the existence of singulars,

these two are found: therefore before the existence of singulars, nature is truly and formally universal.

The minor is proven as to aptitude: nature has aptitude to existing in many before their existence, as the axiom — potentiality precedes act — confirms by experience. It is earlier that something can be done than that it be done in act, and so in nature is given aptitude to existing in many before the singular existence of them.

Nor is the common response of value — that this aptitude is not proximate, which is required for the reason of universals, but only remote. For they respond thus: Nature is apt to be in many, only through proximate potentiality, by which nature is understood so constituted that it includes no particular differences. But if they deny this, then even the aptitude collected through the benefit of the intellect will not be proximate — since the intellect precisely constitutes nature in such a mode that it includes no proper differences of individuals. If they concede it, then the question is answered — that aptitude of nature before the existence of singulars truly is proximate.

Nor does the response please of those who solve the reason thus: Nature is apt to be in many before the work of the intellect — *manifold* they say, *one and the same*, I deny. I am not pleased with this answer, since it does not at all respond to the question. For I would ask of them: when nature is manifold in many, is it in individuals and singulars, or not? If the former, then the reason given is not resolved, which does not constitute universal nature in singulars, but before them. If the latter, then whence arises that multiplicity in such a nature, considered before the existence of singulars — it cannot certainly be assigned, since only the individual differences of individuals can produce this multiplicity. But in that state, nature does not include such differences — therefore it cannot be said to be manifold in many, and therefore it will be one — from which the minor of our argument is proven, as to unity.

Proven second: sciences are only of eternal things and perpetual truths — but only of universals are sciences — therefore universals are eternal — therefore they precede the existence of singulars.

The adversaries respond that universal things are indeed eternal, but not according to what is real.

But against this: if universal natures according to what is real are not eternal, in reality they are nothing — and it seems as if there would be no reason why so much contention of mind and so much labor conspired to them — therefore those universal natures must be eternal according to real existence.

Finally this our proposition is confirmed by the reasons by which in Metaphysics we proved the essences of things to be prior to existence — since that can only be understood of the essences of universals, because each singular, by the very fact that it is singular, exists — it certainly and evidently follows that the universal essences precede the existence of singulars.

You ask: what remains of the grade of Petriety, which we say remains beyond the common grade of humanity in Peter?

I respond: that particular and individualizing difference of Peter is, just as rationality is the specific difference of man, so it is called substance, but incomplete — just as the form of this matter is the specific difference — which will afterward be more clearly declared.

From this doctrine concerning the Universal in particulars before all operation of the intellect, many questions which are customarily treated at length are answered without difficulty. The first is by what abstraction nature is abstracted from singulars — whether really, so that it is truly removed from the singulars themselves, or by false abstraction of reason which denies it to be in singulars, or by abstraction of precision by which the intellect conceives it without the conditions of individuals and their differences, as the color of an apple is conceived without its flavor. This first question, from the doctrine of the universal from the part of the thing without operation of the intellect, is easily answered — because according to that doctrine the universal nature is not to be abstracted really from singulars, since it always remains in singulars. Nor by false abstraction of reason, which would deny it to be in singulars — since that would be false, it truly remaining in them. But by abstraction of precision, by which the intellect conceives it without the conditions of individuals and their differences.

The second question is answered with equal ease: by what operation of the intellect does the universal become universal — whether by absolute abstraction alone, which abstracts from singulars, as human nature from Peter and Paul — or by comparative abstraction, which compares it with them. Since with absolute negation stated, the universal becomes universal by no operation of the intellect — negated also is that it be made either by absolute or comparative operation — this controversy is only between those who hold the universal to be made universal by the operation of the intellect.

Third and finally: in what mode does the intellect make the Universal, according to our doctrine — equally in one word: the universal is absolutely not made by the intellect, and asserting, before every operation of the intellect itself, the universal is found in singulars.

QUESTION III — How Many Kinds of Universal There Are

In constituting the number of Universals there is great dissension. Some set them at ten, following the common number of the Categories. Others at two only — Genus and Species. Others, and indeed most commonly, at five: Genus, Species, Difference, Property, and Accident. We finally, and most truly, hold them to be eight — and this number we explain and confirm by our own method.

There are as many universals as there are proper modes of predicating of many. But there are eight proper modes of predicating of many: therefore there are eight universals. The major is evident — from the proper modes of predicating of many, the universals themselves are derived. Therefore since those are the proper modes of predicating, as many as they are, so many must there be of universals. The minor is proven as follows.

Whatever is predicated of another is predicated either essentially or accidentally. If essentially, or in what something is — either in what simply, meaning about what many things of one species are distinct, as animal of man and brute — and this is **Genus** — or of many things alone numerically distinct, as man of Peter and John — and this is **Species**. If in what something is, by means of the genus and through many species differing, as sensible is predicated of animals by means of the intermediate of man and brute — this is the **generic Difference** — or of many things by means of their species alone numerically distinct, as rational of men by means of the singular men — and this is the **specific Difference**, properly so called.

Those however that are predicated accidentally, or are reciprocated with that of which they are predicated — as risible with man, since whatever is risible is man, and conversely — or are not reciprocated. If they reciprocate, they are predicated either of the genus and of the intermediates of many species differing, as sensible of animals and of all the species of animals and all their individuals — this is the **generic Property** — or of one single species and its intermediates among many species only numerically distinct, as risible of men and by interposition of singular men only — and this is the **specific Property**.

Finally those that are not reciprocally predicated are predicated of individuals of many species, and consequently also of many species, and even of the genus — as white of Peter, Bucephalus, stone, and other individuals of diverse species, both of animals and of other bodies — and this is the **generic Accident** — or only of one species and its individuals, as the dialectical quality of the sole species of man and its individuals — and this is the **specific Accident**.

Therefore in these eight modes of predicating of many — namely Genus, Species, generic Difference, specific Difference, generic Property, specific Property, generic Accident, and specific Accident — are contained the eight universals. So that these may be more easily understood, we append a summary table.

There occur adversaries who say that no distinct species of universal should be constituted from generic and specific Difference, nor from generic and specific Property, nor finally from generic and specific Accident — since they are always predicated in the same mode. Difference whether generic or specific is always predicated in what something essentially is. Property is in what is accidental and reciprocal. Accident finally is in what is accidental and non-reciprocal.

But against this: although generic and specific Difference convene in the common and universal, their modes of predicating are nonetheless diverse, as we taught above — and thus two distinct universals are rightly constituted.

Third objection: Every universal must be predicated of many — but Differences and Properties are not predicated of many, but only of one in number, as sensible of animals, rational of men, quantity of body — therefore Difference, Property, and Accident are not universals, and consequently not eight.

I simply deny the major: it is only required for the universal that it be apt to be predicated of many, whether those many are great or small — and this condition that the universal be predicated of inferiors is granted by the adversaries freely and without foundation, and without citation negated.

SECTION III — On the Essence of the Universal

QUESTION I — On Its Definitions

Two definitions of the Universal are commonly given. One accurate, essential, and metaphysical, derived from Aristotle, first Metaphysics chapter 3: **A universal is one apt to be in many, vocal and divisible.** Another accidental and more logical, which is more commonly assigned in this context: **A universal is apt to be predicated of many vocally and divisibly.**

This latter definition of the Universal — accidental and logical — is called so because it is the prior, truly essential and metaphysical, that the essential definition must be given through what is essential to the thing defined. But this posterior one is not of such kind, since it is delivered through aptitude for predicating of many — which is not the essential universal, but only accidental — namely the property itself remaining from the aptitude of existing in many, through which the prior definition is delivered. For it is prior to be in something than to be affirmed or asserted of it — just as it is prior that human nature be in Peter than that of Peter we say, Peter is man. Therefore this posterior definition of the Universal, which is delivered through aptitude for predicating of many, will be accidental and logical — the prior truly essential and metaphysical.

Hence some distinguish a two-fold Universal — one in being, namely the nature itself insofar as it is apt to be in many — another in predicating, namely that same universal nature but defined materially as the thing defined, while universality itself is the formal definition, the defined by-what. Declared: Universal nature, for example human, according to its own essence considered, must be defined as rational animal capable — but as truly universal, it is defined as that which is apt to be in many. Therefore since the universal nature is apt to be in many, what is defined here is not defined according to its own essence, but according to its universality.

Confirmed by example: when the cause of definition is taken as that which flows from essence, that definition is not of the cause according to its own essence, but only as cause. Since when all causes of the same essence convene, as God, the Sun, and Man are all three causes, if they were all said to be defined as such, they should have the same definition — but no one says this. Therefore by equal reasoning, with universal nature defined as what is apt to be in many, it is defined not according to its own essence but according to its aptitude for universality.

QUESTION TWO — What Is Defined by the Allotted Definition of the Universal

I respond: the nature of the Universal is defined not according to its own essence considered, but according to its aptitude for being in many, which is its universality — the thing defined being the material universal, universality being the formal definition. Declared: Universal nature, for example human, according to its own essence, must be defined as a rational animal capable of reason — but as truly universal, it is defined as that which is apt to be in many. Therefore the universal nature here is defined by what is apt to be in many, not according to its essence, but according to its universality.

Confirmed: when the cause of definition is taken as what flows from essence itself, that definition is not of the nature according to its own essence considered, but only as cause. Since when all universals convene in the definition — as animal, whiteness, science, and others — they convene in the definition of the universal, but if all these are the same essence as each other, that is plainly absurd. Therefore by equal reasoning with universal nature, the definition delivers what is apt to be in many — not according to its essence, but according to its universal aptitude — and therefore only this is the formal definition.

QUESTION III — Whether the Nature of the Universal Is Only a Word or a Concept of the Mind

The Nominalists affirm this, but the whole Peripatetic school refutes them, asserting that universals are not bare words or mental concepts or formal qualities to which no real natures underlie — but real and true natures signified by words and expressed by formal concepts. For example, man being universal is not only the word "man" or an unnamed concept of the mind, but some nature declared by that name and by the concept of the mind.

Proven first: There is no science of bare names and words, as already proven — therefore there is given only science of real things and natures, not however of singulars, as has been shown — therefore there is given science of real things and natures that are universal, and consequently universals are real things and natures, not bare words and concepts of the mind.

Proven second: Man, for example, is universal in that mode by which it can be communicated to many. But it can be communicated according to essence — the essence of man, namely humanity, convenes to all men, and not only the name, as all understand — therefore man is universal, and similarly of any universal, it must be said not only a voice, but a real nature.

Finally: Universals are eternal and immutable, as we have already shown — but voices are not of this kind, as in the Logic preliminaries against the Nominalists we proved — therefore universals are not voices, but real natures.

QUESTION IV — Whether Universals Are Corporeal or Incorporeal

I respond briefly: the Universal is corporeal which exists in corporeal particulars — incorporeal, which exists in incorporeal particulars.

Body and Spirit are like the two most general members of substance, their combined scope completing all bodies and all spirits — therefore that is rightly called universal corporeal which exists in corporeal particulars, and incorporeal which exists in incorporeal singulars.

SECTION IV — On the Affections of Universals

QUESTION ONE — Whether Universal Nature Is Really Separated from Particulars, or Is a Platonic Idea

Aristotle attributes the opinion of setting universal nature really separated from singulars to his teacher Plato, and wishes him to have held that human nature was truly separated from Peter, Paul, and the other many people — and existing outside them, that he called an idea — from which, while remaining the same, all things, essences and forms, are mutually exchanged — no less than the same seal impresses various images in wax.

Justinus Martyr in his oration to the Gentiles, Tertullian in his books on the Soul, and many others, rightly reprehend Aristotle in this, that he maliciously imputed to his teacher Plato the opinion about ideas and the nature of universals.

Whatever the case, whether that was Plato's opinion or whether Aristotle imposed it upon him somewhat unfairly — this opinion about ideas and the natures of universals being really separated from singulars is rightly exploded by all Peripatetics.

First reason against that fictitious idea: what is predicated of something cannot be really distinct from it. But universal natures are predicated of singulars — for example, animal and man of Peter and Paul, because Peter and Paul are said to be animals and men — therefore universal natures are not really separated from singulars. The major is proven: what exists in something essentially cannot be really separated from it. What is predicated of something, at least essentially, is in it essentially — for the mode of predicating follows the mode of being, a thing existing in another in some mode being able to be affirmed of it. It is prior that human nature be in Peter than that of Peter we say, Peter is man — therefore what is predicated of something, at least essentially, cannot be really separated from it.

Second reason: whatever exists outside God exists either by itself or through another produced by God himself — if by itself, it is singular; if through another, it is universal existing in singulars, as man in Peter, who is called man because he was produced not only by God, but either through some other particular man or some particular woman — therefore no nature exists outside singulars, and consequently neither does that fictitious Platonic idea.

Objection of the Platonists: the incorruptible and eternal cannot exist in perishable and corruptible things — but Universals, from what was said, are eternal and incorruptible, while singulars are fluid and perishable — therefore they cannot exist in singulars, and therefore must be really separated from them as existing on their own.

I respond by distinguishing the major: the incorruptible and eternal cannot exist in perishable things, if incorruptible and eternal according to existence more than according to essence — I concede this. If according to essence alone — I deny. Now when we say Universals are incorruptible and eternal, this is understood only by reason of essence, because things have their essences from eternity. Man, for example, is from eternity a rational animal — not however by reason of existence, since Universals do not exist except in singulars, and when the first singulars began to exist, they too exist, and they exist as long as those singulars do. From which the commonly proposed question is resolved — in what way and sense Universals are eternal — in one word concluding: they are eternal by essence, but not by existence.

QUESTION II — Whether Universals Are Everywhere

I respond briefly: Universals are not everywhere positively, but only negatively. This response is explained and at the same time proven. That is said to be positively everywhere which occupies every location, as God does, and as a body would if it were given that it would fill all space by its mass. That is truly negatively said to be everywhere which is found in no certain location strictly, but can exist in whatever designable location. Universals do not fill every location, nor are they even in any certain location, and thus they are not positively everywhere. But they can exist in whatever designable location, since they exist only in singulars — which occupy no whole space, and yet can be indifferently present everywhere — therefore universals are not everywhere positively, but only negatively.

FINAL QUESTION — On the Conformity of Universals Among Themselves

From what has been said, the universal can be considered two-fold — materially for universal nature, such as human nature — and formally for universality itself.

Furthermore, from what is to be said below in the section on categories, the conformity of entities is triple. They are called **synonymous** among those which convene by one name alone. **Homonymous** among those which convene by name only and not by nature — as celestial dog, terrestrial dog, and marine dog convene only in the name of dog. **Synonymous** among those which convene both by name and by nature — as man and brute in animal. And **analogous** among those which convene by name and by some connection in nature, though not the same connection — as animal, drink, and urine which convene in the name of healthy, and by some pact in nature, though not the same — since the ratio of the health of an animal is different from that of a drink or urine.

These two things being posited, the following is established:

First Proposition: Universals considered in the first mode, among themselves convene synonymously.

Proven: all substantial as well as accidental natures can convene in synonymy, as we shall prove in the section on categories against D. Thomas — but Universals regarded in the first mode, namely for the things themselves which are said to be universals, are substantial natures — as animal is the genus of substance, and whiteness accident. Therefore Universals in this first mode taken among themselves convene synonymously.

Second Proposition: Universals convene vocally in universality — or what amounts to the same — Universality is the synonymous or vocal common name of all Universalities, of genus, species, and the rest.

Proven: that is vocal synonymy which convenes according to name and nature expressed by name — but universality is of this kind for all universalities — therefore the comparison of all universalities is synonymy. The minor is proven: universality consists in the aptitude of existing in many conjoined with the unity of nature — and these the essence of each universality of singulars competes — for just as the universality of genus is the aptitude to existing in many, so the universality of species, difference, property, and accident — therefore the nature of universality convenes to all universalities, and consequently its synonymy is universal for all universalities.

Objection first: what convenes independently to one thing and dependently to another is not synonymous between them in their own respect — but universality convenes independently to genus, and dependently to other universals, since without genus and

species, differences, properties, and accidents do not have their own proper differences — therefore universality is not synonymous to all universals.

The major is simply to be denied: for intelligence and science in the degree of quality convene synonymously, even though according to the mind intelligence is independent and sciences depend on intelligence — and yet they are synonymous. We should note that the major cannot hold in all cases, since the divine Persons — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — share "divine person" synonymously according to name and nature, and yet this name cannot be a genus of the divine Persons, since species must be composed of genus and difference, and those Persons admit no composition. Therefore synonymy holds, and yet no genus is present. These points and more are cited in the Antepraedicaments.

SECOND DISPUTATION — ON UNIVERSALS SPECIALLY

SECTION II — On Genus

QUESTION I — On the Name and Various Acceptation of Genus

What the head is to the other parts of the body, that Genus is to the remaining Universals — just as to the head the other members are submitted, so to genus the other universals are subordinated, and just as all parts depend from the head, so the remaining universals depend from genus. Remove the head and you remove all members — remove Genus and no universal remains. Therefore this disputation of universals is not incongruously begun with Porphyry in his Introduction from genus — and Porphyry teaches in chapter 2 of the said Introduction that Genus is taken three-fold.

First for collection and multitude of those which flowed from one principle as from one fountain — as the genus of the Heraclidae for those men who descended from Hercules.

Second, genus is accepted for that principle or head from which a multitude of such kind has flowed — and this is either a father, as Hercules is their genus in respect of those who descended from him — or a Fatherland, as Gaul is the genus of the Gauls, Spain of the Spaniards, and so of others.

Third, genus is taken accurately and philosophically for that universal which contains species under itself — as animal contains man and brute — which is predicated of many species differing in the question what something is, as the same animal of man and brute, when what they are is inquired. But these require a fuller exposition than the third question shall give us.

QUESTION II — On the Existence of Genus, or Whether It Exists

Since genus is the first universal and as it were the head from which the rest depend, all must unanimously concede that it exists — and to take it away from the middle is to force all the remaining universals away from the middle as well.

But the difficulty is whether with one species existing, genus would also exist — for example, with only one species of man existing, would animal also exist — taken materially, that is for the universal nature of animal — and whether taken formally as it is genus, or for the generosity of it, as they say. The same question is proposed concerning Species — whether similarly with only one individual existing, as only one Peter, man could exist — whether materially taken for the nature of man, or formally taken as the ratio of speciality.

Let the following be established:

First Proposition: Genus materially taken for the nature which is said to be genus can be conserved in one species, and species in one individual. For example, the whole nature of genus is in the single species, and the whole nature of species is in a single individual — as total animality in the single man alone, and humanity in the single Peter alone — so much so that man alone does not have more animality than brute alone, and Peter alone does not have more humanity than Peter, Paul, and the other men. Therefore genus materially taken for the nature which is said to be genus can be conserved in one species, and species in one individual.

It occurs to you to ask: if genus is wholly in one species, how can it be in the others?

I respond: in the same proportional mode as the soul total exists in the finger, and total exists in other parts of the body. From which they say the genus total to be in one species intensively — that is, according to its whole essence — not however extensively, since according to the same essence it extends to other species. Just as the soul existing in the finger is there intensively, that is according to its whole essence, not however extensively, since according to the same essence it does not limit itself to extend only to the other parts of the body.

Others say the genus total to be in one species essentially — that is, the total sum of its essence — not however entitatively — that is, not according to that mode by which the essence of genus disperses through the various species. Just as the soul in the finger is totally essential — that is, according to the total sum of its essence — not however entitatively — that is, not according to that mode by which the soul disperses through the various parts of the body.

Second Proposition: Genus formally taken for generosity can be conserved in one species, and species in the same mode taken in one individual.

This proposition is easily proven, given our opinion of the universal formally from the part of the thing in singulars — nature in some singular existing is formally universal, as we proved above. Therefore genus can be formally genus in one species existing, and species formally species in one individual existing — for example, animal in the sole man existing, and man in the sole Peter.

Objection: a perfect universal must refer to all its inferiors — therefore since genus in one species is not a perfect universal, nor is species in one individual, they are not the perfect universal.

I respond distinguishing the antecedent: a perfect universal must refer to all its inferiors that are possible or potential — I concede. That are actual only — I deny. Otherwise never would genus and species be perfect universals, since through divine potency always more species can be given under one genus, and more individuals under the same species, than actually are. From which it appears the consequence is to be denied.

QUESTION III — On the Essence of Genus

Article I — On the Definitions of Genus

Just as the universal in common, so the definition of Genus can be given in two modes — either by property, namely by predicating aptitude — in this mode: **Genus is a universal apt to be predicated of many things differing by species in the question what it is** — or by essence, namely by aptitude for existing in many: **Genus is a universal apt to be in many things differing by species**, as essential part responding to matter.

Of the prior definition, which is handed down by Porphyry in this article, we speak most particularly and examine each of its parts diligently.

First therefore **universal** is placed, in which genus convenes with the other universals. Added: **apt to be predicated of many**, to distinguish individual, which is predicated of only one, as Peter of only Peter. Third is added: **by species differing**, to differentiate species itself, which is predicated of many only numerically distinct — as man of Peter and John, when what they are is inquired.

Finally is placed **in the question what it is** — which is the question of essence, namely when what man is and what brute is are inquired. Rightly through genus namely animal is the response given. This particle distinguishes genus from difference, property, and accident — which, although essentially predicated of their inferiors, are not predicated in what simply, but in what kind of thing, or through the mode of form

and quality. That difference is predicated in what kind of thing is clear, since sensible pertains to the essence of animal, and rational to the essence of man. In what kind of thing however — since it holds itself through the mode of form and quality of the genus, determining it to a certain species, as rational determines animal to the species of man.

Distinguished moreover is that same particle genus from accident, even by the aforesaid method.

Article II

Whether the Superior Difference Is of the Essence of the Inferior, and Whether It Is Essentially Predicated of It

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To make the status of the present difficulty more apparent, let us adduce an example. **Sensible** is the superior difference — **Rational**, the inferior. Now it is asked whether sensible is of the essence of rational, and of it essentially predicated.

The common opinion denies it — proven first: only that in which man differs from other things is of the essence of rational — now man does not differ from other things through sensible, since man does not differ from brutes through sensible — therefore sensible is not of the essence of rational.

Second: if sensible were of the essence of rational, sensible in man would be found twice — once by reason of genus, in which it is included, and again by reason of difference, since rational is essentially constituted by it — which cannot be said. Therefore sensible is not of the essence of rational, nor is any superior difference of the essence of an inferior.

Finally: if sensible were of the essence of rational, rational would be wider in extension than sensible — since rational extends through all men and through many individuals from various animate rational beings, in whom genus is also included in rational. But the extension of rational is not wider than that of sensible, as can be proven. Therefore sensible is not of the essence of rational.

Article III — Whence Genus and Difference Are Derived

To make this more easily established, it must be noted that in man some composition is found — something by which he convenes with others, and something by which he differs from others. In man there are found grades in which he convenes with other animate beings, as what is entity, substance, body, living, sentient — and from the brute animate beings he is separated by something else — namely, what is rational.

I respond: from the common by which it convenes, genus is to be derived — from the peculiar and proper by which it differs, the difference is derived.

The reason is clear: through genus things convene among themselves — through differences they are distinguished. Therefore from that common convening, genus which is common is best derived — and from that diverse quality by which man differs in actuality, the difference which is proper and peculiar is derived.

QUESTION IV — On the Affections of Genus

Article I — How Genus Contains Its Species and Differences

Note first: to contain something under itself is another thing than to contain it in itself. **Containing under itself** is nothing other than to contain those things which are located and placed below it — in which mode man contains the singular men, since they are constituted under it. **Containing in itself** means to hold in the very thing itself what is said to be contained — as man contains in himself animal and rational, since he cannot consist without those.

Note second: something can contain another in two modes — first **in act**, in which mode man contains animal and rational, since without those he can in no way be — second **in potency**, in which mode iron contains heat before it is heated.

Note third and lastly: to contain in act is accepted in two modes — either **distinctly**, or **confusedly**. Distinctly, when nothing of those things is hidden which are contained — as man contains animal and rational, because we distinctly recognize each to be in the very essence of man. Confusedly, when it does not fully appear what is contained

determinately — as white contains all things whitened, as are walls, swans, etc., because by the name white no one determinate thing is conceived.

With these posited, the following is established:

First Proposition: Genus at least contains under itself its species and differences — for example, animal contains man and brute, rational and irrational.

Proven: to contain under itself is nothing other than to contain those things which are constituted and placed below it — but species and differences are placed below the genus — therefore genus contains under itself its species and differences.

Second Proposition: Genus does not essentially contain in itself its own species and differences.

Proven: it is only that which is of its essence that the genus essentially contains in itself — but the species and differences of genus are not of the essence of genus — for genus is what is common to the species, and it does not include the species themselves as part of its essence — therefore genus does not essentially contain its species and differences.

The minor is proven: only that which is common to the species in genus is of the essence of genus — but species and differences of genus are individual singular things in each species, common only in a broader sense to man and brute — and it is just this that is common to species in genus. Therefore genus does not essentially contain its species and differences in itself.

Third Proposition: Genus actually connotes its species and differences — for example, animal actually connotes man and brute, rational and irrational.

Proven: animal, for example, does not say animality alone, but furthermore connotes in act animality — but the species are what have animality — therefore animal connotes in act its species and differences, man and brute, rational and irrational.

Confirmed from the fourth book of the Physics, chapter three: man is contained in animal and all species in genus — therefore animal connotes in act its species and differences, man and brute, rational and irrational.

Final Proposition: Genus does not distinctly and explicitly connote its species and differences, but only confusedly.

Proven: when I say animal, I only understand what has animality in any form — whether it be man, or brute, whether rational or irrational — therefore the genus does not connote distinctly its species and differences, but confusedly.

Article II — Whether Genus Is Said to Properly Respond to Matter, and Difference to Form

I respond: Genus responds to matter and difference to form — not by identity of nature, as if genus were the same thing as matter and difference the same as form — but by proportion and similarity, in that genus in many things is indifferent just as matter is, and difference forms and determines it to a specific nature.

The prior part of the response is shown first by considering genus and difference simultaneously: many things consist of genus and difference — as Angels are from the grade of substance as genus and from the spiritual grade as difference — and yet they are not composed of matter and form, as all acknowledge. Therefore genus and difference are not matter and form.

Second: genus and difference — for example animal and rational — are predicated in the direct and nominative case jointly of man, saying man is animal, man is rational — not however as in the propositions about matter and form, which say man is from a soul, man is from a body — therefore genus and difference are not the same as matter and form.

Third, specifically that genus is not matter — because in all corporeal things common to at least the sublunar world, the same species and essentially the same composition is found — and yet in their doctrine there are most diverse genera among them, namely the genera of stone, metal, tree, animal, etc.

By equal facility it is specifically proven that difference is not form, since things that are specifically different differ through their differences — as man and brute through rational and irrational — but by an equal grade some can convene — as man with plant through the vegetative grade, and with brute animals through the sensory grade, both of which are included within the rational — therefore genus and difference are not the same as matter and form.

The posterior part of the response — that genus by proportion and similarity responds to matter, and difference to form — is shown with many agreements demonstrated. As matter is indifferent to receiving various forms — as the matter of stone is adapted to receiving the form of fire, of man, and so alternately — so also genus is indifferent to various species, as animal to various species. Just as matter is prior by order of nature to the composition — so also genus is prior by order in its species, as animal is prior in its own species of man and brute. And just as form determines matter to a certain composed natural thing — so too difference determines genus to some species, as rational determines animal to the species of man. Just as form is posterior to the matter which it has arrived at — so difference is posterior to the genus, since it is understood as arriving at genus.

SECTION II — On Species

On the Name and Various Acceptation of Species

Species is taken first by Porphyry, in his chapter on species, for **beauty** — in which sense it is said that the species is worthy of a first-rate empire, meaning men of apt proportion of members and greatest bodily beauty are worthy of empire. In the same sense the Poet Vates says of Christ our Lord: beautiful in form above the sons of men.

Second, Species is accepted for **a simulacrum and image** — in which sense we say an architect has the species of a house in mind, meaning the image or idea of it.

Third, for **some appearance and demonstration** of a thing — as we say something appears to be a species of good, just, beautiful, etc. — meaning apparently so.

Fourth, it is taken for **that which is subjected to the genus** — of which genus is predicated in the question what it is, as of the genus animal is predicated in the question what man is, namely animal.

Finally, Species is taken according to universal **for that which is predicated of many only numerically distinct** in the question what something is — as man of Peter and Paul, when what they are is inquired.

QUESTION II — On the Existence of Species

From Porphyry it is here noted that species is double — **intersected** and **infima**, or more generally speaking, in the series of predicamental and categorical things three are found — the highest genus, the intersected genus or intersected species, and the infima species or specialissima.

Of the highest genus he gives a double definition. The prior is: **The highest genus is that which is so much a genus that it cannot be a species.** The posterior: **The highest genus is said to be that which has no genus above itself** — which definition is the proof of the prior, since the highest has no genus above itself, it cannot be a species of any, since species is immediately subjected to genus.

The **infima or most specialized species** has a triple definition.

The first is: the infima species is that under which no species can be posted — since whether compared with superiors, it is always species and never genus — if compared with superiors it is always species, since it is immediately subjected to genus — if compared with inferiors, it is species also, since there are no species contained under it into which it could be divided. And it is the second definition specifically from Porphyry — species which is immediately divided into individuals. And those individuals are predicated of it in what something is — as man is predicated of Socrates, Aristotle, and other singular men — and it is the last of the infima species definitions which Porphyry gives.

Whatever moreover is between the highest genus and infima species — those are called intersected genera and intersected species — showing that if compared with superiors they are species, but genera with respect to inferiors. So that animal, which is an intersected genus and species, is species with respect to living things, genus with respect to man and brute, and is intersected genus or intersected species, being species with respect to the superior living thing, since it is immediately subjected to that genus — and genus with respect to man and brute below it, since of those, as of species differing, it is predicated in what something is.

Furthermore since here we ask the existence of intersected species — not because from the prior section the existence of the infima species is by affirmation and experience clear — it gives horse, lion, man, which are infima species. Confirmed: the infima species is that one which is predicated only of many numerically distinct, not however of species — for this is more clearly confirmed: lion is predicated of many lions, horse of many horses, man of many men — not however is species predicated of many specifically differing things. Therefore lion, horse, man are infima species.

Objection, specifically of man: man can be predicated of many specifically differing things — therefore it is not well adduced as an example of infima species.

The antecedent is proven: it could happen that two rational souls might inform materially diverse species, as from the opinion of many regarding celestial and sublunary matters, and so constitute men specifically diverse, since they would differ not only by singular difference but by specific difference — therefore then man, common to those, would be predicated of many specifically differing things.

I respond: I concede the whole argument given that hypothesis — that those two rational souls inform materially diverse species. For when we adduce man as an example of infima species, we take him as he is from the part of reality, and under him are contained men who from the part of reality, in the sense we stated above, do not differ from each other in species but only in number, as individuals of the species of man — which suffices for our purpose regarding the infima species.

QUESTION III — On the Essence of Species

Article I — On the Definitions of Species from Porphyry by Subjectibility Handed Down

Porphyry considered Species in two modes: either insofar as it is subjectible by genus, or insofar as it is complexed with the intersected, insofar as it is the superior genus predicable of individuals.

Of this subjectible species he assigned a double definition. The prior: **that which is immediately subjected to genus** — as the aforesaid man to animal. The posterior: **that of which genus is predicated in what it is** — as animal of man.

These definitions are held as legitimate, because they are reciprocated with the defined — since nothing is a species which is not immediately subjected to genus, and of which genus is not predicated in what it is. And nothing is the immediate subject of genus and of which genus is predicated in what it is, that is not species — as anyone looking can see — which nevertheless has the appearance of a legitimate definition.

Objection: a legitimate definition must be given through something more known than the defined — but the definitions of Species handed down by Porphyry are not of this kind, since they are given through genus, which is not more known than species, since it is also defined through species, being predicated of many species — therefore these definitions are not legitimate.

I distinguish the major: that a definition must be given through what is more known, in absolute things I concede — in relative things, I deny. For in relative things, one is defined through another, or rather toward another — as Father through son or rather toward son, and conversely — and neither being more known than the other. Therefore since the subjectible species and genus are correlates, the subjectible species and genus are referred to each other in the same way.

Article II — On the Other Definition of Species Given by Reference to Inferiors

The species compared to inferiors can be defined in this mode: **Species is a universal apt to be predicated of many only numerically distinct.** Or: **Species is a universal apt to be predicated of many only numerically distinct in the question what something is** — as man of Peter and Paul, when what they are is inquired.

First is placed **universal apt to be predicated of many**, in which species convenes with genus and other universals, and is distinguished from the individual which is predicated of only one, as Peter of only himself. Added **only numerically distinct**, to differentiate genus, which is predicated of many specifically differing things.

Finally is placed **in the question what it is**, by which species is discriminated from other universals — difference, property, and accident — which are predicated either in what kind of thing simply, or as property and accident are predicated, as will be clear from what follows.

Objection: this definition of species convenes with others besides species — namely with point, matter, rational soul, which confers on the subject the mode of existing in itself — and substance, which confers on accident the mode of existing in a subject. Since all these are not complete beings and not constituted in the straight order of the Category, as will appear below — therefore this definition of species is not legitimate. The antecedent: point is predicated in what it is of many points numerically distinct, matter of matters variously distinct, rational soul of many rational souls, existence of many existing substances, inherence of inherings, and so of others — therefore the allotted definition of species convenes to all those.

It can be responded, first to the antecedent, that the definition of species does convene to point, matter, form, and others there assigned — but not as things distinct from species — but as beings incomplete and not constituted in the straight order of the Category.

It can be responded otherwise by denying the antecedent — that the definition of species does not convene to point, matter, and others handed down there, because all those are not complete beings — since this definition of species is understood of the complete species.

Article III — Through What Species Is Constituted According to Universal

The question is: whether species is constituted in being of the second universal through the respect it has toward the genus to which it is subjected, or truly through the respect it has toward the individuals of which it is predicated. This question is to be resolved with a double proposition.

First Proposition: Species in being of species is constituted through respect to genus, and not through respect to individuals of which it is immediately predicated.

Proven because species is called species, because it confers the splendor and beauty of genus, and is called the species of animal genus — therefore insofar as it regards the genus itself, and not individuals. Furthermore, since the intersected species are not referred to individuals, nor is species predicated of them, they would not be species, which is contrary to all.

Second Proposition: Species is constituted in being of the second universal through respect to individuals of which it is apt to be predicated, not however through respect to genus to which it is subjected.

Proven: that through which species is constituted in being of the second universal is what pertains to the reason of universal and can constitute something as universal — but only the respect of species toward individuals or inferiors can pertain to the reason of universal, and constitute something as universal. The respect of the same species toward genus or superior is plainly impertinent to the reason of universal and cannot constitute any universal — because something is not said to be universal because it is recalled to universals and subjected to them, otherwise the individual also would be universal, since it is subjected to superiors. But something is universal insofar as it is predicated of many — therefore species is not constituted in being of the second universal through respect to genus to which it is subjected, but through respect to inferiors or individuals of which it is predicated.

Confirmed: genus is not constituted in being of genus through respect to individuals of many species which we comprehend under it — therefore as species will be universal, it is not through being subjected to genus, or through respect to genus, but through being predicated of individuals, or through respect to individuals.

Objection against both propositions: Species, insofar as it is species, is universal — therefore nothing can constitute species in being of species which does not constitute it in being of universal. Therefore if in being of species it is constituted through respect to genus, the same respect in being of essential will constitute it, which fights against the posterior proposition. Or if on the contrary in being of universal it is constituted through respect to individuals, by the same respect in being of species — which fights against the

prior proposition. The antecedent is demonstrated by argument from equality: genus insofar as it is genus is universal — but genus insofar as it is genus is universal — therefore species insofar as it is species will be universal.

The antecedent is to be absolutely denied — because a physician who is a physician does not paint, even though he paints — so although species, e.g., man is called universal, it is not however universal as species, or by reason of genus. For as species it regards superiors, but as universal it must regard inferiors, as we have proven in our propositions.

FINAL QUESTION — On the Affections of Species

Here we treat only the lowest species **(***infima species***)—regarding which we set forth this first** attribute**: whether** the lowest species **established under the same genus are of unequal perfection.**

I respond affirmatively, and it is clear from experience — so among the heavens one Empyrean, among the elements fire, among metals gold, among colors whiteness, among figures the circular are recognized as advancing the dignity of others in their kind.

Another affection of species — whether it is referred by diverse relation to genus and to individuals — as that each referred to both — is declared in the final article of the question above.

The negative part is defended by Cajetanus in the chapter on species.

We however with the remaining Philosophers affirm with much greater probability that the Relation of species to genus is entirely distinct from the relation of the same species to individuals.

Sound reason: Species, as it refers to genus, has the ratio of subject and inferior — but as referred to individuals, of predicate and superior. But relations of inferior and superior, and conversely of superior to inferior, must be distinct — therefore the relations of species to genus and to individuals must necessarily be distinct.

But a greater explanation of these relations is to be had in the particular disputation on relation which we shall institute below.

APPENDIX TO THIS SECTION — On the Individual

Since along with cognition, one is defined through another or rather toward another — as father through son or toward son, and conversely — since species and individual are correlates, referring to each other mutually, as is sufficiently understood from what was said — therefore it does not seem far from the absolute explanation of species to deal briefly about its correlate the individual — and however much can be done with brevity, more will be explained in Metaphysics.

On the Name of the Individual — Chapter I

Individual, as is clear from the force of its own name, signifies **a thing indivisible in many inferiors** — as Socrates.

Indeed it can happen that some individual is divided into essential parts — as Socrates into soul and body — and likewise integrating parts, as the same Socrates into head, arms, and other parts — yet the perfect individual is not defined as divided into inferiors subjected to it, of which it can be predicated in the straight case, but as predicated of itself alone — as Socrates is Socrates.

On the Existence of the Individual — Chapter II

The existence of the individual is clear both from the experience of all and from its own various divisions, of which the first is handed down in **Physical and Logical individual**.

The **Physical individual** is a real nature incommunicable in itself to many inferiors — as Socrates.

Furthermore I said **in many inferiors**, because it can happen that some individual is divided into accidental parts — as this science in particular, this intellect — and yet these are accidental things commonly subjected to the individual to which they are affixed, and thus this science in particular, this intellect, this place, and so of others — they remain a perfect individual.

The **Logical individual** truly is the singular thing itself considered by the reason of singularity and individuation, in common — or insofar as it is able to be predicated of many and others in this mode — as Petrus is individual, Paulus is individual, and so of others.

Second, the individual is divided into **substantial** — which is some singular substance, as Petrus — and **accidental** — which is some accidental particular thing, as this whiteness, this science, etc.

Third, the individual is divided into **determinate, demonstrative, hypothetical, and vague**.

Determinate is that which is expressed by a proper name, as Petrus.

Demonstrative is that which is signified not indeed by a proper name in the place of its proper name but by a demonstrative pronoun — as this man, this image, this wood.

Hypothetical is that which is designated by a made hypothesis — as when we signify by the Lord Christ the son of the most blessed Virgin: for then we suppose the most blessed Virgin has begotten this unique son, namely the Lord Christ.

Vague finally and **indeterminate** is that which indeed designates some singular thing, but signifies it indeterminately and confusedly — as some man, some horse. By these expressions things singular are designated, but which determinate one that is, is not signified.

On the Essence of the Individual — Chapter III

Various definitions of the individual are put forward.

The first: **that which is immediately subjected to species** — as Petrus to the species man.

The second describes: **that which into many inferiors subjected to itself cannot be divided** — as shown in the first chapter.

Finally defined: **that which of only one can be predicated, namely of itself** — as Petrus is Petrus.

On the Essence of the Individual — Chapter III

So that it may be understood what this individual is, it must be noted that predication can be constituted as triple.

The first is called **ordered**, in which a superior is predicated of an inferior, as animal of man, saying man is animal.

The second is **against order**, when from the contrary an inferior is predicated of a superior, as animal of man saying animal is man.

The third is called extra-ordinal (or 'beyond order'), namely when the attribute does not have the nature of a superior relative to the subject—as when we say 'Peter is Peter.' In this case, there is no reason why Peter would be superior or inferior to himself.

From this it is understood that the predication of the individual is the predication of the final genus, since it is of itself alone — one indeed is not itself superior, or inferior.

Against this definition of the individual objection is made: a definition is not of singular things, but of the universal — but individual is a singular thing, not universal, as is clear — therefore it cannot be defined. The major is certain: a definition is only of necessary things, and what can be kept under the knowledge of science — but the definition of singulars is not necessary, and such is not able to be kept under the science of universals in common — therefore a definition is not of singulars.

I respond, distinguishing the major: a definition is not of singulars, as singular is, or according to the reason of its singular nature, I concede — according to the reason of individuation in which it convenes with other singulars, and for that reason can be predicated of many lower individuals — I deny. From which I say that the individual is not defined by the reason of its singular nature — for example, Socrates is not defined by the reason of his own singular nature, because that definition cannot convene to other singulars — but according to the reason of singularity in which it convenes with other singulars, and thus it comes to be universally in common that the individual is defined as that which is predicated of only one.

From these two things follow. **First** — the defined thing of the individual, the material definition, is the singular thing itself, not however considered according to its own singular nature, since that cannot be defined by others — but according to the reason of its singularity in which it convenes with other singulars, and for that reason can be compared to a universal in the same way we said of the universal itself — as we said, keeping the proportion given from the universal, that the nature itself is the defined thing materially, universality the form.

It follows from the same reason of singularity that it can be predicated of many lower individuals — rightly we say, as we said of the universal, that the nature itself is the material defined thing, universality the formal definition — as the individual defined materially is the singular thing itself, universality truly the formal definition — and so the individual defined through only one of which it is predicated, is not defined according to its own singular nature, but according to the reason of universality, as we declared, keeping the proportion given from the universal.

Another is — that the individual is the final genus, since it is of itself alone — and it convenes with others in individuation and in singularity from which is common and is a kind of universal.

On the Affections of the Individual — Chapter IV

The first affection of the individual is **that it is predicated of only one** — but of this enough has been said.

Another is **that it is subjected to both species and genus** — species indeed immediately, as Peter to the species man, genus mediately, as the same Peter to animal by means of man.

Concerning this affection, some ask what individual is referred to regarding species and genus — and to both it is referred by one single relation.

I respond affirmatively — for just as genus as a single superior is referred by a single relation to species, and to individuals to whom it can be communicated, so species is immediately referred to them, and to individuals mediately through intervening species — it is thus not only a single relation in individuals to be constituted, by which it is referred to species immediately, and by means of species to genus. Neither is one single relation to be constituted in those two diverse subjects — since genus and species, which are two diverse subjects, are referred to one term, namely genus, in those relations — at the same time that species and individual are different subjects, which are referred to one term, so genus being immediately terminated to species, and species to individuals is mediate. When however on the contrary there are two subjects, of which one is referred to the immediate term, the other only mediately — then not one single relation but a double relation is to be constituted. So alike it appears in the relations of genus and of species to individuals, which are different in that they are a diverse genus and species — and so find themselves as two diverse subjects — both referred to one term, namely to the individual — therefore in genus and in individual there is a double relation, but one.

SECTION III — On Difference

QUESTION I — On the Name and Various Acceptation of Difference

What by reason distinguishes man from horse — that thing is called **difference**. It is taken in two modes — first broadly, second strictly.

Broadly — for everything that makes one from another, in whatever mode that may be, whether common or proper, or even through some accident and separable thing — as whiteness distinguishes a wall from black, and is called common in that sense. **Common** is called that which is derived from some common and separable accident — as whiteness distinguishes a wall from black. **Proper** is willed to be that which is derived from some property, as risibility distinguishes man from others by the respect of man. Most properly finally **proper** is named that which is derived from some essential principle, and which constitutes the thing essentially and gives the essential definition of it, as rational with respect to man — and this last difference we shall chiefly treat in the whole question in dispute, and afterward of the other two in their proper place.

Strictly taken difference, as it is distinguished from other universals, is accepted only for the proper, essential difference — and that full discussion of it which is taken thus shall treat this whole question. But strictly difference is distinguished from the other universals — as it is taken for the most proper and essential, and which in this whole disputed question we shall discuss — afterward of the other two in their proper order.

QUESTION II

On the Existence of Difference

Two temples are held in antiquity to have existed — one of Concord, one of Discord spread abroad by fame. Concord's temple I would say is Genus, in which completely diverse Species from the sky are connected together — as man and brute in animal — joined by the bond of peace. Discord's temple I would willingly ascribe to Difference, which in genus joined and connected, so conjoins them that they cannot consent together — as those in genus, so disjoined that without it they cannot go well.

First Proposition: Universals considered in the first mode, among themselves convene synonymously.

Proven: all natures both substantial and accidental can convene in synonymy — but Universals regarded in the first mode, namely for the things themselves which are called universals, are natures substantial and accidental — as animal is genus of substance, and whiteness accident — therefore Universals in this first mode taken among themselves convene synonymously.

Second Proposition: Difference exists.

Proven: before all things by the testimony of experience — since we most manifestly perceive by the senses that things differ from each other — as man from horse through the power of reasoning, and through reason — and so through experience differences are given.

Furthermore: each infima species has its own proper something, so that another thing cannot convene with it — as man has the power of reasoning, through which he differs from all other things — as is understood from what has been said. Therefore from such a grade can be derived the difference of man himself, namely rationality, which is reciprocal with him.

QUESTION III — On the Essence of Difference

Article I — On Its Definitions Assigned by Porphyry

Porphyry hands down, in the chapter cited, the definition of difference in his words: **difference is that through which species surpasses genus** — as man surpasses animal through rational, since it always surpasses it — for genus is clear by species, as animal by man — but beyond the genus grades are given in species of particular differences — as in man beyond all animal grades there is given the peculiar grade of particular differences, as rationality — and beyond the grade of generic differences peculiaris is given the grade, and with the same it is reciprocated.

The second he assigns from this series of words: **difference is a universal which is predicated of many species differing in what kind of thing it is.** First, what is handed down only by the property of universal, namely by predicating aptitude — not by essence, that is aptitude for existing — of its accurate definition. First, what is handed down is not accurate, because it is handed down only through the property of universal, namely through predicating aptitude — not through essence, that is through aptitude for existing. Second, it is not credited accurate, because everything of species does not convene with it, since the infima species, which are from one species only and the individuals mentioned, as rational of many individuals by means of men, and its intervenience of singular men alone — but the definition of difference is handed down, which convenes with the infima species of many species differing — which is not accurate.

The third and fourth add Porphyry's definition with his words: **difference is that which sets those things apart which are placed under the same genus, item, through which the singulars of it differ.** This definition is general for difference — to comprehend generic, specific, and the most proper — as we shall interpret.

The **last** definition of difference is thus handed down by Porphyry: **difference is that which gives being to the thing, as essential part** — as rational to man, to whose essence it belongs. This definition only of the most proper difference convenes, since it is the sole which gives being to the species as an essential part.

Therefore we urgently press forward these definitions of difference, both generic and specific, since both convene with them. So it must be said: **Difference is a universal apt to be in a universal subject or to be predicated of the universal, in what kind of thing it is, and those things which are contained under itself.**

If anyone wants to accommodate this definition to another of the differences generic, he can do so with minimum effort — placing in the place of the universal subject, or genus, whatever he wants to accommodate the definition to generic difference — or species, if specific he wishes to accommodate it.

Furthermore the legitimate definition of ours is acknowledged — first, that which it defines, namely difference, convenes with it — secondly, that it distinguishes it from others.

In individual indeed, because it is predicated of only one, and with no intermediate — difference however from generic and specific material, and from that by means of interposition of individuals, or from genus, or by means of species, is predicated of one only.

[*Difference is distinguished*] from Genus and Species because a Genus is predicated directly of many species (which differ in *essence*), and a Species is predicated of many individuals (which differ only in *number*) in terms of what they are (*in quid*).

Difference, however, is not predicated generically of species, nor specifically of a genus, nor [only] of many individuals distinct in number. Rather, it predicates generically of the 'most proper differences' of individuals in the same way a genus predicates; and it predicates specifically of many individuals in the same way a species predicates. Because Difference differs from Genus and Species in its mode of predicating (as shown above), they are rightly established as distinct universals.

Likewise, Genus and Species are predicated simply in terms of 'what' a thing is (*in quid*) regarding their inferiors; Difference, however, is not predicated absolutely as 'what,' but as 'what kind' (*in quale*)—for example, 'sensible' of an animal or 'rational' of a man. It is 'what kind' because it functions as a form or quality that determines a specific species, just as 'rational' added to 'animal' determines the species of 'man.' Furthermore, that same small distinction of Genus is distinguished from Accident by the aforementioned method.

Article II

Whether the Superior Difference Is of the Essence of the Inferior, and Whether of It It Is Predicated Essentially

To make the status of the present difficulty more apparent, let us adduce an example. Sensible is the superior difference — Rational, inferior. Now it is asked whether sensible is of the essence of rational, and essentially predicated of it.

The common opinion denies — proven first: only that in which man differs from other things is of the essence of rational — but man does not differ from other things through sensible, since man does not differ from brutes through sensible — therefore sensible is not of the essence of rational.

Second: if sensible were of the essence of rational, sensible in man would be found twice — once by reason of genus in which it is included, and again by reason of difference, since rational is essentially constituted by it — which cannot be said. Therefore sensible is not of the essence of rational.

Third: if sensible were of the essence of rational, the extension of rational would be wider than that of sensible — since rational extends through all men, and through many individuals from various animate rational beings, in whom genus is also included in rational — but the extension of rational is not wider than that of sensible, as is proved — therefore sensible is not of the essence of rational, nor is any superior difference of the essence of an inferior.

I respond — difference superior is only universal in respect of the genus of which it is the difference, and of those things which are contained under it — not in respect of the inferior differences as their superior — responding to the material of form, saying only of the material and identical comparison of those things between which there is a difference — whereas the form determines it to some species, as rational determines animal to the species of man — in the same mode by which genus must be said to contain confusedly its species and differences, as we said in the proper article.

Article III — Whether Those Differences Are Real Which Are Expressed by Negation

Some differences are expressed by affirmation — as sensible, rational — others by negation, as insensible, irrational. The prior are all held to be real — the doubt is only about the posterior ones.

Some say those differences expressed by negation are not real — I respond negating the minor, since the difference superior is only universal in respect of the genus of which it is the difference, and of those contained under it, not in respect of inferior differences — responding that what is said by material and identical predicating of those things, is only of the material and identical — whereas form determines to some species.

We however constantly assert those to be real — since real species constitute them, and from other real species they distinguish — as insensible distinguishes plant from animal, and irrational brute from man.

You ask: why are such differences expressed by negation?

I respond: because according to us they are unknown things, and we cognize them more easily — what things are not — rather than what they are — and through negation, quicker to comprehend than through affirmation. For example, more promptly we understand God to be infinite, incorporeal, immutable, incomprehensible, and other things that are his perfections, expressed by negation — than through affirmative attributes.

QUESTION IV — On the Affections of Difference

Article I — On the Opposition of Differences

Note first: **opposition** is nothing other than the repugnance of two things between themselves — as we shall more fully show below.

Note second: the opposition of universals is four-fold.

The first is called **contradictory** — which consists in affirmation, and negation of the same thing, and whose terms are: not entity, not man.

The second is **privative** between a form and its privation — as between sight and blindness.

The third is **relative** — when one is referred to another — as father to son.

The fourth is **contrary** — between those which under the same genus are maximally distant — as between heat and cold, which under the same genus of quality are constituted, and are maximally distant from each other.

Note third: this last contrary opposition is double. One **properly so called** — those which are maximally distant, and apt to be mutually expelled from the same subject — as heat and cold, since heat expels cold from the subject, and cold heat — as warmth always makes warm, always cold makes cold. Another **improperly** — between those which, though under the same genus, are maximally distant, cannot mutually expel each other from the same subject — as rational and irrational, as will be shown below.

With these posited:

First Proposition: Differences placed under the same genus — as rational and irrational — are neither contradictorily nor privatively opposed.

Proven: the contradiction of contradictory opposition is most extreme, of which one term is non-entity — but differences of the same genus, as rational and irrational, do not so have themselves — since both are real, and positive things, and under the same genus constituted — therefore they are not contradictorily opposed. The major about contradiction is clear. That of privation is also clear from what was said in the preceding article of the question — since differences expressed by negation are real, which contradicts privation: since contradiction of privation, as rational and irrational, does not so hold, since both are real and positive, constituted under the same genus.

Second Proposition: Neither are differences placed under the same genus in a relative opposition.

Proven: rational is not referred to another — as rational — since rational does not refer to irrational, as father is referred to son — since they cannot properly be called contrary — rational referring to irrational, and vice versa — since only those things can properly be contrary which are maximally distant and apt to be mutually expelled. But rational and irrational, though placed under the same genus, do not mutually expel each other from the subject — rational cannot expel irrational from the subject, as heat expels cold — since rational is not able to expel irrational from the same subject, as heat does cold — the reason is that differences are not contrary, since of their kind no other opposition surpasses all others rejected — and since that improper contrariety from what has been said lies in this alone: that those differences are maximally distant from each other, placed under the same genus — as rational and irrational, being real entities, are constituted under the same genus — therefore they are not maximally distant from each other, and consequently the improper contrariety of them is held.

Objection: substance has nothing contrary, according to Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on substance — but differences opposed, as rational and irrational, are substances — therefore they are not contrary.

I distinguish the major: substance has nothing contrary, by proper contrariety, I concede — by improper, I deny — in which mode we said differences opposed, as rational and irrational, are called contrary.

Objection moreover: contrary things can be in the same subject — but differences opposed, as rational and irrational, cannot be in the same subject — therefore they are not contrary.

In the same mode distinguishing the major: contrary things in the proper sense can be in the same subject, I concede — improper, I deny — because improper contrariety consists in this alone: that those things placed under the same genus are maximally distant — and thus rational and irrational maximally differ from each other, and can constitute the most different species, while yet they cannot be expelled from the same subject — it is sufficient so that they are called contrary improperly.

Article II

Whether Differences Accept Intension and Remission

It must be noted that those things accept intension and remission which can be augmented and diminished — as heat according to degrees, since sometimes the heat is more intense, sometimes more remiss.

Concluding here briefly: at least some Properties are not of intension and remission capable — as risibility and the like, which are equally participated from singular men.

But if any man seems more prompt to laughter than another, the prompter to laughter one is not to be referred to the perfection of the laughing faculty, but to the better disposition of organs, through which the actions of the soul's faculties as existing in body depend. Disputed is about the heat of fire, the cold of water, and the like among other things' properties. For these sometimes seem more intense, sometimes more remiss — the same cold becomes more intense, or the same heat sometimes more diminished—[and it is] in the same cold and in other qualities that some thinkers simply say these qualities undergo intension and remission.

But it is more accurately philosophically to be held — affirming this — that the intension of heat and cold should not fall into their essence, since essence of things is indivisible in number of them — therefore the essence of heat does not augment by intension, since generically the essence of things is assigned indivisible like the number of forms, remission or addition — therefore those qualities, intension and remission accept, falling only in that mode which the essence of heat has in the subject — whether it be in more grades or fewer. They call this mode the Metaphysical entity of quantity, of which we shall treat fully in Metaphysics. So much about Property.

SECTION IV — On Property

QUESTION I — On the Name and Various Acceptation of Property

Property is the same as what is peculiar to any thing.

It is taken in various modes — first insofar as anyone gives from his own thing, in that sense of which one properly gives.

Second, it is taken insofar as it is opposed to common, and that is double. **Essentially**, by which pact difference is called proper — and by the same the definition is called proper. And **accidentally** — by which pact property is properly and more commonly defined, which the quadruple arrangement of it by Porphyry makes.

First: **what belongs to only one species and not to the totality, but always convenes** — as to be a doctor, though not to all men, since it is only to some — I said through art, for the fine beasts themselves, by some natural instinct, by some certain natural remedies heal themselves, but not through art.

Second, it is taken for property **as what belongs to the whole species, but not to it only** — as to go on two feet convenes to man, though it always convenes to man among men — yet even in other things from nature's decree it is found always among men.

Third, it is accepted for property **as what belongs to the whole, and to the species alone, but not always** — as to grow gray convenes to man — who not in childhood or youth, but in old age can grow gray — not however by potency of growing gray — but in second act, or actual grayness, which is accidental common — as actual laughter is common accident of man.

Fourth, and most properly property is accepted for **that which belongs to the sole, whole, and always** — as to be able to laugh, since only man is able to laugh, since no one else can — and of this last property we treat from here on.

SECTION II

On the Existence of Property

The existence of Property is conceded by all, and can sufficiently be understood from the question above.

Property is double as constituted — one **generic**, which is attributed to genus and all its inferiors, and to each of its species and their individuals — as what belongs to one only in number and convenes to it — another **specific**, in that mode belonging to one only in number of the species, since the whole species and its individuals alone — as risible convenes to the horse in common and to the singular horses in particular.

Here to be noted is the efficient cause and origin of properties — but the whole question of Physics is the consideration, and therefore to it is remitted.

QUESTION III

On the Essence of Property

Property in the fourth mode taken by Porphyry, which is the sole one here treated, can be doubly defined — essentially in his words: **Property is a universal apt to be in a universal subject, and in those things which are contained under it accidentally, and reciprocally.** Accidentally truly by property by this pact: **Property is a universal apt to be predicated of the subject universally, in what accidental it is, and not reciprocal.**

From this definition, it is easy to understand those two-fold [definitions] which some wish to restrict to generic properties only (by understanding the subject as a genus). If, however, they wish to adapt the definition to a specific property, they can interpret it via a universal species as the subject—and thus define it specifically.

It is said first **universal**, by which it convenes with the other universals.

Said second **apt to be predicated of a universal subject** — whether it be genus, or species — which constitutes it, generic namely and specific.

Third is placed **in what accidental**, to the distinction of genus which predicates in what it is, and difference also which predicates in what kind of thing.

Fourth is added **reciprocal**, to the distinction of common accident, which is not predicated reciprocally as we shall teach below.

Objection: if property is predicated accidentally, it will not be universal. But the consequence is false — therefore the antecedent also. Proved: the consequence — because property is predicated accidentario, not essentially — therefore it is not universal.

I respond by denying the major premise, or rather by distinguishing its proof—since if a property is predicated accidentally, it is not universal. I respond by denying the major, or rather by distinguishing it—since the major premise cannot hold by synonymy. Since a property predicated accidentally is not predicated synonymously, I concede—but as for accidental synonymy, I deny it: since [only] a certain kind of synonymy suffices for a universal

SECTION V— On Common Accident

QUESTION I — On the Name and Various Acceptation of Common Accident

Porphyry in the chapter on accident, passing over the various acceptations of the name **Accident** in common, treats only its definitions. We in the third question of this section examine these — beforehand concerning the name of Accident, and its various acceptations, some things must be premised.

Accident is thus said — **that which besides the essence of something happens** — and is used in three modes — broadly, and strictly, and properly.

Accident broadly taken comprehends all that, **which is beyond the essence of any thing** — whether the substance be, or accident. In which mode rational is said to be the accident of animal, since it is beyond its essence.

Accident broadly taken comprehends all that which is not substance — whether it makes something peculiar, or not — as risible in comparison of man.

Accident strictly and properly is accepted for **what contingently happens to a thing, and not from its essence flows**, or when it is converted — as blackness in comparison of man, or grayness in comparison of parietis — and of this Accident we treat here.

Finally, accident is said to be separable — another **inseparable**, and this is the division of Porphyry in the chapter on accidents. Of the prior's example he places sleeping — of the posterior's, the blackness of the Ethiopian, which in reality is never separated, nor can be ordinarily separated by law.

QUESTION II — On the Existence of Common Accident

The existence of Common Accident is clear both from experience and from its divisions — of which the first is handed down — **as fortuitous and natural**.

Fortuitous — which happens beyond the intention of the agent, as the finding of a treasure by the one digging the ground.

Natural truly — which has in itself some certain and determinate cause — as whiteness of the wall, the science of the mind, and the rest of that genus.

Furthermore another is called natural accident — **that which happens to substance**, as the science of the intellect, and another **which accrues to another accident** — as sweetness of whiteness in milk.

Finally another accident is called **separable** — another **inseparable** — and this is the division of Porphyry in the chapter on accidents. Of the prior's example he places sleeping — of the posterior's, the blackness of the Ethiopian, which in reality is never separated from it, nor can be separated ordinarily by law.

QUESTION III

On the Essence of Common Accident, According to the Mind of Porphyry and the Truth of the Matter

The first definition of Accident from Porphyry is this: **Accident is that which is present and absent from a subject without the destruction of that subject** — as whiteness from a wall, blackness from a man — and these can be absent and present, since they are not essential to the thing, nor pertain to the essence of the thing, nor flow from it.

From this definition however this Accident's definition convenes to others — namely to the rational soul, which can be absent from body without its destruction, insofar as it can depart from body without the soul's destruction — and so it remains and persists in the body itself — therefore this definition is not legitimate.

I respond to the antecedent: the rational soul is part and form of the total man, and not only of the body — but from man the action can be absent from the body without its destruction, since the accident can depart from it without any loss of itself — therefore this definition is not legitimate.

Second objection: in the doctrine of Porphyry there is given the inseparable accident — therefore accident is badly defined as that which can be absent and present.

I distinguish the antecedent: inseparable accident is given according to Porphyry, in reality, concede — by reason and cogitation of the intellect, I deny — for even though the Ethiopian's blackness cannot in reality be separated from him, yet it can by cogitation of the intellect be separated and be absent — which suffices for it to participate in that definition.

Will you object further: cogitation of the intellect can separate properties from a subject — as risibility from man — therefore it will be a common accident.

I deny the consequence — since always properties reciprocate with the subject, as risibility with man — and a subject cannot be understood with a contrary property — but an accident to the contrary — as rational cannot expel irrational from the same subject.

Finally, an objection: this definition does not apply to all common accidents—since the death of an animal and the burning of a house are common accidents—but these cannot be absent and present without the destruction of the subject. The antecedent is proved: the death of an animal and the burning of a house are common accidents, yet they cannot [simply] be absent and present—since death cannot exist without the destruction of the animal, nor burning without the destruction of the house. Therefore, the definition does not encompass them.

I respond, negating the antecedent. To its probation I say that death of the animal and burning of the house are indeed accidents — but privative only, not positive — which are comprehended under the larger definition of accident.

A second definition of accident is thus handed down by Porphyry: **Accident is that which the same thing can be present and not present.**

A third definition is handed down by the negation of other universals: **Common accident is that which is neither genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property, and which always remains in the subject, never departing from the subject, according to the nature of the faculty.**

A fourth definition expresses common accident as universal distinct from others by two modes — first by this: **Accident is a universal apt to be in many accidentally, and not reciprocal.** And by property: **Accident is a universal apt to be predicated of many in what Accidental, and not reciprocal.**

From which definition easily can be understood the two complex species of common accident, of which we said something in the prior disputation. The prior comprehended those accidents which are only predicated of those which under one species are constituted — to be learned, of the singular men under the human species contained — and it is called the specific accident, which pertains to one only in number of the species, and to one single species can penetrate. The posterior truly are those accidents, which can be attributed to individuals of many species — as white in this wall, this cygnus, this man, and so of others — and it is called generic accident, which pertains to various species of individuals, and consequently also to those species' genus — as is understood from the examples adduced.

From which passing is to be noted the distinction between Property and Accident, since Property descends from universals to singulars — as risible from man to the singular Peter — while Accident from the particular ascends to the universal, as from the common man Aristotle and Socrates and other particular men are Philosophers — insofar as man in common is said to be a Philosopher, in that he participates in Aristotle, Socrates, and other particular men who are Philosophers.

From the rest of the definitions of accident — **Accident is a universal apt to be predicated of many**, etc. — the parts must be briefly examined.

First: **universal** — in which it convenes with the remaining universals.

Second: **apt to be predicated of many** — to the distinction of individual.

Third: **in what Accidental** — to the distinction of genus and species.

Fourth: **non-reciprocal** — to the distinction of Property, which is predicated reciprocally, as will be taught below.

Objection: a part cannot be predicated of the total. But accident has the ratio of part in comparison of the subject — namely as some form advenient to the subject — as white as the form of the wall advenient to it — but the genus is a connotative entity, signifying the essential ratio of genus, as they call the genus, and connotates the nature itself which is said to be genus — as for example the nature of animal — therefore genus cannot be defined by a single definition. The major is shown: what can be defined by a single definition must have a single essence — but connotative entities do not indicate a single essence, but double — as white indicates whiteness and subject — therefore the connotative entities cannot be defined by a single definition.

I respond distinguishing the major: connotative entities cannot be defined by a single definition, which distinctly explicates both parts, I concede — by a single definition which explicates only one part, I deny — and the definition which solely explicates one part, only for those — as the definition of white, which is given by one definition that solely explicates whiteness — such the definition of white is not the universal apt to be in many — in the same mode with the genus, since it is a connotative entity, the genus cannot be defined by a single definition which distinctly explicates both parts — namely the genericity and nature — I concede — but by a single definition which only explicates one part — I deny — for the posterior definition of genus which is handed down through aptitude of existing in many species differing, to be the essential of genus, is because it explicates the totality of genus essence, and through the essential grades is handed down, which is synonymous to the definition desired — these meanwhile essential grades are genus and difference.

TRACTATUS I

On Definitions of Accidents

[Only the privative definitions, not the positive ones, are comprehended by the remaining definitions of accidents.]

Antonius Rubius adds another point in his *Commentaries on Logic, on this chapter concerning accidents, Question 4*: that death does not happen to an animal accidentally, because when death comes the animal has ceased to be; nor is combustion an accident of a house, because while combustion is occurring, the house is nothing more than the material of a house; and these remain as the matter of an animal and a house simultaneously as long as death and combustion are still to come, and after death and combustion what truly remains as accident is outside the subject without its destruction.

The second definition of accident is handed down by Porphyry: *"An accident is that which can be present in and absent from the same thing"* — understand: successively, not simultaneously.

The third definition is given through negation of more universal things: *"A common accident is that which is neither genus, nor species, nor difference, nor property, yet is always present in a subject"* — that is, it is never preserved as actually separated from the subject, according to the nature of the capacity of the thing.

The fourth definition expresses a common accident as a universal distinct from others in two ways: first, *"An accident is a universal apt to be present in many accidentally and not reciprocally"*; second, through property: *"An accident is a universal apt to be predicated of many as accidental in quality, not reciprocally."*

From this definition one can easily understand the complex and simple species of common accidents, about which we said something in the higher disputation. The prior species comprehends those accidents predicated only of things belonging to one species — for example, being learned, of individual humans under the human species — and it is called a specific accident, belonging to the individuals of only one species. The posterior species contains accidents which can be attributed to individuals of many species, such as being white, being black, being sweet, etc. — these are found in individuals of many species, such as white in this and that wall, and in this swan, and in this and that man; and it is called a generic accident, belonging to the individuals of various species, and consequently attributed to their entire genus, as the attached examples make clear.

From this one may note in passing the difference between a Property and an Accident: a Property descends from a universal to singulars — for example, "risible" from man to Peter and Paul, because it first agrees with man that he is risible, and through man with

Peter, Paul, and the other men. But a common accident ascends from particular to universal — from Aristotle and Socrates to man — because man in general is called a Philosopher insofar as Aristotle, Socrates, and other particular men are Philosophers.

The individual parts of the definition of accident — *"An accident is a universal apt to be predicated of many, etc."* — are to be briefly examined:

- **First:** "universal" — in which it agrees with other universals
- **Second:** "apt to be predicated of many" — to distinguish it from individuals
- **Third:** "in quale [as a quale]" — to distinguish it from genus and species
- **Fourth:** "accidentarium [accidentally]" — to distinguish it from difference
- **Last:** "non reciprocum [not reciprocal]" — to distinguish it from Property; all of which are understood from the foregoing.

Objection: A part cannot be predicated of the whole. But an accident has the role of a part compared to its subject, for it presents itself like a form coming to a subject — for example, white is like a form coming to a wall. Therefore an accident cannot be predicated of its subject.

Response: I concede the major, and distinguish the minor. An accident has the role of a part compared to its subject if it is taken in the abstract — I concede; if in the concrete — I deny. For example: white taken in the abstract (i.e., for whiteness) has the role of a part of the wall to which whiteness adheres, namely the wall's part; but if it is taken in the concrete for the very white thing itself, then the universal has not the role of a part but of the whole. For you rightly say "the wall *is white*," not "the wall *is whiteness*": therefore, predicated thus, white does not have the role of a part but of the whole.

Some ask here whether inherence is part of the essence of accident; but this is a question for all of Metaphysics, and must be deferred to Metaphysics.

ON UNIVERSALS

LAST QUESTION: On the Common Affections of Accident

The first affection of common Accident is its distinction from the subject — whether it is formal, real, or by the nature of the thing.

I respond: it is to be believed with firm faith that Accident is at least in some way distinguished in reality from the subject, and can truly be separated from it and exist separately — as we believe occurs in the most sacred Sacrament of the Eucharist, in which the accidents of bread and wine remain after their substance is converted into the substance of the Lord's Body. Concerning this, the Theologians dispute from their proper office.

The affection of the same accident is its distinction from Property and from the other Universals; but this is sufficiently understood from what has been said. No other affections of accidents occur which we ought to dwell upon. *Thus much for Universals.*

POSTERIOR TRACTATUS OF THIS PART: ON CATEGORY

PREFACE

After the darkness with which the doctrine of Universals — called the forest of Porphyry — is said to be surrounded, a doctrine of something purer and of a more pleasing quality now follows. Departing from the dreadful labyrinthine places and meanders, with the voice of Porphyry rushing to frighten the mind, we are led happily to the Elysian fields — most pleasing to all, filled with the abundance and truth of things — and we enter the divine little book of the Categories: that divine work which can have only its own price, which we meditate on interpreting, led by Aristotle, the prince of Philosophers. In it all things are contained, as in a circle. Therefore, no one should fear poverty amid such abundance, or darkness amid such light; with minimum labor, one will harvest the most abundant fruit, and from the densest fog, the most splendid light.

Moreover, the triple disputation of this treatise shall be: first, on *Ante-predicament*, or ante-predicamentary things; second, on *Category* itself; third, on *Post-predicament*.

But first, we shall preface some preliminary matters about the object and end of this book.

PROLEGOMENA TO THE BOOK ON CATEGORIES

FIRST PROLEGOMENON: On the Author

Whether Aristotle is the author of this book, or whether someone composed it under the name of Aristotle, is debated not without cause. Not only does Iamblichus doubt this, but he wishes to have it presented as a work introduced under the name of Aristotle, as he says, the better to be distributed to others — since, he claims, great discords appear in this little book and in the Metaphysics, as will become apparent later. Others more commonly reproach Iamblichus, saying the author of this book is Aristotle, since it has the same phrasing as his other books, the same pure and concise style, the same subtlety of doctrine; and furthermore, the Analytic books would have been composed in vain, since without some knowledge of the Categories they cannot be understood, as will appear below. Whatever may be the case — whether Aristotle is the author, or someone else writing under his name — the book is certainly, as containing a singular doctrine and being necessary for the remaining parts of Logic, most worthy of careful and diligent exposition, which we shall accomplish, God willing, with a ready mind.

TRACTATUS II

SECOND PRELUDE On the Object of this Book

If we are speaking of the material object, it must be established that it is not — contrary to nominalists — mere words, but rather things themselves as contained in the Categories; and philosophers commonly affirm this with one voice. Voices by themselves are the object of no science, but are taken only insofar as they serve to express things. If indeed we speak of the formal object, it must be asserted that the things of the Categories are not taken absolutely, but insofar as they contribute to establishing modes of distinguishing.

It is proven: things must be treated in Logic in the way that most advances Logic toward achieving its end. What advances it is this: things considered insofar as they serve to construct modes of distinguishing, since the end of Logic is to direct the mind in modes of distinguishing, as has been said. Therefore Categorical things are considered in Logic under this formal account, since it is the same formal object — and Metaphysics distinguishes those same Categorical things in the same way, yet contemplates them under another account, namely insofar as they are certain beings.

FINAL PRELUDE On the End of this Book

If we speak of the immediate end, it must be stated that the notions of things which are in the Category itself are contained therein. If however we speak of the remote end, it is most fittingly described thus: *notions of Categorical things, modes of distinguishing, definitions, divisions, and arguments easily composed* — as we shall confirm more below when speaking of the usefulness of the Categories.

FIRST DISPUTATION On the Ante-Predicaments, or Things Before the Predicaments

FIRST SECTION On Homonyms, Synonyms, Analogues, and Paronyms, according to the Mind of Aristotle and the Truth of the Matter

QUESTION I – On Homonymy

ARTICLE I

On the Name and Various Acceptations of Homonyms

A homonym is called that which *has only a common name*, as will appear more below. Meanwhile, homonyms are taken sometimes for *significants*, or as others say for homonyms proper; sometimes for *significates*, or as they say, homonymata.

Homonyms by their significants, or homonymous significants, are *those which come together in a common name alone*, such as the heavenly, terrestrial, and marine dog come together under the name "dog."

Homonymous significates, or homonymata, are *those which come together under some common name*. The aforesaid dogs are the celestial, terrestrial, and marine, who come together only in the name of dog.

ARTICLE II

On the Existence of Homonyms

The common use of homonyms — and it is not infrequent — sufficiently confirms their existence. How many kinds there are, let us briefly declare.

Therefore some homonyms are called such *by chance or fortune*, others truly *by deliberate intention*.

Homonyms by chance are those *which beyond intention come together fortuitously*, such as when a boy named Lucius Petri and another person of Rome happen to be called by the same name.

Homonyms from deliberation are those *which have their coming together in some common name from the intention of the one imposing the name*. This comes about in two ways: first, by reason of *similarity*, which shines forth in the very things signified, or the homonymy of them; for which reason they are given the same name, because they comport themselves in some way in the same manner among themselves. Second, true homonyms are called from deliberation *without any foundation or similarity*, when some name is imposed on something from the pure pleasure of the imposer, where the name agrees with others though in the meantime there is no similarity among them. This for the most part happens for two reasons: first, if someone named his son after Aristotle, this was done so that the excellence of his doctrine and the perfection of his philosophy would be communicated; or if someone called his son John in memory of his ancestor who had that name, or for some other similar cause.

One inquires: whence arise homonyms of this kind?

I respond briefly: they arise from a scarcity of words, since more things came to exist needing to be designated by names than there were names themselves.

ARTICLE III

On the Essence of Homonyms

Homonyms are defined thus by Aristotle at the beginning of his Ante-predicaments: *Homonyms are those whose name alone is common, and the account of the substance corresponding to the name is altogether different*.

It is called first *those whose name alone is common*, to distinguish them from synonyms, whose common name is the greater, and nature itself is also common.

There is added for greater explication: *the account of substance responding to the name, altogether different*. About these words several things are notable. First, that through Aristotle's definition, *account* is understood to mean the definition, which when it is the account of opening the nature of a thing, is taken first as the optimal account to be uncovered. Second, to note that by the name of substance is understood the essence of any thing, whether it be substance or accident. Third, to note expressly that Aristotle placed in this definition *the nature responding to the name, which it expresses*, to indicate that those alone are homonymous that do not have the same nature signified by the superior name in which they converge, even if in some degree they converge as synonyms — such as Bull-father, Bull-mountain, and Bull-animal, between which the degree of body is the common nature of synonyms insofar as they converge in the same name of Bull.

From all these things the definition of homonyms can be collected: *Homonyms are those whose name is common, and the definition — that is, the account of the essence expressed by the common name — is altogether different*.

If homonyms have the same name, they are univocal, or of one voice. Distinguishing the consequence: homonyms will be univocal if the univocal is taken as having one common name — I concede; if it is taken as having one common name and nature — I deny. And so homonyms are called univocal only in the first sense.

ARTICLE IV

On the Properties of Homonyms

The first is that they remove contradiction. If such are of a natural kind, we can simultaneously receive affirmation and negation without contradiction. Thus we can affirm of a dog simultaneously that it is capable of barking and deny the same, for the propositional truth is preserved: *a dog is not capable of barking* — namely, the heavenly or marine dog — *a dog is capable of barking* — that is, the domestic dog.

The second property is that homonyms are more to be distinguished than defined, according to their nature.

The reason is clear: since when homonyms signify diverse natures, before a definition is given that defines the nature to be defined, it must be noted which nature is at issue — which is effected by distinction.

The final property is that homonyms can in some respect be called synonyms. By way of example, Bull is a homonym with respect to the celestial Bull, Bull of the mountain, and Bull animal. If however one takes precisely the common nature, which is only that of Bull animal in particular, one will not properly obtain the name of synonyms, since for them not only is the name common but also the nature designated by the name agrees. Whichever it is — namely Bull animal — is called Bull and has the nature of Bull animal, which those alone postulate to be synonymy.

QUESTION II

On Synonymy

Since not much arises about synonyms to be said, with the question understood we may readily comprehend them.

A synonym is expressed from the word: that *which has the same nature with a name in common*, as we noted above.

Synonyms are twofold: *essential* and *accidental*. The essential is that which agrees according to name and nature, from inferiors with essential participation, such as animal with respect to man and brute, who communicate essentially.

Accidental is that which agrees according to name and nature, but only accidentally participating — such as the Proper, for example risible by comparison to man, and the accident white by comparison to the wall. Both share a name in common, for example in this name *white*. As risible agrees with man in a natural way but accidentally participates, the same must be said of white.

The definition of synonyms is given by Aristotle in the first chapter of his Ante-predicaments: *Synonyms are those whose name is the same, and the account of the essence responding to the name is the same*.

Note first — as we said above of homonyms — that here by synonyms are meant only *essential synonyms*, those which converge in some common name and nature, since this definition does not carry the mark of *significants*, which say a name in common for many, but according to *essence*, the definition which shows the nature is equally shared by those participating in it, as is understood by examples adduced of animal, risible, white, etc.

Note second, that they are not defined as mere words and voices, but as things and natures insofar as they come together in some common name and the nature designated by that name agrees — by which ratio the homonyms are defined, which were thus defined by Aristotle, as we have proven.

Note third, that Aristotle expressly placed in this definition *the account of the essence responding, the same*. For it can happen that among synonyms some have partly different natures, though not altogether different — namely the nature of brute and man, which have some difference between them — though nothing other is a truly different nature; they are therefore synonyms only because they do not have a wholly different essential nature in what they are called synonyms.

Moreover, since synonyms are the properties altogether contrary to those of homonyms, those properties are easily understood from the properties of homonyms set forth above.

QUESTION III

On Paronyms

Paronyms according to Aristotle are those things *which are called from something with a case or termination differing*: as Grammatical from Grammar, Logical from Logic, brave from bravery, and so of others.

The paronym is divided first into *the paronyming* — that is, the denominating form — and *the paronymated* — that is, the denominated. The paronyming is the *form of denomination*, for example bravery, which denominates the brave. The paronymated is *the thing itself which is denominated*, for example man, who from bravery is denominated brave.

The paronym can be understood in three ways: first, for the significate — that is, for the denominating form; second, for the thing re-signified — that is, the thing denominated; third, for the aggregate of the denominating form and the denominated thing, from which bravery and man arise. This last is properly called the paronym, which arises from another by nomination and is altered in case and termination, differing from it: as *brave* is said from bravery, from which it receives its appellation, varying in case and in termination.

Moreover, paronym is properly so called, or is divided into *substantial* and *accidental*. The substantial is that *which is taken from some substantial form, which has itself with respect to an adjacent other, but for the thing itself as something subsisting* — such as man, who is called from the human form, which though it is a substantial form, yet in no way adheres to man as an accident but per se subsists. The accidental is that *which is taken from some accidental form, which has itself after the mode of something adjacent to a subject* — such as white, which is taken from whiteness, which is a kind of accidental form adhering per se to the subject, for example to the wall.

Nor do I see the reason why some before have rejected it that paronyms are defined by Aristotle as that which *is derived from something and differs from it in case and termination* — man from humanity, animal from animality, and so of others. But this cannot be gathered from the words of Aristotle himself, for the reason that those things proper to paronyms are given to things vocally expressed, not to mere voices. Therefore paronyms as defined by Aristotle are things, and not mere pure voices.

Nor is it pressed that paronyms are defined here insofar as they differ by case from those from which they are derived, since this is properly from things vocally expressed — not from the things themselves without voices — but by account, case, and termination different, they are defined.

There are no properties of paronyms worth immersing the work in to explicate; wherefore we proceed to Analogues.

QUESTION IV On Analogy

Although Aristotle made no mention of Analogues, since however they hold the middle place between homonyms and synonyms, and are of the greatest importance to the absolute treatment of the Categories, we shall add some notes about them here.

ARTICLE I

On the Name and Various Acceptations of Analogues

Analogue properly signifies *proportion and similarity which intervenes between some things*. Generally speaking, it is used in three ways: two properly, the third most improperly and abusively.

1. The proper acceptation is that according to which an Analogue is called *that which can be attributed to many things insofar as they are referred to one*, such as health is attributed to animal, urine, diet, and walking — these latter are referred to the animal, whose cause, sign, or effect of health they are — and these are called *analogues of attribution*.
2. The second acceptation is that *analogous* means that thing *which signifies many things because of some proportion*, as it has itself with respect to the foot of man, of the mountain, and of the channel — since three such kinds of feet are given the name of foot because of the proportion they bear among themselves, just as the foot of man is said to be the lowest part ordained to sustaining it, thus the feet of the mountain and the channel are the lowest parts by which they are supported — and of this kind are called *analogues of proportion*.
3. Taking it most improperly, the *analogous* thing from which some inferior is signified in the same name, and the essential ratio converges in many — which in some other exists in an imperfect mode — since the nobler difference of man is conjoined with the analogue of the brute with respect to the sense of man and brute, because it is permissible according to name and essence that it be suited in man and in brutes, yet it exists in a more perfect mode in man, and imperfectly in brutes. This is called *analogy of inequality*, which we said to be improper and abusive, since true synonymy is this — as is seen in the example adduced of animal: one does not find it properly an analogue, but truly synonymous with man and brute. Coming upon this acceptation we do not tarry, but return to the proposed.
4. Thus both analogues — of attribution as well as of proportion — are taken bifariously. First, the analogue which attributes to many and denominates many is called *analogue analogans* or signifying, taken as primary from the things denominated, whose cause, sign, or effect of health it is, and called *analogue analogatum* or signified. The former is health; the latter is urine, diet, walking, etc., which receive the denomination of health.

ARTICLE II

On the Existence of Analogues

It is established that certain analogues can be given; it remains that we distribute them into their species, beginning from the analogy of attribution.

It is notable that this analogy of attribution is itself called by another name *from cause* or *from use*, because it is called an analogue of attribution reasoning from one use or from one cause — since it attributes to many insofar as they are referred to one, as animal to urine, diet, and walking; the latter inasmuch as they are referred to animal as their cause, sign, or effect.

There is also a fourfold genus of *cause*: material, formal, efficient, and final; and thus a fourfold analogue of attribution, namely from material, formal, efficient, and final causes.

Analogue of attribution from material cause — such I do not think exists — is said to be when many are referred to one as toward their material cause and subject, as in the case of substance, many accidents have it, since they are all referred to substance and subject as to their material cause, to which it is suited to receive those accidents. But for this analogy, properly speaking, there are synonyms, as will be proven below.

Analogue from formal cause is that which agrees to many, of which one or several are ordered to another as toward a formal cause: in this way man is called an analogue with respect to a living man and a painted one, since the painted is referred to the living as to an exemplar, by whose inspection and imitation it was produced.

From efficient cause is that which is attributed to many, of which one or several are ordered to another as toward a more proximate efficient cause: in this way medicine is called an analogue with respect to the physician, his books, and his instruments — since his books and instruments are called medicinal, since they pertain to the physician himself, who is the efficient cause, to whom they are referred ordinarily, and who is the principal analogue to be defined.

And finally *from final cause* is that which signifies many things, of which one or several are referred to one or several as toward a final cause: in this way health is called an analogue with respect to animal and walking, since these two latter are referred to animal as to the final cause, for which they are established, as we have said.

Moreover, others divide the analogy of attribution into *intrinsic* and *extrinsic*.

The *intrinsic* analogy of attribution is that in which the essential ratio of the analogue — by whose name the inferior analogates are signified — participates essentially at least in

the primary or most principal analogate, and in the others only extrinsically and as if by translation: as health is intrinsically and essentially in an animal, and in urine, diet, and walking is referred to it and ordered to its health, as we have said many times.

Attending to the *analogy of proportion*, this is constructed from the common opinion from two analogies: one *altogether extrinsic and metaphorical, as if by translation*, the other *intrinsic and essential*.

Extrinsic and metaphorical is that in which the ratio by which something is named is found only essentially in the primary inferior analogate, and in others only extrinsically and through some metaphor and translation: as *to see* is called an analogue with respect to man, meadows, fortune, and the arts — since the ratio of seeing essentially fits man, in the others only metaphorically. For they say that the meadow smiles and Fortune smiles, though the ratio of laughing and seeing essentially fits only man; yet in the others only metaphorically, since man laughs, the meadows laugh, and Fortune laughs — yet the ratio of laughter is essentially fitting only in man, in the others only metaphorically, through some proportion or likeness, such that the meadow in its flowering gives delight, and fortune in its abundance.

Intrinsic, or *essential*, is called that whose ratio by name is found essentially in all inferior analogates, as the *principle* has itself — that ratio of essential principle is found essentially in all the analogates, and yet inasmuch as they preserve some proportion among themselves: in this same way, the foot is said an analogue with respect to the foot of man, of the mountain, and of the channel, since in all those the true ratio of foot is found essentially, and yet they serve some proportion to one another by what they have among themselves concerning the sustaining of the subject, as we said above.

But whether truth is verified in the examples adduced, I do not wish to expend more carefully here: I said I can by no means admit clearly this kind of analogy, in which the essential ratio lies essentially in all the inferiors.

ARTICLE III

On the Essence of Analogues

Analogues have this definition: *Analogues are those whose name is common, the ratio responding to the name partly the same, partly different*.

First is placed *common name*, in which they converge with homonyms, since both homonyms and synonyms alike have a common name, as appears from their definitions.

Added is *the ratio of the name responding partly the same*, in which they differ from homonyms, which have altogether different ratios in differing things, as we showed in their place.

And finally *partly different* is added to distinguish them from synonyms, which obtain the nature through the name signified altogether the same and in no way different, as we saw above.

Objection. In analogues the ratio of the analogue's significants responds to it altogether the same; therefore they were badly defined as *those whose name is common and the ratio of the name responds partly the same*.

The antecedent is proven: the ratio by name expressed and responding to the analogue is formally and intrinsically in one analogue alone, and in the others only extrinsically and through some relation to one — if they be analogues of attribution — or through some translation and metaphor — if they be analogues of proportion — as the examples proposed show. Therefore the ratio of the superior analogue is by no means the same in all inferior analogates.

I respond, negating the antecedent. To its proof I say: the essential ratio of the analogue is found essentially in one analogue alone, and in the others only extrinsically. Yet the inferior analogates are said to have the same nature at least from the same form — in one existentially, in the others extrinsically — as urine, potio, and walking are denominated from animal health; animal is purely the essential analogate insofar as health is essentially in it, but in the others only by denomination from the same form existing in the animal. Therefore the inferior analogates are denominated partly from the same nature and partly differently.

The antecedent cannot stand firm: the essential ratio of the analogue cannot be divided by form and nature, as if some part of the form and nature of the analogue fits in one inferior and other parts in another, since generally the essence of things is like numbers — indivisible — from what has been said. It can be divided by reason of denomination from the same form, so that because of the denomination the same nature in one animal

is essentially named, while in another the same nature is obtained by denomination from that form essentially existing, as we said immediately.

We inquire: are those things defined as analogues the analogues themselves, or the true analogates?

I respond: they are defined as analogates, to which this brief definition is assigned — which concurs in name and nature partly the same and partly different. All of this can be gathered wholly from the said things on homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms, since by par there ought to be a corresponding ratio for analogues.

ARTICLE IV

On the Properties of Analogues

To analogues generally is attributed that *they cannot be defined unless their distinct species have been first established*: whose ratio is the same as that attributed to homonyms, since they by no means signify one nature common to many in a common name but various ones, and for the common use of man, urine, potio, and walking, only one definition ought to hold.

Peculiarly to the analogue of attribution is conceded that *they have a primary analogue from which the others receive their name and ordering*: thus among the analogates of health is given animal health, from which others are named. The primary analogue is that which orders all the rest from itself and to which all the others are referred.

Moreover to the analogues of the same attribution another property is attributed: *to be less definable than the principally denominated analogate, from which the others are named*. He who requires that this be defined first — since the definition of the others specifies through it — ought therefore to imbibe it more, so to speak; for health to be defined is the health primarily said of the animal, yet among the rest, those ought to draw more from the definition of health.

SECOND DISPUTATION

On the Category Itself

SECTION I – On those Things That Are in Others and Predicated of Others in General

QUESTION I – On the Name and Various Acceptations of Category

The name Category, as we said in the Summary, signifies accusation from the courts of judges; having been transferred to the schools of Philosophers, it signifies the supreme genus, or rather a certain series of things — of genera, species, and individuals under the supreme genus — so that it stands as a kind of accusation when from one predicate another is predicated. Thus as when we say Judas is a thief, we seem to accuse man of animality; thus in the schools of Philosophers it signifies a supreme genus or series of things under it, so that just as Judas is a thief, we accuse him of being a man, so by simple terms Judas is an animal.

Beyond the useless acceptations, Category is taken in two ways. First *materially*, for the very things which are constituted in the Category — for substances if they be substances, for accidents. Second *formally*, for the series and ordering of all things — of genera, species, and individuals — under a superior subject, and thus inferiors are constituted in the superior place, and inferiors of inferiors.

The second division, which is somewhat more obscure, is given by Aristotle through *being in a subject* and *being predicated of a subject*, which things are said to be in some or predicated of some subject.

Certain things, he says, *are said of a subject* (understand this as of attribution, and of an inferior) *yet are in no subject* (that is, of inherence). He gives the example of man, who is said to be predicated of some particular man, yet in no particular subject does man inhere — as science inheres in the intellect, as color in a wall — for accidents of some individuals are called singular and individual, and since they have no inferiors, they are predicated by no one.

Others (Aristotle continues) *are in a subject* (namely of inherence) *but are in no way predicated of a subject* (that is, of attribution). Take as examples particular accidents, which are in a subject of inherence since they are in the substance of particulars — this color in a wall, this Dialectic in the intellect — being predicated of no subject of attribution, since they are singular and individual and have no inferiors, and are therefore attributed to no one.

Third he adds: *that which is in a subject* (namely of inherence) *and at the same time is predicated of a subject* (that is, of attribution) — understand the accidents in common, such as science, which is in a subject of inherence since science is an accident, and it is also predicated of a subject of attribution; for example grammar, which is predicated of grammar as its subject of attribution, since it is said to be science, and is predicated of the subject of attribution.

But since the entire difficulty of this Aristotelian division depends on the ambiguity of the word *subject* — whether it be taken for the subject of attribution or for the subject of inherence — therefore the rule to be held here is: *Take subject from Aristotle for the subject of attribution*, with the particle "of" placed in use: when something is said to be predicated, or not to be predicated, of a subject — then take *subject* for that of attribution; with the particle "in": when an entity says *something to be* or *not to be in a subject* — then take *subject* for that of inherence, as the antecedent shows.

And so the Aristotelian division unfolds: *in universal substance*, insofar as it says to be predicated of the subject of attribution and to be in no subject of inherence; *in universal accident*, which is in a subject of inherence and is predicated of a subject of attribution; *in singular substance*, which is in no subject of inherence, nor of a subject of attribution predicated; *in singular accident*, which is in a subject of inherence but predicates of no subject of attribution — as all of this is illustrated by the examples adduced.

QUESTION II On the Existence of Category

ARTICLE I Is a Category Given?

I respond affirmatively, in accordance with the common consensus of Philosophers who, after Aristotle on the Category, have handed down certainly many and splendid things.

It is proven second from the greatest utility which the intelligence of categorical things provides — to definitions, to divisions, to the laws of argumentation — most commodiously to be handed down. It is easy to show by induction: for the Definition of at least the primary species requires an immediate genus and proper differentials, as the definition of man from animal and rational. The Category itself is what hands down various genera, species, and differentials — what the immediate genus is, and what the mediate genus is, and what the propria and improper differentials are — and the proceeding of the Category makes this easy; hence the laws of definition cannot be known and understood without the Category's notice.

And that definition contributes also to division: for the division of a genus must be done in species, of genera in an immediate species and through proper differentials of the species, just as man into animal and species immediately, and into species through the rational immediately, which is the proper differential for that species — and for the accommodation of the division of species most fittingly.

And that the Categories contribute most fittingly to Argumentation is easiest, since they trade various genera, species, and differentials — what is the immediate genus and what the mediate, and what the propria and improper differentials, and what those are — and the proceeding of the Category makes this easy, whence the laws of definition to be known and understood cannot be without the Category's notice.

ARTICLE II

On the Number of the Categories — What It Is, and Whether Synonyms Exists with Respect to God and Creatures, Substance and Accident

How many the Categories are, and how varied among Philosophers the opinion is, takes long to state; and since one finds that on this there is among themselves no consensus, with nothing between themselves agreeing. And to restore more is still open, with the infinite minor opinions of some weightier Philosophers being proposed on the question. And since Aristotle carries the torch before all others, we shall first propose his opinion.

Now if we wish truth to stand, it must be admitted that in the said Categories Aristotle maintains the number which vulgar Philosophy follows — and without any major distinction, at least neglecting, the reasons of contraries to the contrary being held — it follows there to be ten Categories, in accordance with ten supreme genera: Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, Where, When, Position, and Having.

This number Aristotle takes and gathers, saying it expressly in chapter four of his Ante-predicaments, from various significations of things: *Some of these* — he says, of the things of the category, both simple and complex — *signify Substance*, such as man; *some Quantity*, such as three cubits; *some Quality*, such as white; *some Action*, such as to cut; *some Passion*, such as to be cut; *some When*, such as yesterday, tomorrow; *some Where*, such as in the forum; *some Position*, such as to lie, to stand; *some lastly Having*, such as to be shod, to be armed. From which, not against the Aristotelian opinion, his ten Categories are — not truly of verity but from one position alone — that only one Category is given, namely created being, complete, to which as to the supreme genus of substance and accidents everything revolves.

Moreover, because this proposition is as potent — arguing from two most important things, since one makes *Being* with respect to substance and accidents synonymous, and the other makes Being the genus of Divine and created things, so that our general argument extends to being in common, both for God and creatures as well as for substance and accident — it is thus:

First Proposition. Being truly and properly is synonymous with respect to God and creatures, substance and accidents. This is the sentence of Saint Thomas, Part I, question 5, article 1 and 3, and all his disciples, Part I, question 13, article 3 — and the Thomist sentence in the dispute on universals in the common, to wit, the example of the Divine Persons — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — agreeing in three persons, yet it is not any one of the universals, neither species, differential, proprium, nor accidental. Indeed according to the Thomists, Being is synonymous with respect to God and creatures, yet not therefore genus of the genus; hence palpably it is something able to be synonymous which nonetheless would not be a genus; and thus it appears possible to be synonymous which is not a genus.

Being common to God and to creatures is not distinguished in its nature from God, formally and from the nature of things, which is not fitting for God as distinctly, as the Theologians prove in the first part. And those two things are found in Being which compare God and creatures, substance and accidents: therefore the ratio of these with respect to Being cannot fail to be synonymous.

The minor is proven. First, it is certainly certain that the name of Being is common to God and creatures, substance and accidents, since all are called Beings. The ratio so communicated with the name consists in Being in that it is something real, distantly and independently of the thinking intellect, as all concede. By this ratio Being in God converges just as in creatures, just as in substance as in accident — since equally in God and in creatures, in substance and in accident, from the ratio of the intellect independently it is found. Therefore by such a ratio the name Being signified, it converges thus in God as in creatures, thus in substance as in accident; so Being is synonymous.

And the minor is proven second with greater probative force. The ratio of Being must be found in all inferiors at minimum one and the same in the common thing which is Being; it will not be thus if the ratio is not synonymous as we said. But such a ratio of Being is found in God and in creatures, in substance and in accident; therefore Being is synonymous. The major is certain. The minor is proven: the ratio of Being in all inferiors is found more in one, than in all others in the manner of God, since nothing more has Being in one inferior than in any other; because the ratio of Being is found in God most of all in one — more than in all — because Being is in God simply in itself, and in all is equally from the ratio of the intellect independently; and the ratio of Being in God equally more is in all others, etc. Therefore Being is entirely equally synonymous.

Concerning the responses of Thomists: the Thomists say, negating the antecedent, and to their proof they say: for the perfect synonymy it suffices that the ratio be synonymous, which convenes in inferiors absolutely, with any mode of order and dependence of one upon another. Thus they falsely assert those adversaries; therefore Being is thus synonymous. The creature indeed orders to God the Creator and depends from it; by which therefore in those places the dependence of one upon another, not synonymy — not consequently synonymous.

To the contrary. Such a condition of synonymy is required: that the grade of synonymy convenes in inferiors absolutely, with any mode of order or dependence of one upon another. As they falsely assert, those adversaries: therefore Being is thus synonymous; Creature indeed orders to God Creator and depends from it; by which therefore in those places, dependence of one upon another, not synonymy, not consequently synonymy.

The antecedent is proven. Any habit is ordered to the natural faculty in which it inheres, and directed by it — intellectual habits, as science, to the intellect; the habits of the will, as virtue, to the will. But quality does not define synonymy meeting with faculties and habits; and this is from the doctrine of all Philosophers, as we shall teach below. Therefore to synonymy it is not required that the grade of synonymy convenes in inferiors absolutely, with any mode of order or dependence of one upon another.

From this easily all the arguments of the Thomists run — all the reasons of all, with which their opinion is argued — which are not other than from our ratiocination, assigned to themselves by the Thomists.

They object furthermore. If Being with respect to God and creatures is synonymous, with respect to them it ought to be genus. But Being is not a genus, as cannot be; therefore Being is not synonymous with respect to God and creatures.

The major is proven: Being synonymous, if it be synonymous, debits to be genus — who else from its inferiors can be distinguished by genus and differential, whose composition from genus and differential necessarily is. Should there come from genus and differential, then of necessity it ought to be genus. But Being, if it were synonymous, could be distinguished in its inferiors from genus and differential, as is proven most certainly from the initiation of this book. The major therefore is most certain, and of the foundations beginning this book.

The minor is proven: Being is not a genus, since one cannot specify Being by any differential — neither real nor rational — since the differential itself would be Being, and what is said to be added to Being must be Being, since it cannot add what is outside Being, for outside Being there is nothing.

I respond, distinguishing the major: Being synonymous ought to be genus, if the synonymy be of such kind that the common ratio fits absolutely in inferiors without the intrinsic mode ordering and depending on one another, I concede; if the synonymy be of such kind that the common ratio fits in inferiors with some ordering and dependence, I deny.

But against this, those adversaries object. Because Being ought to be analogous with respect to substance and accidents, since the ratio of Being fits more in substance than in accident — substance being more Being than accident; therefore Being is not synonymous but analogous with respect to substance and accidents.

I respond first: this argument proceeds only against those who hold that Being is simply synonymous with respect to substance and accidents without any mode of greater or lesser participation; but against us who say that Being is synonymous with respect to God and creatures, substance and accidents — yet with some ordering and dependence, so that it fits in God most principally, and in creatures less principally — the argument does not conclude. For the synonymy of Being, as we hold, is not of such sort that it fits in all its inferiors in an absolutely equal manner, but that it fits in all inferiors truly, really, and essentially, though with some diversity of mode and degree.

Second Proposition. Being created, contracted to complete, is no mode synonymous, but truly a genus with respect to all inferior complete beings, whether they be substance or accidents; and consequently one unique Category is given, namely created being complete, and to it as the supreme genus, substance and accidents revolve.

That it is synonymous is proven in proposition 1 sufficiently; that it truly is a genus is proven by this most valid reason. The total reason why substance created complete is a genus with respect to corporeal and spiritual substance is the same that proves it is also a genus with respect to inferior complete beings, substance and accidents. From inferiors it is distinguished by true differentials in which it is not included — by which substance is contrasted to accidental substance — because it is included in it, and equally all lower complete beings. Complete Being contracted to corporeal and spiritual substance draws its inferiors, as it is likewise substance created complete, of the species corporeal and spiritual of its true differentials in which it is not included; so that corporeal and spiritual substances are its species. Its inferiors must contain it in the same right; thus Being complete is contracted to Body and Spirit, by true differentials in which it is not included; so that the minimum contains it in the same right, and so created complete Being is the genus of substantial and accidental beings, by which pact substance and accidents are its species.

Third Proposition. If Being created is restricted to complete, it is no mode synonymous, but truly a genus with respect to all the inferior complete beings, substance and accidents; and consequently one unique Category is given.

If Being restricted to complete is contracted, it is the genus of substance and accidents — which we have proven. But being restricted to complete, contracted, since it is contracted to complete being, and its inferiors are substance and accidents, it follows that substance and accidents are its species, and it is their genus; therefore one unique Category is given.

Responding to the second: all beings of reason can be referred to the Category of real beings, and to diverse species of real beings revoked, as they are conceived in various modes of substance, as chimera consisting of human body and the head of a lion; or by quantity, as magnitude corrected from earth to heaven; or by relation, as relations of reason — verbal gratia — and so of others. These new things therefore do not constitute a category.

QUESTION THREE On the Essence of Category

Category is defined thus: *Category is a series and ordering of genera, species, and individuals, under the supreme genus.*

Alternatively stated: *the highest genus and that which contains all things under itself, naturally disposed.*

Since in our opinion a unique Category is the case, therefore it is not required to be added the particle *of the highest genus*, but simply *of the supreme genus*; because the disposition which is in the series categorical observing, so that superior are predicated of inferior — is entirely natural, and does not depend on human arbitration.

For the greater explication of the cause, one inquires: what conditions are required for a categorical being?

I respond: many are to be desired. The first is *that it be real being*, because here we deal only with the category of real beings, as we said above.

The second is *that it be simple, and not complex, and per se, not through accident and per accidens* — that is, so that it has a unique nature, not multiplied through various cases coalescing; which would not be achieved if the beings complex, either per accidens or they sew various natures together: since a heap of stones, a house, an exercise, entities connoting things, which signify qualities such as candor, sweetness, connoting the subjects in which they are found — all these are aggregate entities, per accidens, and not simple, per se.

The third condition is *that it not be of infinite nature, and of perfection* — whence God is removed from the category — which we shall prove below within the category.

The fourth condition is *that the being be complete or perfect*, for the comprehension of which condition one notes that complete being is that dual thing constituted: first, *simply*, that which by no composition of any entity per se comes together — and individual beings of species, verbal gratia Petrus, Paulus, Bucephalus, from which by no means anything per se is composed.

This is expressed, *the composition of some being per se*, since some accidental individuals can pertain to the constitution of some being's entities per accidens — as albedo and similar things pertain to the constitution of this white being — yet they do not obtain the habitus of complete and perfect, nor are they inserted into the categorical series, because Being is an entity per se not constituted.

Second, *another thing is said a being composed only insofar as that*, which though possible to enter the composition of some entity per se, yet can have the ratio of the whole, if considered independently — as genera, which though when with their species differentials constitute man, verbi gratia, they can nonetheless have the ratio of the total under some consideration, as we spoke of in the first place. Hence these are removed from the right ordering of the Category as integrating parts — as head, arms, legs — nor are these differentials, which are only in indirect order, or from the side constituting.

Adding them further a most final condition, *that which is posited in a predicament, be univocal*, or it convenes with its inferiors univocally — a condition which cannot be understood except from the genera and superiors, sub which condition they are constituted into individuals, which have no inferiors from individuals, which by no univocal converge with them. This condition we understand from the Analogue excluded from Category.

FINAL QUESTION On the Properties of Category

Some here ask what distinction must intervene between Categories. But this question is none with us, who hold only one unique Category, which we now accept.

What must be declared is in which mode substances in Category are placed, whether in concrete, or truly in the abstract.

First it must be noted that *the abstract*, taken in eo that it is opposed to the *concrete*, means the form without the subject, for example albedo, nigredo [black; color] , etc.; *concrete* truly signifies form in the subject — as album [white thing], which signifies form in whiteness, in the subject — for example in the wall, verbal gratia, or in the swan.

This noted, the substances in Category are placed *formally* and *in concrete*, not in abstract.

First Proposition. *Substance in Category is placed concretely, not in abstract.*

Proven: the mode of substances in Category, which are placed there, must be the mode in which one can be predicated of inferiors. But substances in the abstract cannot be predicated of inferiors — nor is this true proposal, *Humanity is animality* — yet substances in concrete can be predicated of inferiors. *Humanitas* [humanity] is *animalitas* [animality] — verbi gratia, *this is an animal* — as is said elsewhere. Therefore substances which in Category are placed, must be placed in concrete, not in abstract.

Confirmed: Genera and species have the ratio of parts, when in the abstract they are taken — namely animality and humanity, that in respect of man — verbi gratia — what is placed in Category should not have the ratio of parts of superiors. Therefore genera and species should at least not be placed in abstract, but in concrete, when they are constituted in Category.

Second Proposition. *Accidents that are in a Predicament should not be used in concrete, but only in the abstract.*

Proven first: Accidents in concrete taken signify an accidental form and a subject — albedo in concrete is album [a white thing], and substance of milk, to which albedo is affixed — and since these entities are per accidens, they cannot be placed in category.

In this mode accidents in a predicament must be constituted so that superiors can be predicated of inferiors. But in concrete, superiors of accidents cannot be predicated of inferiors — for it is not true, *color is quality* — but the same thing *coloratum* [colored] — therefore accidents are not constituted in a predicament, insofar as they are taken in concrete, but in the abstract.

Objection. If accidents which are placed in the Categories as abstract take there, when, where, position, having, which are not distinguished from location, time, vestment, and the abstract of substance — the concrete placement of these verbi gratia, is absurd.

I respond, negating the consequence. To the proof: I say, where, when, having do not signify location, time, vestment: in the abstract. But *where* signifies *ubiquity* or *the reason* by which something has it, that *situ esse* [to be in a position], or *esse situationem* [to be a situation], the mode by which a thing is said to exist in such a mode exteriorly — as is *situ esse togatum vel armatum* [to be robed or armed], the mode by which a thing exists in such an exterior manner — argument ratione without doubt from the things exposed on Category in common.

SECTION II – On the Category of the Species, or rather of the Supreme Genus of Category, Substance and Accident

QUESTION I On Substance, both according to the mind of Aristotle and according to the truth of the matter

ARTICLE I On the Name and Various Acceptations of Substance

Here, more accurately treating the Category, and about to explain its chief parts — from Substance, as the foundation of all accidents — in accordance with the method of Aristotle we begin, and in accordance with the more usual custom, its name and its acceptations we shall elucidate.

Therefore the name of Substance, or [in its alternate form] *subsistance*, deduced from *subsisting*, per se and in se subsists, not existing in others as accidents: from *subsisting* verbi gratia is the particular subject of accidents of albedo, of the blackness of the Ethiopian, and so of others.

Substance in its various modes is used strictly, first and singularly, *according to Aristotle 8. Metaphysics chapter prime*, with the strictly singular first ones, that the substances universals are not, but rather second ones.

It is taken for the sole immaterial substance and spiritual, solely God and intelligences comprehending, as in 12. Metaphysics chapter 2.

Third it is accepted from Aristotle in 8. Metaphysics, chapter 81, for the sole complete and categorical, and thus taken as primary and singular or as universal, it comprehends.

Fourth most broadly it is used, for any thing's essence whatsoever, whether it be substantial, or accidental — as its substance, that is, its essence.

These four modes of using it most strictly, verbal gratia Petrus, Paul, Bucephalus — these are the first with Aristotle — the second are universal substances, not first ones.

And finally, the name of Substance is accepted properly, for any real being per se subsisting. But since per se subsisting is subsumed under two modes, let us first distinguish them, which we shall retain, the one more rightly instituted to our discussion.

And so *per se subsisting* can be used in three ways. First for the sole negation existing in another as inherence — in which mode here this cannot be taken for per se subsisting, since it means something posited by something real, and distinguished from accident — which alone is negation, since then the accidents of Eucharistic Sacrament, in which the

substance of bread and wine remain after their substance is converted into the substance of the Lord's body, would be said substances, which is indeed only the negation of the subject of inherence.

To exist on its own is understood here as being the same as a proper, non-foreign substance—that is, it does not exist within another thing as a quality attached to it, nor is it supported by another. For example, Peter does not attach to any subject, nor is he held up by any outside support.

However, existing on its own in this specific way does not define the core nature of a substance. This is because, according to common theological teaching, Christ's humanity is a true substance, yet it does not exist on its own; rather, it is supported by the Divine Word.

Thirdly, and most accurately, existing on its own is defined as having the capacity to exist independently of any outside support. This is the truest definition of a substance and applies to all of them. No substance lacks this natural capacity, even if, by some unique circumstance, it does not currently exist on its own. For instance, while Christ's humanity exists within a foreign support, it still possesses the natural capacity to exist on its own.

If we are speaking of substance as a category of being, it can be defined this way: Substance is a real, simple, finite, and complete being that is naturally suited to exist on its own.

1. It is called a being to show what it has in common with accidents (qualities).
2. It is called real to exclude mere ideas or negative concepts.
3. Simple is added to distinguish it from complex groups, like a heap of stones or a house, which are only joined together by chance.
4. Finite is added so that God is immediately excluded from this specific category.
5. Complete is added to exclude individual parts, such as a head or arms, or basic components like matter.
6. Finally, naturally suited to exist on its own is included to distinguish substance from accidents. A substance is defined by this inherent fitness to stand by itself.

Two problems arise from this definition: First, whether a substance must necessarily be finite, or if God should be included in the category of substance; second, whether by defining it as a complete, simple being, God is removed from the category too quickly.

ARTICLE TWO On the Existence of Substance

That substance exists no one denies, since it is itself the subject of all accidents, which permanently cannot subsist naturally; and so this whole article is engaged in more detail.

MEMBER ONE Various Divisions of Substance Contained

The first division of Substance is given, in *substance first and second*, or in singular and universal: in this division Aristotle is conciliated by much authority and celebrity, from the tractation of substance exordens.

Complete substance is that which does not come to the composition of another as its essential part, but is a being complete in kind, as Petrus, animal, vivens, and similar things, which though different things can concur and constitute the essential constitution of man – rational animal – , nonetheless they can have the ratio of the total considered in itself, for example the genus of substances in this mode under some account of the whole, as we said in the first place.

On the contrary, an incomplete substance is one that has the nature of a part and enters into the composition of another thing, such as a head, hand, body, soul, and similar parts.

Furthermore, complete substance is of two types: one is infinite and uncreated, which is God, and he alone; the other is finite and created by God. This finite type is again twofold: one is immaterial, namely angelic; the other is material, which is subdivided in various ways. These divisions will be understood much more easily by the appended table.

MEMBER TWO In which more accurately is expended the first division of Substance, into First and Second

One inquires here, what division is made by this division, or what in it is divided.

There are various opinions on this matter.

The first argument claims this is not a proper division, but only an enumeration of the parts of Substance. It suggests that when Aristotle lists the things that fall under the category of Substance by dividing it into first and second, he only intends to list what is contained under that genus—just as if someone were to list the parts of speech as letters, syllables, and words.

Although this opinion seems easy to support, it does not seem to reflect the mind of Aristotle. He presents this as a true division and immediately adds that first Substance is "more" of a substance than second Substance. This comparison would not be fitting unless the division was more than a simple list.

The truth is that this is a division of a genus into species; it is not a division of a single, identical type, but one that has a relationship of analogy and order among the things being defined.

To repeat: the first view claims there is no proper division, but only an enumeration of the parts of Substance. It argues that Aristotle, by distributing Substance into first and second, wished only to list those things contained under the genus of Substance, just as if someone, describing the parts of speech, were to say some are letters, others syllables, and others words.

MEMBER TWO On the Division of Substance into Complete and Incomplete

With a few propositions, whatever concerns this division we briefly run through.

First proposition: This definition is good and adequate.

It is proven: a division is good and adequate when the parts that divide it are neither broader nor narrower than the thing being divided. This division is entirely of that type because it is the common division of substance; it does not extend beyond what substance is, nor is it too narrow to exclude incomplete substance. Therefore, this division is good and adequate.

Second proposition: This division is not of the genus into species.

It is proven: no true specific difference can be identified to divide substance into "complete" and "incomplete." In such a case, the nature of the substance would have to include a "grade" of substance that goes against its nature—specifically, a nature that does not contain the grade of a higher genus within its own essence. Therefore, because the specific differences that would narrow a genus down to its species are missing here, this division is not one of a genus into its species.

Final proposition. This division is of some genus in a lower kind of synonyms. Or, *Substance in common converges univocal substance complete and incomplete.* The reason is clear, since both substances nominate from another. Hence these are removed from the right ordering of Category of genus integrating parts — head, arms, feet, and so of others.

MEMBER TWO On the Division of Substance into Complete and Incomplete

Attending to the Aristotelian division [of substance into primary and secondary], it is made at the same time in *first and second*. What the first is and how it is to be understood, we briefly explain in a few propositions.

First proposition. Substance in Category is placed concretely, positively, not abstractly. Proven: by the mode substances in Category are placed, they must be in a mode in which one can be predicated of inferiors — *it is indeed the Category* so that

superior *can be predicated of inferiors* — but substances taken in the abstract cannot be predicated of inferiors; *humanitas est animalitas* [humanity is animality] is not a true example; but substances taken in concrete can be predicated of inferiors: for example, a man is an animal, as said elsewhere. Therefore substances which in Category are placed, must be placed in concrete, not in abstract.

Confirmed: Genus and species have the ratio of parts, when in abstract they are accepted — animality and humanity, namely in respect of man verbi gratia — but what is placed in Category should not have the ratio of parts of superiors. Therefore genus and species at least must not be used in the abstract], but in concrete, when constituted in Category.

Second proposition. Accidents which are constituted in a Predicament must not be used in concrete, but only in abstract.

Proven first: Accidents in concrete signify accidental form and the subject — in concrete signifies the accidental form and the subject — a white thing, for example, & and the substance of milk, to which albedo is affixed itself and accordingly they are beings per accidens, not per se therefore cannot be so placed in category.

By this mode accidents in predicament must be constituted, so that superior can be predicated of inferiors. But in concrete, superior accidents cannot be predicated from inferiors — for it is not true, color is quality — but the same thing colored — therefore accidents are not constituted in a predicament, inasmuch as in concrete are accepted, but in abstract.

Objection: If accidents which are placed in the Categories take the abstract position, where, when, having — which do not differ from location, time, vestment, and the abstract of substance — the placement in concrete of these examples is absurd.

I respond, negating the consequence. To the proof I say: *when*, *where*, *having* do not signify location, time, vestment in the abstract. But *where* signifies *ubiquity*, or the reason by which something is said to have this *situ esse* [to be in a position], or *esse situationem* [to be a situation], the mode by which a thing is said in such an exterior mode — as to be robed or armed, the mode by which a thing has it that it exteriorly so exists — argument made without doubt from the reasons exposed of Category in common.

SECOND SECTION On the Category of Species, or rather the Species of the Supreme Genus of Category, Substance and Accident

QUESTION ONE On Substance, both according to the mind of Aristotle and the truth of the matter

ARTICLE ONE On the Name and Various Acceptations of Substance

Here, more accurately treating the Category, and about to explain its chief parts — from Substance, as the foundation of all accidents — in accordance with the method of Aristotle we begin; and in accordance with the more usual custom its name and acceptations we shall elucidate.

Therefore the name of Substance, or *subsistance*, deduced from *subsisting*, per se and in se subsists, not existing in others as accidents. From *subsisting* for example is the particular subject of accidents of whiteness, of the blackness of the Ethiopian, and so of others.

Substance in its various modes is used strictly, first and singularly, as in the eighth book of Metaphysics, chapter one, of Aristotle — with the first and strictly singular ones, so that the universals are not first substances, but rather second ones. Second, it is taken for the sole immaterial and spiritual substance, God alone and intelligences comprehending, as in the twelfth book of Metaphysics, chapter two. Third, it is accepted from Aristotle in the eighth book of Metaphysics, chapter 81, for the sole complete and categorical — and thus taken as both the primary singular and the universal, it comprehends. Fourth, most broadly it is used, for any thing's essence whatsoever, whether it be substantial or accidental — as its substance, that is, its essence.

Of these four the most strictly said, verbal gratia Petrus, Paul, Bucephalus — these are first with Aristotle — the second are universal substances, not first ones.

And finally, the name of Substance is accepted properly for any real being per se subsisting. But since per se subsisting is subsumed under two modes, we must first distinguish them, and retain the one more rightly instituted for our discussion.

And so *per se subsisting* can be used in three ways. First, for the sole negation of existing in another as in inherence — in which mode here this cannot be taken for per se subsisting, since it means something real and distinguished from accident; which negation alone, since then the accidents of the Eucharistic Sacrament — in which the substance of bread and wine remain after their substance has been converted into the substance of the Lord's body — would be said substances. This is affirmed to be only a negation of the subject of inherence, which from its proper office Theologians dispute.

That accident is distinct from Proper and the remaining universals in distinction; but those in fact sufficiently arise from what is said, and there are no other properties of accidents in which we ought to memorize. *This on Universals.*

THE LATER TRACTATE OF THIS PART: ON THE CATEGORY

PREFACE

SECOND PRELUDE On the Second Substance: Existence

Substance exists — no one denies it — since it is itself the subject of all accidents, which cannot naturally subsist permanently; and so this whole article is taken up in detail.

MEMBER I – On the Definition of Substance in General

Substance can be defined in this mode, by the most general account: *Substance is being per se subsisting, or suited per se to subsist properly,* or at least suited to subsist.

It is called being, in which it converges with accident. Per se is added to distinguish it from accident, which has no such capacity. Nor does accident have proper subsistence; it cannot be suited to subsist as a proper substance, much less actually so. For we understand that actual subsistence is not necessary to the nature of substance, as if there could be no substance which does not subsist; since Christ's humanity is properly called a substance, although it does not subsist on its own but is sustained by the person of the Divine Word.

If, moreover, the talk is of categorical and predicamental Substance, it can be defined in this mode: Substance is a real, simple, finite, complete being, suited to subsist per se.

It is called first *being*, in which it converges with accidents. 2. Placed *real*, to exclude negations and beings of reason. 3. Added *simple*, for the difference of complex beings and per accidens, or however they coalesce — such as a heap of stones, a house, an exercise. 4. Added *finite*, so that God is removed from category, of which immediately. 5. Joined *complete*, so that substantial parts are removed — whether integrating, such as head and arms, or essential, such as matter and differential. 6. Finally placed *suited to subsist per se*, so that substance is separated per nature from accident — substance is declared from what has been said, which consists in this: that it is per se naturally suited to subsist.

Concerning this definition two difficulties arise. First, whether predicamentally and categorically substance must be necessarily finite, so that God ought to be predicamental substance; second, another thing said to be a complete simple being from which God is removed from category, of which immediately.

ARTICLE TWO On the Existence of Substance

Substance existing no one denies, since it is itself the subject of all accidents, which cannot permanently subsist naturally. And so this whole article is taken up in more detail.

MEMBER I – Various Divisions of Substance

The first division of Substance, given *in substance first and second*, or in singular and universal — in this division Aristotle is supported by much authority and celebrity, from the tractation of substance he begins.

Complete substance is that which does not come to the composition of another as its essential part, but is a being complete in kind — as Petrus, animal, living, and similar things, which though different things can concur to constitute the essential composition of man, rational animal — nonetheless they can have the ratio of the whole considered in themselves; for example, the genus of substances in this mode, under some account of the whole, as we said in the first place.

Moreover, incomplete substance from the contrary is said, which has the ratio of parts and enters the composition of another — as head, hand, body, soul, and similar parts.

Moreover complete substance: one is infinite and uncreated, which is God, and he alone; another is finite and created by God. This also is twofold: one immaterial, namely angelic; another material, which is subdivided in various modes — for which divisions, understood much more easily by an appended table, will serve.

MEMBER II

In which More Accurately is Expended the First Division of Substance, into First and Second

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One inquires here: what division is made by this division, or what in it is divided?

There are various opinions on this matter.

The first says: it is no properly called division, but only an enumeration of the parts of Substance — for Aristotle distributing Substance into first and second, wishing only to enumerate those things which are contained under the genus of Substance, as if

someone regarding the parts of speech would say others are letters, others syllables, others words, and so of others.

Though this opinion seems easily sustainable, yet it does not seem thus to the mind of Aristotle, since he himself, as a true division, makes this, and immediately adds that first Substance is more substance than second: which would not be fitting, unless the division itself were more than enumeration.

The truth is that this division fits as a division of genus into species — not of the univocal kind, but of the one having analogy and ordering among the things constituted.

Secondly the opinion is, that it is a division of genus into species — which Aristotle on these predicaments, in the first chapter, gives the division of substance in primam and secundam, which come together in common in some substance among them, and the members of both are distinguished by the essential differentials of substance, since first substance has a certain more full ratio and completely essential, and second substance has a ratio of essential substance, though more deficient.

The truth of the opinion is: the first and second division made by Aristotle is of some genus in the genus in synonyms, as I will prove below. Because thus substance in common comes together with universal substance and singular substance of substance; and reason is clear, since the ratio of substance, what it is a real being per se subsisting, is found equally in singular substance and universal: because both equally per se subsist independently from another; both equally are real — therefore substance in common is synonymous both with singular and universal.

But the members of this division are not entirely equal among themselves; rather first substance is said to be more properly, and principally, substance; the first is that which more really and per se subsists, and is more independent of another, than second; and so the two first and second in this division are not like the two members of a division of genus into species totally equal — as animal into rational and irrational — but rather as more and less principally, as we said.

The second proposition: *This division is not of genus in species*. Proven: no true difference can be assigned by which substance divides into complete and incomplete, since with the kind of substance it is necessary to include the grade of substance, against the nature which does not contain the grade of superior genus in its own essence; therefore with genus and differentials, by which it is contracted to its species, this division will not be of genus in species.

Final proposition. This division is of some genus in a lower kind of synonyms. Or, *Substance in common converges univocally with substance complete and incomplete*. The reason is clear, since both substances nominate from another. Attending to this, the Aristotelian division at the same time in first and second is made.

MEMBER II

On the Division of Substance into Complete and Incomplete

I respond: the first and second division of substance given by Aristotle, accordingly by that division made at the same time in *first* and *second*, may be best understood in this sense — that first substance is more substance, and the second substance is less properly and principally substance, not because the ratio of substance is in the second substance more or less, but because the first substance subsists more per se and is more in act subsisting, and the second is a substance only by participation — as we showed in the first place.

Now first and second substance are not members of a division of genus into species, not in synonyms absolutely equal, as we showed — but rather the division is of something analogous in a lower, as it were a synonym. The reason of this: substance in common is in both first and second analogue rather than genus — because the ratio of substance fits more principally in first substance, and less principally in second.

The truth of this opinion, and the reply to the objection of the first opinion, is already resolved, as we showed, in the discussion of the division of substance.

MEMBER III

On Infinite Substance, namely God, excluded from Category

It must be noted that, in Category, things can be constituted in three ways: 1. *directly*, 2. *indirectly*, 3. *reductively*.

In predicament *directly* are constituted only the genera, species, and individuals.

Indirectly are placed the very species differentials of the species — the sensible, the insensible, the rational, and the irrational.

Finally, certain things are placed reductively within a category (or predicament). These are things that—while not being genera, species, or individuals themselves, nor the specific differences that define a species—are nonetheless parts of substances or related to them in some way. Examples include matter and form, or parts of a body like the head and arms. These are placed reductively in a category because they refer back to things that belong to that category directly.

This being established, it is certain that God cannot be placed in a category directly. Since there is no 'constitutive species differential' in God (as is universally understood), He cannot hold a direct place in any category.

First Proposition: God is truly not placed in any category.

Proof 1: God cannot be placed in a category unless He is a 'substantial categorical being.' However, Aristotle himself—when reviewing the common and well-known categories of substance—enumerates various bodies and entities but entirely omits God. Therefore, by Aristotle's own reasoning, God is not placed in a category.

Proof 2 (Corroborated by Reason): If God were a categorical substance, He would necessarily have the character of a genus, a species, or an individual contained under a species. But God can be none of these.

The Major Premise is certain based on the foundations established at the beginning of this book: if something is a categorical substance, it must fit one of those three roles. The Minor Premise—that God fits none of them—is proven by the fact that He lacks the limitations and divisions inherent to those classifications. Therefore, God is not a categorical substance.

The minor is proven: if God is placed in category under some genus, he will have the ratio of genus; but genus contains many species under itself, in which it can be essentially communicated: but God cannot contain many species under himself which could be essentially communicated, since if he were divided into species, he could be communicated in many individuals, which means it would be possible for there to be many Gods of the same species — which is manifestly absurd and impossible.

The minor is proven for part 2, in which the main difficulty consists: that God cannot have the ratio of species. It is the nature of species, that it comes to exist from genus and differential, as from parts by nature distinct: but God cannot be composed from genus and differential, from the finite and of the finite perfection's parts, since the composition of finite parts would be impossible to give infinite perfection; since the parts being taken from nature, and finite perfect parts, do not indicate infinite perfection, but finite only; since infinite perfection all others comprehend in a simple way — therefore God cannot have the ratio of species.

Finally the minor of this prior syllogism is proven, that God cannot have the ratio of individual under some species contained: for if God were an individual, he ought to be able to be contained under some species — which would be shared with him by many others of the same species, dividing that species into many individuals; but if God is individuated, he could be shared in many individuals, which means more Gods of the same species, which faith forbids — therefore God cannot have the ratio of individual.

From this easily follows that God cannot be assigned to what properly competes with paronyms' significates, since these are not derived from others, but from the prior ones themselves derived, as from words is captured: ergo [therefore] paronyms as significates were defined by Aristotle, not as significants.

I respond by denying the antecedent. I maintain that paronyms (derived terms) should be defined according to what they signify—that is, insofar as they are real things expressed by words, and not merely as words alone.

This is confirmed by the following:

First, a 'composite being' is placed within a category only in a certain respect (*secundum quid*). While such a being might enter into the composition of a 'being in itself' (*ens per se*), it can nonetheless be understood as a 'whole' if it is considered on its own terms. An example of this is genera: although a genus combines with a specific difference to constitute a species (such as 'Man'), the genus can still be considered a complete whole under a different point of view.

Secondly, a being is called 'composite only in a certain respect' if, despite being able to enter into the composition of a 'being in itself,' it still retains the character of a whole when considered independently.

DISPUTATION II – ON THE CATEGORY ITSELF

SECTION II

On the Category of Species — or Rather the Species of the Supreme Genus of Category — Substance and Accident

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THIRD MEMBER On Angels and Intelligences, or Spiritual Created Substances, whether they are True Predicamental Substances

I respond affirmatively, and this response seems most true — taking from the heavens, I use the common opinion of vulgar categories, among the vulgarly distributed substances, celestial bodies, and daemons in the same, from the same chapter 8. Daemons, who are spiritual intelligences, are placed under genus, and to those which seem fitting to themselves, the substances of the Categories — neither can they be placed in category — are placed under genus and under the qualities of the substantial accidental. But angels and intelligences, components from genus and differential of substantial things, from the common degree of substance, are placed as neighbors, and with their own differentials separated. Therefore angels and intelligences should directly be placed in category under the genus of substance.

First Objection (concerning the Heavens): According to Aristotle, the heavens possess no potentiality but are 'pure act' (or entirely devoid of any potentiality). Since a genus is itself a kind of potentiality relative to various species, the heavens cannot belong to a genus and, consequently, cannot be placed in a category.

Response: I deny the antecedent and the main proof. For although a thing—such as a man—may exist, it does not define the physical matter in the same way the genus 'animal' does. Furthermore, the heavens are not the highest degree of potentiality in themselves, but are so only in a certain sense, having existed from all eternity.

Second Objection (concerning Angels): Categorical substance requires three principles: matter, form, and privation (as stated in *Metaphysics*, Book 12). Since angels are immaterial substances, these principles do not apply to them. Therefore, angels are not predicamental substances and cannot be placed in a category.

Response: I deny the antecedent. Others respond that while matter, form, and privation do not 'properly' exist in angels, angels are nonetheless composed of a genus and a difference, which correspond to matter and form. Regarding the claim that these things do not 'operate as one,' they actually can, through the privation of specific operations. Because angels share traits with celestial and other beings but are distinguished by their own specific differences, both angels and 'intelligences' should be placed directly in the category of substance.

The objection regarding both the heavens and angels is answered thus: I concede that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in kind—just as animals and plants do. However, this does not prevent them from being classified under the same supreme 'Created Being.' Just as animals and plants differ but fall under the same genus, the fact that a highest commonality is not immediately recognized does not mean they lack a place in the categories.

ARTICLE IV On the Properties of Substance

From Aristotle's reviewing of Substance's properties, in the chapter on Substance, the first is: that in no way is it in a subject of inherence, since this uses the subject for the subject of attribution, not of inherence: for a most certain Substance of second attribution is predicated, for example, 'man' is attributed to Peter. The second property pertains only to second substances, which all universals should be predicated univocally—understand of first [substances], and singular Substances. Third is that first substance signifies 'this something,' that is, some nature designable as if with a finger, as is Peter; second [substance] truly signifies only 'what kind of thing,' that is, a nature affected as if by some quality, as 'man' in common, human nature, a specialty; as 'man' in common, human nature. Fourth is that to substance nothing is contrary, which property must be understood of properly called contrariety; otherwise it is false, since opposed differences—for example, rational and irrational—are Substances at least incomplete, though they are opposed improperly by contrariety, insofar as those placed under the same genus are most distant.

Objection: Fire properly is the contrary of water—therefore one Substance properly is contrary to another Substance. I distinguish the antecedent: Fire is the contrary of water by accident—by reason of heat and cold—I concede; per se and by reason of substance, I deny.

Fifth is that Substance does not receive more and less, or, is neither intensified nor remitted, since one Substance is not more Substance than another—for example, a giant than a fly—though the one be a greater Substance. Objection: from Aristotle, on Substance, first Substances are more Substances than seconds; therefore Substance is more and less. I distinguish the antecedent: with Aristotle, first Substances are more Substances than second [substances] per accidens, by reason of the mode of subsisting, which in first Substance extends to more than in the second, it is true; truly essentially, by reason of their essence, it is not likewise that second Substance, or one Substance, has more of the essence of Substance than another; [this is] false.

Final property of Substance, which Aristotle reviews: is that Substance, remaining the same, is able to receive contraries; for example, the same Substance of iron remaining one moment in heat, another moment in cold. Objection: this can also apply to an oration: since it is not always true and not always false, and the contraries of an oration are truth and falsity; for example, 'Peter studies,' which is true while Peter is studying, and false while Peter is not studying; therefore it is not only Substance that is properly receptive of contraries. I negate the antecedent. For receiving contraries properly belongs only to Substance, since an oration is not [of itself] only true or only false, which are contraries in an oration—but because no mutation is made in the oration itself; truth and falsity accrue to the oration with no mutation having been made in it itself, as is clear from the example of this oration, 'Peter studies,' which remains always the same in

itself while true, and only then begins to be false when Peter is not studying, but playing. This on Substance.

QUESTION II: On the First Species of Accident, namely Quantity

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What Accident is in general, we said in the Porphyrian introduction—that is, what can be present and absent from a subject without its destruction. It requires a subject in which it, for the most part, inheres, as whiteness in a wall; though some things are given that are only from a substance as an agent—for example, heat from fire—not in the fire therefore [as an accident], since there is nothing essential for an accident [to be in a specific subject], since it would then be essential according to those in all inferiors, namely to men and brutes: but only for the most part, that an accident actually inheres, or is able to inhere. It is not essential, since it is in the sensible, found in all its inferiors, namely men and brutes: but only to affect Substance, either by existing in it, as whiteness in the wall, or [emanating] from fire and others.

But since these things are for meditation, and accordingly addressed more to the higher part of Philosophy, namely Metaphysics, the most worthy part; at our institute it will be thus judged, if we clearly and plainly set forth the individual species of Accident, starting from Quantity, so that we follow Aristotle's order of nature, according to which quantity—as the basis of all other accidents, and the subject through which medium they inhere in Substance—must be treated in the first place.

ARTICLE ONE On the Name and Various Acceptations of Quantity

The name of Quantity, speaking universally, signifies any form by which things are said large — whether by reason of some virtue and perfection, as a great Philosopher, a great Emperor — and is called *quantity of virtue*, as perfections. Whether great by reason of mass and extension, as the great giant, or mountain — and is called *quantity of mass*.

ARTICLE TWO On the Existence of Quantity

The sense and common consensus of all mortals confirms the giving of quantity.

Aristotle hands down three of its divisions, *on quantity*.

The first is *in continuous quantity and discrete*.

Continuous, which is said to exist, whose parts are joined together by a common bond, as parts of a line, a point, the parts of a surface, by lines, the parts of a body by surfaces, and so of others.

Moreover, discrete quantity is that whose parts are said not to be joined by any common bond (*vinculum*), such as number—for example, a set which consists of units—and speech (*oratio*), whose parts are the syllables of the voices, which are disjoined among themselves.

The second division assigns quantity into two members: first, into that quantity which consists of parts having position among themselves, or whose parts are extended in space, such that one part must occupy one place and another part another—as the human body, whose head is in the higher place and the foot in the lowest. Second, into that which consists of parts not having position among themselves—such as number, time, and speech. Indeed, as for number and speech, since they have no continuous parts, it is not required that one part occupy a more prominent place than another; rather, they must be either before or after [in succession]. Such continuity among parts is required [for position], as Toletus rightly notes in his exposition of this chapter on quantity.

The third division is handed down as quantity *per se* and quantity *per accidens*. *Quantity per se* is called that which by its own nature claims extension: namely, the line, the surface, the body, and other legitimate species of quantity (if there be any). *Quantity per accidens* is called that which participates in extension from elsewhere: namely, whether it has this or that [extension] within itself [by association], as all material substance is extended according to the extension of the subject; or as whiteness, sweetness, and other such qualities, which are called 'extended' only because they exist in subjects that are extended through quantity.

ARTICLE III On the Essence of Quantity

FIRST MEMBER In What Consists Within The Essence of Continuous Quantity

Some were not pleased that the essence of continuous quantity consists in that which renders substance divisible, which would otherwise render it indivisible. Others wanted it to consist in this — that it renders substance mensurable as it were actively. Others only require that it extend substance in itself. Others finally (to avoid the lesser sayings) arbitrate that the essence of continuous quantity consists in something among themselves proportionate according to location, and its extended ratio in the next members, as will be apparent.

First Proposition. *The essence of continuous quantity does not consist in that by which it renders substance divisible into parts and into parts.*

Proven: The essence of quantity is not constituted by that which is first understood in quantity, but rather it presupposes quantity itself. For a certain quantity is divisible precisely because it has parts; quantity, therefore, presupposes divisibility and parts, and its essence is thus constituted not in the divisibility of substance, but in something prior.

One may object: Quantity is essentially constituted by that which renders substance divisible into parts; therefore its essence consists in this.

I respond by denying the antecedent and distinguishing the proof of the consequence: Quantity is distinguished from the substance which it affects. Thus, one species of quantity is defined according to length alone [the line], another is the surface which renders substance divisible into parts according to both length and width, and so on for the others. Therefore, since the principle of constitution and distinction is the same, quantity is essentially constituted by that which constitutes it as such.

Second Proposition: The essential ratio (definition) of quantity does not consist in that by which it renders substance aptly measurable. This proposition is better understood if it is more easily proven. It must be noted that 'measure' can be used in two modes: first, actively, for what can measure another; second, passively, for what can be measured by another. In either mode, our proposition holds: the essential ratio of quantity does not consist in rendering substance measurable, whether actively or passively. Since the concept of measure is only understood after quantity itself exists, and we gather what quantity is from what it first supposes, the essence cannot consist in measurability.

Proven: The same reason used to confirm the proposition above holds here: the essence of quantity does not consist in that which is first understood *about* quantity, but

in what quantity itself presupposes. The ratio of measure (active or passive) is not the first thing understood in quantity, but presupposes quantity; for quantity must first be 'how much' (*quanta*) before all other properties of measure can flow from it. Therefore, the essence is not found in the relation of measure.

Third Proposition: The essential ratio of continuous quantity consists in that by which it extends substance in an ordered manner in itself—by force of which its extensions are proper, it is suited to occupy a place, and it is able to expel any other body from the space in which it remains.

Proven: The essential ratio of quantity must be placed in that from which substance first receives the name 'how much' (*quanta*). This comes from the extension of the parts of substance in relation to itself, by force of which it occupies a place and can expel any other body. Therefore, the essential ratio of quantity consists in that extension.

The minor is proven: Substance first receives the name 'how much' from that source from which all properties of quantity flow (as from a fountain). That extension of the parts of substance in relation to itself is the source and origin of all quantitative properties. Therefore, from it all things flow primarily so that quantity may be called 'how much.'

The minor is further proven: All properties of quantity flow from that extension as from a source. Since that extension of parts—by which one part occupies one place and can expel any other body—is the first thing quantity has to be called 'how much,' the essential ratio of quantity consists in that extension.

SECOND MEMBER By which is Agreed that the Essence of Continuous Quantity is Predicamental

The difficulty is this: whether the line, surface, body, place, time, and motion truly constitute the legitimate species of continuous quantity. Before we can affirm certain things regarding this matter in relation to others, we must first disclose what is signified by the name of each.

Line by Philosophers and Mathematicians, is defined *longitudo latitudinis expertes [longitude without latitude].*

Surface: longitude and latitude lacking depth. Body: longitude, latitude, and depth together. Place is defined as the concave surface—the first [surface] of the surrounding body—which is that hollow lunar globe surface that surrounds the elementary fire. Motion is accepted in various ways, but most principally in four modes.

The third division hands down: into *quantity per se* and *quantity per accidens*. Quantity *per se* is called that which from itself claims extension: namely line, surface, body, and other legitimate species of quantity. Quantity *per accidens* is that which participates in extension from another—whether it has that in itself, as all material substance extends to the extension of its subject, or as whiteness, sweetness, and other such qualities, which are called 'extended' because they exist in subjects extended through quantity.

First Proposition: Line, surface, and body are legitimate species of continuous quantity.

Proven: From the definition of continuous quantity, it must be something having 'parts outside of parts' joined by a common bond (as we handed down above). Since line, surface, and body have magnitudes—parts outside of parts—joined by a certain common connection, all by common consent are therefore legitimate species of continuous quantity.

Objection: Incomplete beings cannot be placed in a category; but the line and surface are *per se* incomplete beings; therefore, they cannot be legitimate species of quantity in a category.

The major is shown: That which *per se* enters the composition of some [other] being is incomplete (as is clear from what was said above regarding categories in common); but the line and surface *per se* concur to the constitution of one being [the body], namely...

Second Proposition: The three continuous quantities—line, surface, and body—are essentially distinguished among themselves.

The reason is clear, since it is one thing to possess essentially longitude alone (which is what the line has); another to have latitude with longitude, without depth (which is proper to the surface); and finally another to consist of a triple dimension: longitude, latitude, and depth (which is proper to the body).

Third Proposition: Place is not a species of quantity properly speaking, distinct from surface.

This proposition seems to be against Aristotle, who in his *Categories* (chapter on Quantity) numbers 'place' among the continuous species of quantity. However, Averroës, Albertus, and others vindicate Aristotle from this error, asserting that Aristotle was not speaking from his own mind, but from the opinion of the ancients.

I respond secondly: All beings of reason can be referred to the category of real beings. For example, a Chimera (consisting of a human body and a lion's head) is recalled to Substance, or a magnitude from earth to heaven is recalled to Quantity. These do not constitute new categories.

The reason is clear: Insofar as Place is established as a species of quantity, it has nothing regarding the nature of quantity that is essentially distinguished from 'surface'; therefore, it must not be constituted as a species distinct from surface.

Fourth Proposition: Motion is not a species of quantity properly speaking, insofar as it is taken for the continuous flow itself.

Proven: No incomplete being is placed *per se* in a category as a species of a genus. But Motion—taken as such a continuous flow of a form which is partly acquired and partly to be acquired (for example, the motion of heating, which is the continuous flow of heat already partly acquired while partly remaining to be acquired)—is something incomplete. Therefore, it cannot be a properly called species of quantity.

The minor is proven: That flow is the acquisition of an imperfect form, or one which is not yet in 'fact' but only in 'becoming.' Therefore, it cannot be something complete, nor does it have all its parts simultaneously, but one after another, with the previous parts already destroyed.

Fifth Proposition: Neither can Time—taken as the duration of some motion—be placed in a category as a species of quantity properly speaking.

Proven: The duration of motion is something incomplete, just as the motion of which it is the duration. It does not have all its parts simultaneously, but one after another, with previous parts already destroyed. Therefore, it cannot be constituted as a species of quantity.

Objection: Against this and the preceding proposition, Aristotle (in the place cited above) counts Motion and Time among the species of quantity.

Response: As above, Aristotle numbers these species of quantity according to the opinion of the common people, not from his own [philosophical] opinion in this place.

THIRD MEMBER On Discrete Quantity: Whether It Be a True Species of quantity

The nature of discrete quantity is that it has its parts joined by no common bond; Aristotle assigns two species of this: namely Number and Speech. Regarding Number, it must be noted that it is commonly used in three ways: 1. for the numbering, 2. for the numbered, and 3. for the formal.

Numbering number (*numerus numerans*) is nothing other than the numbering itself and the operation of the intellect in counting. Numbered number (*numerus numeratus*) refers to the numbered things themselves—for example, a quaternary composed of four men, which consists of those men. Finally, formal number is the collection and aggregation of many units, by reason of which they are formally called 'some amount,' such as a group of ten men.

Moreover, others divide the formal number into transcendental and predicamental. The transcendental is that which applies to all things, even those devoid of quantity, such as angels, rational souls, and all other things. The predicamental is that which exists only in corporeal and quantitative things, as found in a binary of men or stones.

These things being established:

1. It is first certain that numbering number—the action of the numbering intellect—is not a species of quantity, since it is placed under 'Action' as its genus.

2. It is certain that numbered number, according to its whole breadth, is not a true species of quantity, because anything can be numbered, and no one would say that [all things] are species of quantity. I added 'according to its whole breadth' because when true species of quantity—namely lines, surfaces, and bodies—are in fact numbered, then that numbered number can be a true species of quantity.

3. Finally, it is certain that the formal transcendental number is not a legitimate species of quantity, since it appears in all things, even spiritual ones, in which no one finds the character of true quantity.

The entire difficulty, therefore, remains concerning formal predicamental number: whether it constitutes a legitimate species of quantity. **Thomas** [Aquinas], *Part I, Question II, Articles 1 and 2*; Capreolus, *Sentences I, dist. 14, Quest. 1, Conclusion 5*; and others hold the affirmative.

On the contrary — and with considerably greater probability — the following thinkers deny it: Albertus Magnus, *Met.* bk. 8, tract. ch. 1; Aureolus, cited by Capreolus above; Marsilius, *Sentences I, dist. 27, Art. 1*; and virtually all others in common.

First proof of our position.

If formal number were a genuine species of predicamental quantity, it would also count as a transcendental species — yet the later Scholastics deny that conclusion, which means they are obligated to deny the former as well.

Proof of the major premise. There is no difference in the ratio of quantity between formal predicamental number and transcendental number: any thing whatsoever, even things devoid of quantity, can constitute a number — take the quaternary — and both continuous, extended things and things entirely beyond any quantity besides the essential structure of the quaternary count as numbered, whether or not they possess quantity. Consequently, formal transcendental number is no less a legitimate species of quantity than formal predicamental number.

2. Every species of quantity must be something that is *one* in its own right. But formal number is not one in its own right; therefore it cannot be a genuine species of quantity. The major premise is certain. For the minor: whatever is assembled from parts joined by no intrinsic bond of union is not one thing in itself. Yet formal number consists of parts joined by no such bond — neither a metaphysical bond of genus and differentia (as in Angels), nor a physical bond of matter and form (as in human beings). The parts that compose a number remain ever discrete and distinct from one another, united only by the operation of the intellect. Therefore number is not one thing in itself.

Finally, our position is established. No being that depends on the operation of the intellect can be a genuine species of quantity. But formal number *does* depend on such an operation. Therefore it cannot be a genuine species of quantity. The major is proved as follows: the quaternary, for instance, is constituted precisely such that the intellect conceives its four units as gathered together; yet those same units, remaining separately what they are, could equally be joined or left apart. Consequently, number depends on the operation of the intellect.

This last argument is confirmed: there is no other reason why a quaternary is a quaternary rather than a ternary, except that the intellect aggregates its four units — while those same units could have been grouped differently. Therefore it depends on the intellect's operation and cannot be a genuine species of quantity.

Objection I. Aristotle, in the frequently cited passage, places Number among the species of Quantity.

Reply. The standard solution — shared by Albertus, Aristotle's commentators, and others — is sufficient: Aristotle in that passage was reporting a view foreign to his own mind, not his own position.

Against the arguments by which we proved Number to be an accidental being dependent on the intellect, one might object: Number is the object of a true and real science, namely Arithmetic; but formal number is arithmetic's object; therefore it is not a being of reason and accident but is genuinely real in itself.

Reply. We deny the major in both its parts. Accidental beings can be sustained by the intellect as objects of a properly-called science. The object of a science may be something accidental; for instance, formal number, while genuinely the subject of a particular science, serves as arithmetic's formal object — yet this does not make it a self-subsisting real entity.

We also deny the minor: beings of reason can serve as objects supported by reason. It is no inconvenience for the intellect's action to concern beings of reason, nor is it absurd that a science — when actualized — should occupy itself with such beings.

Further objection on the minor. Sciences are specified by their objects, and they cannot be real sciences unless their objects are also real.

Reply, denying the inference. Sciences are specified by their objects — but not in the sense of receiving the same nature from them. Otherwise, since the object of Physics is natural body and that of Theology is God, Physics itself would *be* natural body and Theology would *be* God, which is plainly false. Sciences are merely distinguished *by means of* their objects. It can therefore be the case that Arithmetic is a real science even though its object is something accidental and mind-dependent.

The Last Property of Quantity

The third and final property is this: that quantity is continuous and discrete, unified in being either equal or unequal. We call two lines equal when their magnitudes are the same, and two numbers equally equal when they share the same multitude — whether two, three, four, and so on.

For this property to apply universally to quantity, it must be understood in terms of *aptitudinal* equality: if all quantities except one were removed, that single remaining quantity would still have the aptitude and capacity to be equal or unequal to any hypothetical counterpart.

Furthermore, for this property to apply *exclusively* to quantity, the explanation must be given in terms proper to quantity, since equality and inequality do, in an improper sense, apply to other things — for example, the perfection or quantity of virtue. There are infinitely equal things — two men equally prudent, or equally imprudent — yet these must be resolved back through quantity as their foundation.

Finally, the same equality of quantity must belong to quantity *in itself* — for it is only incidentally, through the medium of quantity, that two columns of equal height can be said to be equal.

Some add a further property: that physical quantity may be finite or infinite. But we leave this to the section on Quantity.

Article II: The Existence of Relation

First Member: The Various Divisions of Relations

The first division of relation is into *real relation* and *rational relation*.

A **real relation** is one that precedes every operation of the intellect, not depending on it at all — as paternity in a father and filiation in a son, for no act of thought is required for a father to be a father and a son to be a son. These relations are said to subsist through things themselves, not through the intellect.

A **rational relation** is one that has its being only through the intellect's cognition — as the relation of attribution and subject, or an external denomination in a subject. An example is the relation of the Creator to creatures in God: this is a purely external denomination, nothing real in God himself, since God acquired this relation in time, after the creation of the world, without gaining any real modification — the creatures on their part acquired by their own production nothing that was not already there eternally.

The second division is into **mutual** and **non-mutual** relations.

Mutual relations are those whose terms depend on each other reciprocally with equal necessity — as filiation and paternity: a father cannot exist without a son any more than the son without the father.

Non-mutual relations are those in which one term depends on the other but not vice versa — as science depends on its knowable object, or sight on the visible, while the knowable object and the visible do not in turn depend on the science or sight.

The third division is into **subsisting-and-infinite** relation versus **not-subsisting** or **finite** relation.

The subsisting-and-infinite relation is the one found among the Persons of the Holy Trinity. Finite relation, by contrast, applies only to creatures, and is itself twofold: one kind is **transcendental**, the other **predicamental** (or categorical).

A **transcendental** relation is one that appears across several genera of being — for example, the relation of accident to substance, or the relation of potency to act and object, or the relation of sight to the visible. In God, the relation of Creator to creatures is of this kind — a mere external denomination, nothing real in God.

A **predicamental** relation is one assigned to a single determinate genus and consisting in the respect of one term toward another — as paternal paternity and filial filiation.

The fourth division is into **relations of equality** versus **relations of disparity**.

The former obtains when both extremes receive the same name — as equal, similar.

The latter obtains when the designation of each extreme differs — as father and son, master and servant.

The fifth division is into the **relation of superposition** (or greater comparison), in which the subject surpasses the other — as lord over servant — and the **relation of subordination** (or lesser comparison), in which the subject is surpassed in dignity — as servant toward master, son toward father.

The last division is into **relations per se** and **relations by accident**.

A per se relation is one in which the related terms refer to one another intrinsically — as father and son.

A relation by accident is one in which the terms refer to one another only incidentally — as a man who is referred to a son not as man in his own right, but only accidentally, insofar as he is a father.

Second Member: Whether Real Predicamental Relations Actually Exist

The negative view was followed by ancient philosophers who preceded Aristotle and Plato, according to Albertus Magnus, *Predicamenta*, ch. 2.

The affirmative is far more probable, for this reason:

Proof. Whatever neither depends on the operation of the intellect nor is merely an external denomination is a real being. Now several created, predicamental relations are given that depend neither on the intellect nor are they mere external denominations — the relation of creature to Creator, of father to son, of master to servant, and so on. Therefore some real predicamental relations exist.

Proof of the minor. External denominations are defined from something with no real form in the subject actually existing — as the relation of being-seen exists in the wall only from the action of seeing that occurs outside the wall, in the eye itself. But the relations we mentioned — of father to son, of creature to Creator — are defined from real forms in their subjects: the active generation of the father, residing in him as proximate and formal foundation. Therefore they are not mere external denominations but genuine real relations.

Objection. Every real being that accrues to a subject confers on it some real perfection and truly changes it. But relations accruing to a subject change it not at all — for if all the whiteness in some body at Paris were to exist, virtually all parts of that body would not truly change just because of new relations of similarity or dissimilarity. Therefore no created relation is real.

Reply, granting the major and denying the minor. The produced whiteness in one body mutually changes the relative forms of the body — but this mutation, made through the relative forms, occurs without motion, since those forms themselves are derived from the production of the foundational qualities — the whitenesses and blacknesses — dwelling in those bodies.

Third Member: On the Subject of Relation

The subject of a relation is that which sustains the relation and by which it is denominated — as David, who is denominated the father of Solomon, is called the subject of that paternity.

Since a relation denominates two things — one proximately (as whiteness in quantity denominates the same substance) and one remotely (through the medium of something

else) — the relation constitutes a double subject: one *proximate*, to which the relation properly accrues and which is properly denominated by it, and one *remote*, to which the relation accrues only mediately, through the proximate subject.

It should also be noted that the totality of a relation's being consists in referring its subject to something else: which is why it is called a relation. This distinguishes it from other accidents, which in the first instance affect the subject absolutely, and only in the second instance refer to something else.

Objection. Within a relation there is a double being to consider — one shared with other accidents as an accident, the other proper to it as a relation. Therefore we were wrong to say the entirety of relation's being consists in referring its subject to another.

Brief reply. Relation, considered under the general category of accident, has something in common with all accidents. But I said that the *totality of relation's proper being* consists in its referring — meaning its specific and peculiar ratio as a relation, not the generic ratio it shares with all accidents.

Fourth Member: On the Foundations of Relation

Relations, being extremely tenuous entities, require certain foundations in order to exist in nature. We must briefly discuss this.

Note first that the foundation of a relation is twofold: a **remote** (or material) foundation, and a **proximate** (or formal) foundation.

The **remote** or material foundation is that in which the relation is grounded and which causes the relation to belong to the subject — as whiteness in a swan is the cause of the relation of similarity between that swan and another white thing.

The **proximate** or formal foundation is the relation itself — that is, the ratio that prior foundations cannot constitute without it. It is that in virtue of which, for instance, two swans are not merely said to be white but are said to be specifically *similar in species*.

Note second that the proximate foundations of relation are referred by Aristotle *(Metaphysics V, ch. 15)* to four genera: quantity, action, passion, and measure.

By **quantity** we understand unity, which is the principle of discrete quantity, or multitude, which is discrete quantity itself.

By **action and passion** we understand every pattern by which an agent acts and a patient undergoes — and these are referred to each other and to themselves in turn.

By **measure** we understand not only proper quantitative measure but also, in the broadest sense, whatever standard by which one thing is measured against another in terms of truth or cognizability — and indeed the Philosophers commonly teach that imaginal relations are also founded in this ratio of measure, since images and their exemplars are referred to each other insofar as they correspond in truth.

In quantity — that is, in unity and multitude — all relations called by the terms of congruence, adequation, agreement, or disagreement are founded. Those founded in unity are relations of *identity* (between two substances that share the same specific nature, as between two human beings), *equality* (between two quantities sharing the same magnitude), and *similarity* (between two white things sharing the same species of whiteness). Those founded in multitude are the contrary relations: *dissimilarity* between two substances of different species, *inequality* between two magnitudes that differ, and so on.

The posterior group — those founded in action and passion — include such relations as cause to effect and effect to cause: as the paternal relation toward the son (founded in the active act of generation), and the filial relation toward the father (founded in the passive reception of being generated).

Finally, the **ratio of measure** is said to be the proximate foundation of the relation between science and its knowable object, since science, being true, measures the truth of its object; the Philosophers commonly teach that even imaginal relations — between images and their exemplars — are founded in this ratio of measure.

A difficulty arises here: what kind of entity must serve as the remote foundation of relations in each genus? The answer is affirmative for all cases. In the genus of substance, the substance itself can be the remote foundation of a relation — as the identity between two men. No one doubts that quantity and quality serve as remote foundations of relation. The same holds for other genera: paternity is the remote foundation of the similarity relation between two fathers, grounded in their common humanity.

Articles IV and Last: The Affections of Relation

First Member: The Distinction of a Relation from Its Foundation

We now compare predicamental relations with their remote foundations — for example, similarity as compared to whiteness, and paternity as compared to the active power of generation.

Ferrariensis *(Contra Gentes IV, ch. 14)* and others hold that relations are really distinct from their remote foundations.

On the contrary, Aureolus (cited by Capreolus) and the Nominalists — whom Suarez follows *(Metaphysics, disp. 47, sect. 2, no. 22)* — hold that only a rational distinction interposes between a relation and its remote foundation.

Others require an intermediate distinction — formal and from the nature of the thing — between the relation and its remote foundation. We state our own position in two propositions.

First Proposition. *Some relation can be really distinct from its remote foundation.*

Proof. Paternity is really distinguished from the active power of generation, which is its remote foundation. Experience confirms this: paternity, once all sons produced from a given father have died, is lost, while the active power of generation remains. Therefore paternity can be really distinguished from its remote foundation.

The second part — that some relations *cannot* be really separated from their remote foundations — is proved by example: the similarity between two white walls cannot really be separated from their common whiteness, since no other cause is given for that similarity than that those same white things share the same species.

Objection. A relation, say of whiteness, when remitted (diminished) in one body — say at the fourth degree — can be intensified, and is in fact intensified as that body becomes whiter still at the fourth degree. Therefore a relation can change while its foundation remains constant.

Reply, distinguishing the antecedent. That no relation of motion is given *per se* — I grant. That none is given *through another* — I deny. The relative forms change through another: the mutation of relative forms is effected through the production of the foundational qualities, not through motion in itself.

Second Proposition. *All relations are distinguished from their remote foundations formally and from the nature of the thing, not by rational consideration alone.*

Proof. They are distinguished formally and from the nature of the thing — not by reason alone — because they have diverse essential definitions. A relation and its foundation — for instance, similarity and whiteness — have entirely diverse essential definitions, as all clearly see. Therefore they are distinguished formally, not by reason alone.

Confirmation. If a relation were distinguished from its remote foundation only by reason, it would share the same nature as its foundation. Since that foundation is a substance, quantity, quality, or some other genus of being, the nature of the relation would itself simultaneously be substance, quantity, quality, and so on — which is evidently false.

Second Member: Whether the Formal Ratio That Terminates a Relation Is Absolute or Relative

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First Proposition. *In non-mutual relations, the formal ratio of the terminating term is something absolute, not something relative.*

Proof. The formal ratio of terminating a relation in non-mutual relations is, in reality, not the relation itself — but only a mode of speaking and conceiving. The creature is referred to the Creator as to its terminus, but the Creator is not in reality a relation — only by mode of saying and conceiving. Therefore the formal ratio terminating the relation in non-mutual relations must be something absolute.

Second Proposition. *Even in mutual relations, the formal ratio terminating the relation is something absolute.*

Proof. The formal ratio terminating a mutual relation is the same as the formal ratio founding the correlative relation — as the passive generation of the son is simultaneously the formal ratio terminating the paternal relation and the formal ratio founding the filial relation. Therefore even in mutual relations, the formal ratio of the terminus is something absolute, not something relative.

Qualification. The formal ratio of a relation should be something absolute unless, by accident, the contrary occurs — when one terminus's relation happens to be founded in another relation. In that case, the formal ratio of the terminus can be said to be relative, because it is relative *by reason of that other relation* in which it is founded.

Objection I. One related term is referred to another — as a father by a son — therefore one relation is of a simultaneous nature with the other opposite relation, which terminates it.

Reply, denying the inference. It does not follow that the formal *ratio* of terminating is itself a relation — only that one related term terminates via another. These are quite different things.

Objection II. If a relation terminates toward something absolute — namely, the foundation of the correlative relation — with that foundation preceding in the order of nature the correlative itself (as the passive generation of the son precedes filiation in the order of nature), it follows that one correlate precedes the other in the order of nature, which contradicts Aristotle and all the Philosophers who commonly teach that correlates are simultaneous by nature.

Reply, admitting the consequence. Properly speaking, correlates are not said to be simultaneous *as pure relata*, but only *insofar as they are correlates*, that is, insofar as they mutually refer to one another. In this sense, there is no inconsistency.

Third Member: Whether a Single Relation Can Apply to Multiple Equally Immediate Terms

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It is certain that the same relation applies to many terms, of which one is proximate and immediate, another remote, and yet another mediate — as sight relates immediately to the visible and mediately to the visible object at a distance. The difficulty concerns whether a relation can refer to many *equally* immediate terms — for example, whether one father has the same single relation of paternity toward each of his many sons at once.

[Thomas Aquinas], *Part III, Quest. 35, Art. 5*; [Cajetan] and the Thomists affirm the single-relation view.

On the contrary, Scotus *(Sentences III, dist. 8, Quest. unica)* and all his disciples affirm that multiple distinct relations of paternity are given in one father toward multiple sons.

First proof of Scotus's position. Relations are correctly multiplied on account of varying foundational ratios. But there are multiple and distinct foundational ratios in a father who has generated many sons — namely, multiple distinct active generative acts. Therefore the father who generates many sons ought to have multiple paternal relations, as many as the sons he generated.

2. Each relation corresponds to another relation in its correlate. With multiple sons produced, each has multiple adequate relations corresponding to the one father. Therefore the specific unity of the relation does not follow from the uniqueness of the relatum alone.

3. Finally, the numerical unity of a relation is derived simultaneously from the unity of the foundation *and* the unity of the terminus. Since numerical unity of relation cannot

be derived from the unity of foundation alone, nor from the unity of terminus alone, it must be derived from both together.

Fourth Member: Whence Are Sought the Unity and Distinction of Relations

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This can be stated briefly, building on what was said above. Unity is threefold: *numerical* (as of Peter), *specific* (as of man as species), and *generic* (as of animal). Similarly, distinction is threefold: numerical, specific, and generic. We set out the following propositions:

First Proposition. *The numerical unity of a relation is not derived from the unity of the foundation alone, nor from the unity of an adequate terminus alone, but from both simultaneously.*

1. In a father who has only numerical unity of remote foundation — namely the single active power of generation — yet the relation of paternity toward multiple sons is multiplied. Therefore numerical unity of relation is not derived from the remote foundation alone.

2. Numerical unity of relation cannot be derived from the adequate terminus alone either: many relations of similarity can obtain between two different cygnets and the same terminus. Therefore numerical unity is not derived from the terminus alone.

3. Therefore numerical unity of relation must be derived from both the unity of foundation and the unity of terminus simultaneously.

Second Proposition. *For the numerical distinction of a relation, numerical distinction of the foundation alone or of the total terminus alone is sufficient.*

Proof. Since from the preceding proposition a single relation requires one foundation and one total terminus, it follows that a numerical distinction of either the foundation or the total terminus suffices for the relation to be numerically multiple.

Third Proposition. *The specific unity of a relation does not require the specific unity of one terminus alone, nor one remote foundation alone, nor one total terminus alone.*

Proof. Similarity and dissimilarity — relations of specifically distinct kinds — can share the same specific foundation (for instance, whiteness of the cygnet) while relating to the same specific terminus (another cygnet). Therefore specific unity of foundation or terminus does not alone suffice for the specific unity of a relation.

Fourth Proposition. *Sometimes the specific unity of a relation does not require the specific unity of its terminus or remote foundation.*

Proof of the prior part. In diverse species of remote foundations it is possible to ground relations of the same species — as toward both a crow and a cygnet, two similarities of the same species can be founded. Therefore specific unity of the terminus alone is not required.

Fifth Proposition. *For the specific distinction of a relation, a specific distinction of the foundation alone does not suffice when the proximate foundations are the same species — nor does a sole specific terminus alone.*

Proof. Blackness of the crow and whiteness of the cygnet can ground relations of the same species — similarities from the crow's side to the cygnet, and from the cygnet's side to the crow. Therefore specific distinction of the foundation alone does not suffice; the proximate formal foundation must also differ specifically, as it does between paternity (grounded in action) and similarity (grounded in unity).

Last Proposition. *For the generic and specific unity of a relation, it does not suffice to fix unity through a diverse genus of remote foundations; rather, unity should be established by the common generic degree of relation in which many relations of different species converge.*

Last Member: Some Further, Lesser Affections of Related Terms

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Beyond the affections already enumerated, Aristotle *(Categories, ch. on relation)* identifies several more, which we briefly review.

First is the capacity for contrariety — but this property does not apply to the related terms themselves as such; it belongs rather to their foundations. Thus relations have foundations capable of contrariety — similarity and dissimilarity, for instance, are grounded in contrary qualities — yet the relations themselves do not properly obtain contrariety.

Second is the property of admitting increase and decrease in intensity. This property, however, does not genuinely apply to all relations in common — as Aristotle notes — since double and half do not admit of such intensification or remission. Nor does this property follow from a relation's essential nature, but only from the entity of the relata themselves on which it depends.

Third is that related terms are mutually convertible — a son is said to be the son of a father, and the father the father of a son. One further note: cognizing one relatum requires cognizing the other only through the ratio of correlation — we can know a father *through* a son, by way of correlation — but to cognize one relatum simply does not require the other to be simply known.

Fourth is that correlates are *simultaneous by nature* — which was explained in the third member: the father is prior to the son by nature, not as a correlate but only as the one who generated.

Fifth is that upon cognizing one relatum, the other becomes known — which is not universally true, but holds in so far as knowing one correlate gives us access to the other *through the ratio of correlation*.

Question IV: On Quality

Article I: On the Name and Various Acceptation of Quality

The word *quality*, speaking generally, signifies everything by which a thing is said to be *such* — and it is taken in three ways:

1. For anything that determines something else and is predicated of it as qualifying it, in which sense the Essential Difference is called a quality, because it determines the genus to a certain species and predicates *what kind of thing* something is.

2. For every accident insofar as it can be predicated as qualifying — in which sense every accident can be said to have the ratio of quality, since it predicates of its subject *what kind of thing* that subject is.

3. Finally — and this is the sense in which we will use the word throughout — for that peculiar accident by which a thing is said to be *especially* such: heat, cold, and similar qualities. This is quality in its proper and strict sense.

Article II: The Existence of Quality

To establish the existence of quality, we must first explain the celebrated division of quality into four pairs of species: habit and disposition; natural faculty and imbecility; susceptible quality and passion; form and figure.

The goodness of this division can be shown as follows. Quality is either exterior — existing in the surface of a substance — or interior. If exterior, it is form or figure. If interior, it either resides in the sensory faculties, in which case it is susceptible quality or passion; or it does not reside in the senses. If the latter, either it is innate from nature — in which case it is natural faculty or imbecility — or it is acquired, in which case it is habit or disposition. From this the four twin species arise.

Article III: On the Essence of Quality in General

Some define quality as follows: *Quality is an absolute accident, following upon a form as something complementary to its perfection, in either the act or the mode by which a thing is disposed well or ill.*

It is said to be an *accident* to distinguish it from relation. It is said to *follow upon a form* to distinguish it from quantity, which attends the mode of matter. The qualification *of created substance* extends it to spiritual creatures who lack quantity. The addition *as complementary to perfection* distinguishes quality from the six other accidental categories — action, passion, position, when, where, and having — which are rather pathways toward some terminus than forms intrinsically affecting things.

We also note a fourth member: *form and figure*. Here we hold that form and figure do not constitute essentially distinct species of quality but differ only accidentally: a triangle, for instance, is called a form insofar as it is conceived in a body, and a figure insofar as it is understood purely by quantity without regard to any particular body. That difference is merely accidental.

Confirmation. Quantity considered in a body and quantity considered abstracted from a body do not differ essentially, only accidentally. Therefore neither do form and figure — which are consequent on quantity — differ essentially but only accidentally.

The divisions of figures ought to be sought from mathematicians, and above all from Euclid, easily the greatest of all mathematicians.

Last Article: The Affections of Quality

Aristotle enumerates three properties of quality.

First, that quality admits of a contrary — for heat is contrary to cold, and whiteness is contrary to blackness.

This property does not, however, apply to *all* quality if the proper sense of contrariety is intended: qualities of the second and fourth species — including form and figure, and the intellect, will, sight, and similar natural faculties — do not properly admit of contrariety.

Second, that quality is susceptible of increase and decrease in intensity — for heat and cold can grow stronger or weaker.

Third, that things sharing the same quality are called *similar*, while those not sharing it are called *dissimilar* — as two learned men are similar, and a learned man and an ignorant one are dissimilar. Similarity and dissimilarity, being relations, are not themselves called quality; rather, things are said to be similar *on account of* quality.

Questions V and VI

On Action and Passion

Action and Passion are one and the same thing and are most conveniently treated together.

Action is defined as *the act of the agent as agent* — or as others say, the accident by which a thing is formally called an agent — as fire, warming something, by the act of warming.

Passion is the *act of the patient as patient* — the accident by which a thing is formally called a recipient of something — as wood, receiving heat into itself, is said to undergo warming.

Two important consequences follow:

First, that action and passion are not two really distinct things but one and the same thing: insofar as it proceeds from the agent, it is called action; insofar as it is received in the subject, it is called passion. It is impossible to have action without passion or passion without action — which would be the case if they were really distinct from each other.

Second, that action and passion are formally distinguished and from the nature of the thing, possessing essential definitions that differ from the nature of the thing itself.

Action is divided, first, into *momentary* and *successive*: momentary action is completed in an instant, as the generation of a human being; successive action extends over some duration of time, as fire's heating.

It is further divided into *immanent* and *transient*. Immanent action is received in the same subject from which it proceeds — as the action of the intellect, which proceeds from the intellect and is received in the same intellect and remains there. Transient action is received in an external subject — as fire's heating of wood. The rest concerning action and passion is to be sought from Physics.

Question VII: On *When*

The great dispute concerning Time belongs to Physics; we are not here discussing duration, since *When* — which is the category in question — is not duration but

something produced by it: specifically, it is the mode by which a thing is said to have existed at some point or to exist now — as yesterday and today — by reason of its having existed or now existing within some particular duration.

Three properties of this accident:

First, that it has no contrary — since yesterday and tomorrow seem opposed, but they are not properly contrary, only improperly so, as different measures of the same genus, namely time.

Second, that *When* does not admit of more or less — since nothing is more "tomorrow" than anything else, nor is "today" more today than another today.

Third, that *When* belongs only to corruptible things — since it is inseparable from Time, from which it results, per the common teaching of the natural philosophers.

Question VIII: On *Where*

Although *Where* [the category] has great affinity with place, it differs from it in that *Where* is broader — it is admitted even in Angels and rational souls, in whom ordinary corporeal place cannot be found, since a place is the bounding surface of a surrounding body, which spiritual entities lack.

Where is properly defined as *a real mode intrinsically resulting from a thing's existence in a place*, by which mode a thing is said to be formally here and nowhere else — as a teacher in a chair, a student in a hall.

Where is divided into *definitive* and *circumscriptive*.

Definitive Where belongs principally to spiritual beings — Angels and rational souls — which are contained within a certain space without any multiplicity of parts, obtaining a certain sphere of presence.

Circumscriptive Where applies only to bodies, which so occupy a place that each part of the body corresponds to a part of the place, part by part.

Two properties: **first**, no contrary — since *above* and *below* seem contrary but are not properly so in the sense of this category. **Second**, *Where* does not admit of more or less — since nothing can be *more where* or *less where* than another.

Question IX: On Position

Position has a double signification: improper and proper. In the improper sense it is taken for *place itself*, as when we ordinarily say that a house's position is the location

where it stands. In its proper sense — the sense that matters here — it is *a real mode resulting from the disposition of a body's parts in a place*, by virtue of which certain parts stand superior, others inferior, one before another, and so forth.

Position thus taken differs from circumscriptive *Where* in this: *Where* merely signifies the mode by which a body exists in a place through the correspondence of its parts to parts of the place, without specifying which part is higher or which lower. *Position* adds the specific arrangement of those parts — their being stacked, ordered, and disposed in a particular way.

Position is divided into *natural* and *voluntary*.

Natural position is determined by nature — as the head is naturally erect in humans and reclined toward the earth in quadrupeds.

Voluntary position is that which depends on will — standing, sitting, and similar postures.

Two properties: **first**, that standing and lying down seem to be contrary positions, but they are only improperly contrary — as two species under the same genus can be opposed by their differentiae without being properly contrary. **Second**, *more* and *less* cannot be applied to position.

Last Question: On *Having* (or *Habit*)

Some interpret *Having* as any external denomination by which a thing is said, by reason of some adjacent thing like a garment, to be clothed or wearing something.

Others more correctly say it is *a mode resulting from the adjacency of a garment to a body*, by virtue of which the body is formally said to be clothed — as one wearing a toga, wearing armor, and so on. This is why Aristotle's interpreters note that *Having* properly applies only to corporeal things, since only they can have external garments or coverings adjacent to them.

Moreover: the form from which this mode results need not be intrinsic to the subject — since a garment is not *inside* the person who wears it — and thus being-headed or being-armed does not belong to the category of *Having*, because the head and arms are interior parts, not exterior adjacents.

The species of *Having* can be multiplied in proportion to the variety of garments or external adjuncts — as being armed, being togated, and so on.

Two properties: **first**, no contrary; **second**, admitting of more and less — since a body can be more or less clad, covered to a greater or lesser degree — but these properties, as we have repeatedly said, must always be understood in terms of the entity of the subject, not of the essence of the category.

Third Disputation and Last: On the Post-Predicaments

Section I: On Opposition

Question I: On Opposition in General

Following Aristotle's order of post-predicaments — and likewise tracing his steps in accurately explaining the categories — we shall now treat what must be handed on after the categories themselves have been completed: the post-predicaments.

To understand the name of Opposition in all its senses, we begin from a higher principle.

Note, first: all entities are either the same by some common nature — as two human beings share human nature — or they are diverse, joined by no bond of nature — as man and horse.

Again: those that are diverse either have repugnancy between them or do not. Animal and rational, for instance, have no repugnancy and can be joined in the same human being.

Those *with* repugnancy, when found in the same subject, constitute a double difference: they are called either *disparate* or *opposite*.

Disparate things are those that, though very different from each other, can nonetheless fight with some third thing — as man and horse: though they are far apart, either could be said to be greater or lesser than some stone.

Opposite things are those that so fight with each other that they cannot simultaneously fight with any third thing in the same mode — as heat and cold. These constitute four genera of opposition in the tradition descended from Aristotle: contradiction, privation, contrariety, and relation.

Question II: Particular Oppositions

Article I: On Contradictory Opposition

Of all oppositions, the greatest is contradiction. We shall describe it as the repugnance of two simple terms with respect to being and non-being.

It is said to be *of two simple terms* to distinguish it from complete contradictory opposition between propositions — as *every man is an animal* and *some man is not an animal*. When contradiction operates on singulars, it is of the form: *Aristotle is a*

Philosopher versus *Aristotle is not a Philosopher*. These propositions repugn each other so thoroughly that they cannot both be true at the same time, and one must necessarily be true.

The second opposition is **contrariety** — between universal propositions of opposite quality: *every man is an animal* versus *no man is an animal*. The first pair, being in necessary matter, cannot be simultaneously false; one must be true. The second pair, in contingent matter, can be simultaneously false.

The third is **sub-contrariety** — between particular propositions of opposite quality: *some man is just* versus *some man is not just*. The first two sub-contrary propositions can be simultaneously true in contingent matter; the second two, likewise.

The fourth is **sub-alternation** — when propositions repugn in quantity alone, one universal and one particular affirming or denying the same predicate: *every man is an animal* versus *some man is an animal*. Subalterns: the truth of the universal necessitates the truth of the particular.

Article II: On Privative Opposition

First, the definition of privation commonly used:

Privation is *the absence of a form in a subject apt to receive it, according to time and species*.

It is said, first, *absence of form* — to distinguish it from pure negation, which is the mere absence of form without reference to suitability.

Second, it is said *in a subject apt* — to distinguish it from the absolute absence of vision, which does not constitute a privation in a stone, since a stone has no natural aptitude for sight.

Third, *according to time* — since privation requires that the subject be capable of receiving the form at the relevant time of its existence; a kitten is not considered blind immediately at birth, since such animals are not yet capable of sight at that stage.

Fourth, *according to species* — since not any absence counts as a privation; blindness would not be called a privation in an animal that, according to its species, is entirely unsuited to sight.

From this it is clear what the privative opposition consists in — namely the repugnance of a habit and the privation of that same habit: as sight and blindness, hearing and deafness.

Question. Whether privation can have a natural return — that is, whether a subject, once deprived of a form, can naturally regain it.

Note first that regressions from privation to form are of two kinds: one where privation removes only the act and not the potency (as sleep removes the act of seeing but not the faculty), and another where it removes the act and potency simultaneously (as death removes both the act of sight and the capacity for sight entirely).

First Proposition. *Nature gives a regression from privation to form when the privation removes only the act, not the potency.*

Proof by example. Sleep removes the act of seeing; the sleeping person naturally recovers it upon waking. Again, an extinguished lantern loses its light but regains it naturally when relit. Therefore natural regression from privation to form is possible.

Second Proposition. *A mediate natural regression from privation to the form of the same species is possible when the privation removes both the act and the potency simultaneously.*

Proof. A dead man, who has undergone the privation of his vital form, can be transformed back into a living thing — not directly, but mediately, through the chain of natural generation: the body becomes nutrients, nutrients sustain a living man, a living man produces new life. Therefore mediate natural regression is possible.

Third Proposition. *An immediate natural regression from privation to the form of the same species is not possible.*

Proof. It cannot happen naturally that a blind man regains sight, a deaf man regains hearing, or a dead man immediately rises back to life.

Last Proposition. *No natural regression — immediate or mediate — from privation to a form of the same species is possible through the extraordinary power of God alone.*

Proof. The extraordinary power of God is not subject to the laws of nature. God has restored sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, life to the dead — as the miracles of Christus and the Apostles attest. Therefore such extraordinary regression is possible.

Article III: On Contrary Opposition

Contrariety becomes known from the contraries themselves, about which we shall speak directly.

Aristotle *(Metaphysics VII, ch. 12)* states that contraries often appear alongside opposites.

1. Contraries are called things that *are in the same genus, maximally distant from each other*. The definition continues with a double difference: some are *improper* — in the same genus but unable to expel each other from the same subject — as rational and irrational, from the diversity of genus. Others are *proper* — in the same genus, maximally distant from each other, mutually expelling each other from the same subject, unless some other force intervenes from nature.

It is further said *maximally distant* — to distinguish them from disparate things like man and horse, which are maximally distant not within the proximate genus but only within a remote one.

It is added that they are *mutually self-expelling from the same subject* — to distinguish the improper contraries, which while in the same genus cannot simply expel each other.

2. Contraries must have the *same genus*: whether proximate, as whiteness and blackness share the genus of color, and temperance and intemperance share the same habitual genus; or remote, as when no proximate genus can be found.

3. It is added *mutually expelling* — for heat and cold, which are contraries, mutually expel each other from a subject.

4. It is added *from the same subject* — since contraries do not repugn from diverse subjects.

Last addition: *unless some external force intervenes from nature* — for the absolutely divine power can hold both contraries simultaneously in one subject.

First Proposition on Contraries: In Diminished Degrees, Two Contraries Can Naturally Be in the Same Part of the Same Subject Simultaneously.

Proof. The same lukewarm water can possess some degree of coldness and also some degree of warmth at the same time.

Second Proposition. *No two contraries at their maximum intensity and at the same time and in the same part of the subject can naturally coexist.*

Proof by experience: whenever a fully intense contrary is admitted into a subject, the opposing contrary is immediately expelled — maximum heat destroys maximum cold entirely.

Third Proposition. *Concerning the infinite power of God: two contraries at maximum intensity can coexist in the same subject simultaneously.*

Proof. That God can do so does not imply a contradiction. The antecedent is proved: it implies contradiction only if it makes something be and not be simultaneously — but the admission of contrary intensities at maximum does not make the same thing be and not be at the same time, therefore it does not imply contradiction.

Article IV: On Relative Opposition

Concerning relative opposition, much has already been said above in the treatise on relation. One point worth adding here: among the related things, one cannot be had without the other — a father cannot exist without a correlative son. Hence the related things are simultaneous in nature.

Objection. A father can *be* prior to a son, since a father first *is*, and the son only afterward.

Reply. The father is prior to the son as father by his own filiation — as a human generator, not as a correlate. The correlate — the father *as father* — implies the son's existence simultaneously.

Section II: On the Modes of Priority

Aristotle *(Categories, ch. 10)* enumerates five modes of priority.

First is *priority by time* — a thing is called prior which temporally precedes another — as a father temporally precedes a son.

Second is *priority by nature* — a thing is called prior by nature when the inference does not hold in the reverse direction but does hold in the given direction. For example: from the existence of an animal, man can be inferred (since man is an animal); but from the existence of man, animal does not *uniquely* follow (since many other animals exist). Thus animal is prior by nature to man.

Third is *priority of order* — that is called prior which must be posited first in a science; as principles and elements in sciences are said to be prior in order.

Fourth is *priority of dignity* — that is called prior which is more worthy; as a king is prior in dignity to his subjects.

Fifth is priority by *causality* — that is called prior which is another's cause; as light is prior to illumination, fire to heating.

These five modes of priority can be captured in a brief verse:

By time, nature, prior order, rank, and cause — we call things prior.

Section III: On the Modes of Simultaneity

Aristotle *(Categories, ch. 12)* enumerates three modes of things being simultaneous.

First — things are *simultaneous by time* — those which have begun to exist at the same point in time, as two men born at the same moment.

Second — things are *simultaneous by nature* — those that reciprocally imply each other, so that neither can be inferred without the other — as man and rational animal.

Third — things are *simultaneous by division* — things that are immediately divided into the same genus, as man and horse are immediately divided from animal, meaning that they immediately fall under that common genus.

And this concludes the treatment of synonyms, which Aristotle adds as a supplementary matter.

SECOND PART OF THE LOGICAL WORK

On the Proposition, or Enunciation

Preface

Just as a syllable is composed of simple letters, propositions are composed of simple terms — and because of those terms, it is the best method to arrive at an interpretation of propositions by starting from the very principles of proposition, which are names and verbs. We proceed to this second part.

Since the simple terms of propositions are *names* and *verbs*, we presuppose their explanation and give what is necessary about propositions, as will be clarified.

Prior Tractate of This Part: In a Single Disputation

On the Principles of Propositions, That Is, On the Name and Verb, and What Pertains to Them

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Section I: On the Signification of Words

Since both names and verbs are defined by voices that are significative signs, before we arrive at the true definition of the proposition, it is necessary to say something about voices as signs.

Note first that the signification of a voice is *the conformity it has with the thing it signifies* — for example, the signification of the voice *man* is its conformity with humanity, to which it responds and which it signifies.

Note second that the signification of a voice is twofold: one *natural*, sought from the nature of the voice itself, in which sense a *groan* is said to signify interior pain — not by human convention, but naturally, since groans and laughter signify pain and joy by their very nature. The other is *not-natural* — entirely dependent on human free convention, which men have established for a voice to signify — like the voice *man*, which signifies human nature and not a stone or horse.

It follows from this that voices signify concepts, not things directly, since voices are not signs of what is written but instruments by which we express our concepts — as the footprint of an animal is said to be an instrumental sign of the foot that imprinted it.

Note further that concepts and voices are signs of things in diverse modes, since a concept is the formal sign of the thing itself — it forms the thing in the mind — while a voice is an instrumental sign — the instrument used to signify things.

Note lastly that since a sign is twofold — one manifest thing (as ivy hanging outside a shop manifests wine for sale) and one that represents and supposes simultaneously — we hold that a voice is a sign *of concepts as what they manifest*, and not of suppositions. For voices do not stand for concepts but only make them manifest. This follows clearly from what has been said: if voices stood for concepts, then the voice *paries* (wall) standing for the concept of wall, and the voice *albi* (white) standing for the concept of whiteness, these two voices in a single proposition — *paries est albus* (the wall is white) — could not be united, since we would be saying *the concept of wall is the concept of white*, which is false.

Note additionally — stated above in the fourth place — that a concept and a voice are signs of the thing, but in a diverse mode, since a concept is the formal sign of the thing — it forms the thing in the mind directly — while a voice is an instrumental sign — the instrument by which we express the thing as an imprint, so that the vestige of a foot is said to be the instrumental sign of the foot that made the imprint.

Note finally that, since a sign is twofold — one thing that is manifest in itself (as ivy hanging outside manifests wine for sale) and one that simultaneously represents and supposes — we hold that a voice is the sign of concepts in that it manifests them, and not

as a sign of suppositions. For voices do not stand for concepts; they only make them manifest.

Section II: On the Name

Aristotle *(First book of On Interpretation)* treats names and verbs, and will now explain the definition of name. His definition runs as follows: *A name is a voiced sound, significative by convention, without reference to time, of which no part is separately significant*.

Voice is placed as genus, to distinguish names and verbs from particular sounds — since any particular sound is voice, but not every voice is name or verb.

It is added *significative* — to exclude voices that plainly signify nothing, like *blitri*, *barat*, and similar nonsense, and also conjunctions, adverbs, prepositions, and syncategorematic expressions like *every*, *no*, *some*, *which*, *any*, which unless joined with verbs acquire no plain signification on their own.

It is added *by convention* — to exclude voices that naturally signify, like groans, which signify interior pain not by convention but by their very nature.

It is added *without reference to time* — in order for the name to be distinguished from the verb, which as we shall see in the following section does signify with reference to time.

It is added *finite* — to exclude infinite names like *non-man*, *non-equus*, which signify nothing definite in themselves, but indefinitely signify everything — for *non-man* includes whatever is not a man, whether positive, negative, or even fictitious.

The sixth qualification is *in the nominative case*, by which Aristotle teaches that names are properly those expressed in the nominative or *direct* case — as *man*, *equus* — and not those in oblique cases, which are expressed in other ways.

The reason is that the name is taken here by Aristotle insofar as it has its own proper significative capacity — and *per se*, it can be the subject of some proposition, as *man is an animal*; oblique cases however are not referred from the direct case but insofar as they are subjects of propositions, as *of Socrates, who is the philosopher*, is the proposition of Socrates.

The seventh and last qualification is *of which no part is separately significant* — without any connection, without any parts by themselves. The parts of a name signify nothing, as *homo* (man) — admittedly *ho* and *mo* are parts but those syllable-parts are not separately significant — distinguishing thus from complex names composed of multiple perfect words, as *respublica* (republic), which *are* and *publica* compose; they do not signify separately from each other, but together as a total they signify one thing, as prior to the division the total is signified. Accordingly, this definition of name equally applies to pronouns like *ego*, *tu*, *ille*, since they similarly can be subjects of propositions

— as *ego loquor* (I speak), *tu studes* (you study) — and therefore the definition of name is not illegitimate for them.

Section III: On the Verb

Aristotle *(book three of On Interpretation)* gives this definition of the verb: *A verb is a voiced sound, significative by convention, with a finite time indication, of which no part is separately significant, perpetually of those things which are said of another.*

That the verb is, as *voiced sound* — significative, finite, with none of its parts separately significant — is common to the name from what was said in the preceding section: that it *signifies with reference to time*, the name lacks, as we said there; that it is *of things which are said of another* distinguishes it from names.

First Proposition. *A verb always signifies a thing with reference to time, whether it be of the second kind, or of the third kind of adiacent.*

The proposition is clear from its very definition. That it is taken from the verb *is* — so that propositions of the second kind, in which the verb *is* is the copula and the attribute, as *Peter studies*, where the verb *studies* functions as both copula and attribute — similarly those of the third kind of adiacent, which include a *substantive verb*, as *man is an animal*, where the verb *is* is copula, and animal is attribute.

Proof. The verb *is* in a proposition of the second kind is the copula, as *Peter studies*, where *studies* is both copula and predicate — and the verb, when it signifies *certain temporal difference*, in propositions of the second kind, indicates verity of the proposition for a certain time, not for all time, as these propositions testify: *man lives*, *man is an animal*, etc.

Second Proposition. *In propositions of the second kind or third kind of adiacent, the verb does not signify a certain temporal difference, but rather designates some temporal denomination.*

Proof. The verb *is* in a proposition of the second kind or third kind signifies a certain temporal difference, since it indicates the truth of the proposition for a certain time, and not for all time — as is clear from those propositions, *man lives*, *man is an animal*, etc.

Third Proposition. *In propositions of contingency or of the second kind or third kind, the verb signifies some temporal difference.*

Proof. The verb *is* signifies a certain temporal difference — since it indicates the truth of the proposition for a certain aliquod time, and not for all time — and this is apparent in propositions of the second kind or third kind, as *Peter is white*, *Peter runs* — which are only true so long as Peter is white and running, not otherwise, at all times.

Posterior Tractate: In a Single Disputation Comprehending the Proposition Itself, or Enunciation

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Sections I and II: On the Name and Existence of the Proposition, or Enunciation

A proposition, which by another name is called *enunciation* — and is called *oratio* (discourse) from its being shown forth, or exhibited in speech by enunciating, as if one made another understand something inwardly — is understood similarly in that enunciation proceeds from enunciating, nearly as if one made another understand something inwardly.

Its existence is immediately obvious. The divisions of propositions are chiefly these:

First, into *complex* (or *composite*) versus *incomplex* (or *simple*).

The complex proposition is more properly a double proposition than a single one — for instance *Peter is an orator, and a philosopher*.

The simple proposition is one in which we deal with a single proposition — as *Peter is a philosopher*. Of this we speak here, since it alone is properly called a proposition.

The proposition is further divided into *one of the second adiacent* and *one of the third adiacent*, of which we spoke above.

Third, into *finite*, *infinite*, and *modified*.

Absolute propositions are those that absolutely state an attribute to belong to a subject — as *man is an animal*.

Hypothetical propositions are those that state an attribute as belonging to the subject under some assumed condition — as *if kings are philosophers, states will be blessed*.

Modified finally are those that not simply state an attribute to belong to a subject but further declare the mode of its belonging — as *possible*, *impossible*, *necessary*, *contingent*, as stated above.

From this a quadruple modal proposition is collected. The first is called *de possibili*, the second *de impossibili*, the third *de necessario*, the fourth *de contingenti*.

Section III: On the Essence of the Proposition, or Enunciation

Aristotle defines a proposition (*On Interpretation*, ch. 4) as: *Oratio [speech] that is either true or false*. Speech [here] is genus: that which signifies something true or false — this is the difference.

Question I: On Speech

The use of speech (*oratio*) is duplex — one *rhetorical*, the other properly *dialectical*. The prior does not necessarily contain truth or falsity but tends toward what is useful or good — or harmful — or some mode of another. The posterior truly contains truth and falsity — as *Peter is a man*, *Peter is a stone*.

Now this speech, as genus of the proposition, is debated: whether Aristotle defined simple speech only, as *Peter is a man*, and not complex speech. Others say Aristotle defined neither simply complex speech, nor simple speech, nor hypothetical speech — but only that the complex proposition is a type of speech having parts — namely subject and verb — the meaning of which as affirmation or negation signifies; it is sufficient that at least those parts signify tanquam words, not as affirmations or negations: for simple propositions are plainly such, and their parts — subject and verb — joined signify only as words, not as affirmations or negations.

Others say, Aristotle did not even define the simple oratio, nor the complex, since an *oratio* is a genus common to all kinds — with the difference that Aristotle speaking in common, expresses it by those parts that separately signify only as words, not as affirmations or negations, and fats is that at least those parts signify tanquam words; which these things apply plainly to propositio simplici: ergo the oratio of Aristotle's definition equals both the simple and complex speech.

Question II: On the Truth and Falsity of Enunciation, and Second Mental Operation: Where, Occasionally, of the First and Its Truth

An enunciation (*enunciatio*), which is the second mental operation, either affirms something of something else or negates it — and from this it is generically recognized as a proposition, to which it adds truth and falsity as it signifies. On the truth of the proposition, asked from the prior question — whether its truth is essentially its own — a few things must be added.

Note first that truth is found most broadly, transcendentally, and intellectually.

Transcendental truth is that which belongs to all things insofar as they are beings — and it is defined as: *the conformity of any thing with its own exemplar*, by which sense we say that the image of Caesar is true, because it corresponds to Caesar himself — its exemplar and prototype — namely the gold of the divine mind.

Intellectual truth truly, which arises from the intellect, is further defined as *the conformity of the intellect with the thing it understands* — by which mode we say that the proposition *man is an animal* is true, since in forming it the intellect grasps the nature of man just as it is.

Note further that intellectual truth is twofold: one *simple* and one *complex*.

Simple truth is that which follows upon the first operation of the intellect and occurs when something is apprehended simply and without any affirmation or negation — as *homo* is apprehended from the part of the thing, nothing is negated or affirmed.

Complex truth is that which follows upon the second operation of the intellect — affirming and denying — and occurs when what the intellect attributes to what ought properly belong to it — as to man it attributes *animal*, which is properly due, *homo est animal*.

Unique Proposition. *In the first operation of the intellect only simple truth is found; in the second, complex truth.*

The prior part of the proposition is proved: simple truth is that which follows upon the first apprehension of a simple thing, which is the first mental operation — and therefore simple truth is truly given in the first mental operation. The second part follows easily.

Question III: What in an Enunciation Has the Ratio of Matter, and What of Form

Note first that an enunciation has a ratio of matter — since matter is what determines another, and form is what is determined by it. So in an enunciation, the predicate determines the subject — what determines is form — and what is determined thereby is matter.

Note second that an enunciation can be considered in two modes: first, insofar as it is an act of the intellect itself — affirming something of something else — and this enunciation is called *mental* and *formal*; second, insofar as it is a certain artificial composition of the intellect from various concepts attributed — of the subject, the attribute, and the nexus which intervenes between the two. When the intellect affirms something of another — for example, it affirms *man* of *Peter*, saying *Peter est homo* — this results from that act of the intellect in the very intellect — in the intellect objectively. This enunciation is said to be *mental objective*, of which we treat only here, seeking what it has as the ratio of matter, and what of form.

First Proposition. *The predicate in an enunciation, with respect to the subject, has the ratio of form; the subject truly has the ratio of matter.*

Proof. What determines another has the ratio of form; the subject is what is determined, the ratio of matter, since in an enunciation the predicate terminates the subject to that enunciation — for example, in this enunciation, *Petrus est animal*, animal is the predicate determining *Peter*, as the huius enunciationis subiectum — *Petrus est animal* — man from himself could be the subject of another enunciation, *Petrus est homo* — therefore in the enunciation the predicate has the ratio of form, the subject truly the ratio of matter.

Second Proposition. *In an enunciation, subject and attribute simultaneously have the ratio of matter, the nexus truly has the ratio of form.*

Proof in the same mode as the preceding proposition. What determines another has the ratio of form; what is determined, the ratio of matter — since in an enunciation, the nexus of attribute and subject determines both toward that enunciation — as in the enunciation *Peter is man*, and *homo poteram determinare ad hanc enuntiationem*, *Petrus est homo*, *Petrus non est homo*, by reason of diverse connection — therefore the nexus, intervening in an enunciation, determines subject and attribute both — therefore it has the ratio of matter, the nexus truly of form.

Section IV: On the Affections of Enunciation

Question I: On Necessity and Contingency of Propositions

A proposition is *necessary* if *Peter is a man*; *contingent* if *Peter studies currently*.

First, it is noted that of the effect of the future contingent, the contingent can be referred to two things: first, to the efficient cause of itself — as the study of the future Peter, which refers to Peter himself — and to the very conditional knowledge of God — which predicts such an effect in such a time. Second, from Theology, one must know that the knowledge God has of things is threefold: first *simple intelligence*; second *vision*; third finally *conditioned*.

Simple intelligence is that by which God sees all possible things — all things that He could produce.

Vision truly is that by which God sees res, according to their proper existences as things.

Conditioned finally is that which God has for some future things — if these conditions are placed. For example, God has conditioned knowledge that Peter would have denied Christ, had he been led into a house, tried there, and had those conditions been placed — as is the case in the historical account.

Note third that the *effect of the contingent future* cannot be referred to the simple intelligence of God, nor to His vision, but only to the conditioned.

Proof. The contingent future cannot be referred to divine simple intelligence — because that knowledge is of all possible things, and among all possible things there are many others that are not future contingents. Nor can it be referred to vision — because vision is of things that will actually be future: but the contingent future is that which in fact will be future, yet could equally not be future; since the vocabulary of contingency and the conditional indicate. Therefore contingent futures are referred only to the conditioned knowledge.

First Proposition. *Of two contradictory propositions of the future contingent, neither is determinately true or false, but only indeterminately.*

This is the position of Aristotle, of all his disciples, of St. Thomas, and most of the more recent ones.

Proof. Propositions of the future contingent are not more determinately true or false because of this: the very things they affirm are future — the affirming propositions will be true, and the negating ones false; if those things are not future, the affirmations are false, and the negatives true. But contingently future things — since they are contingently future — are not determined to be future; since determinate future means it will be future, and determinate non-future means it will not be future. The contingent future is precisely what may or may not be future — the vocabulary of contingency itself indicates. Therefore propositions of the future contingent are neither determinately true nor determinately false.

Second Proposition. *Nor is one of two propositions of the future contingent determinately true, and the other determinately false — even though God's conditioned knowledge might have foreseen them, true or false.*

Proof. God's conditioned knowledge is not the *cause* of the truth of propositions of the future contingent — therefore it does not make one of them be determinately true or false. The antecedent is proved: no knowledge of God makes it so that the thing will be or not be future; but only contingently future, as we have said and proved above. Therefore if God sees future things through conditioned knowledge — then *seen* does not make them determinate future. And therefore his knowledge of the future contingent does not make the proposition of the future contingent to be determinately true or false.

Question II: On the Modification of Propositions

A proposition is said to be *modal* when the attribute is not stated simply to belong to a subject, but the mode of its belonging is also declared — as *possible*, *impossible*, *necessary*, *contingent*, as we said above.

Note first that two things are distinguished in a modal proposition: the *dictum* and the *mode*.

The *dictum* is the proposition itself; the *mode* is the qualification by which such a proposition is expressed — for example, in this modal proposition, *it is necessary for a horse to be an animal*: *for a horse to be an animal* is the dictum; *it is necessary* is the mode.

Note second that propositions modal in affirmation can be both affirming by part of mode and denying by part of dictum — as *it is necessary for a man to be an animal*: and contrariwise, denying by part of mode and affirming by part of dictum — as *it is not necessary for a man to be a stone*; and on the other hand, affirming by part of mode and affirming by part of dictum — as *it is necessary for a man not to be a stone*; and

finally, denying by part of mode and denying by part of dictum — as *it is not necessary for a man not to be white*.

Note third that, although affirmation and negation in these modal propositions are applied not only to the mode but also to the dictum, the modal propositions affirming are simply posited as those that affirm by part of mode, even though they deny by part of dictum — as *it is necessary for a man not to be a stone* — since from part of mode, namely *it is necessary*, affirming; this proposition modal is said to be *affirming*. Contrary to this, those that deny by part of mode, and affirm by part of dictum — as *it is not necessary for a man not to be white* — since from part of mode they deny, these modal propositions are taken as negatives.

Note finally that modal propositions are said to be universal or particular — just as the dictum is expressed universally or particularly — as *it is necessary for every man to be an animal* is universal; *it is necessary for some Peter to be a man* is particular.

Question III: On the Opposition of Propositions

The opposition of propositions is the repugnance of propositions between themselves — either in quantity, in quality, or both.

Repugnance in quantity is when one proposition is universal and the other particular — as *every man is an animal*, *some man is an animal*.

Repugnance in quality is when one affirms and the other negates — as *every man is an animal*, *no man is an animal*.

The opposition of propositions is fourfold:

First is *contradiction* — between those propositions that repugn in both quantity and quality simultaneously, one being universal affirming and the other particular negating, or vice versa: *every man is an animal*, *some man is not an animal*: or *no stone is a man*, *some stone is a man*. These propositions repugn so much between themselves that they can simultaneously neither both be true nor both be false; one must necessarily be true.

Second is *contrariety* — when propositions in quality alone, and not in quantity, since both are universal — one universal affirming, the other universal negating: *every man is an animal*, *no man is an animal*: or *every man is just*, *no man is just*. The first two, since they are in necessary matter, cannot both be false, and one must necessarily be true. The latter, since they are in contingent matter, can both be false.

Third is *sub-contrariety* — when propositions repugn in quality alone and not in quantity, both being particular — one particular affirming, the other particular negating: as *some man is just*, *some man is not just*. The first two sub-contraries can be

simultaneously true, and they equally can both be false. The second two, since they are in contingent matter, can also both be true.

Fourth is *sub-alternation* — which obtains when propositions repugn in quantity alone: one is universal affirming, the other particular affirming — as *every man is an animal*, *some man is an animal*; or one is universal negating, the other particular negating. The first two sub-alternates are simultaneously true; and they also can both be false. The second two similarly are both true, and both can be false.

Peculiarity of the opposition of modal propositions. It is communicated in this way:

First, modal propositions are said to be contradictory — of which one is necessarily affirming, the other of possible negating — as *it is necessary for a man to be an animal*: *it is not possible for a man not to be an animal*.

Second, these are contraries — of which one is necessarily affirming, the other of impossibly negating — as *it is necessary for a man to be an animal*: *it is impossible for a man not to be an animal*.

Third these are sub-contraries — formed by the mode of contingency — one affirming, the other negating — as *it is contingent for a man to be upright*: *it is not contingent for a man to be upright*.

Subalterns finally are those where one is of necessity and of contingency — and each affirms — as *it is necessary for a man to be an animal*: *it is contingent for a man to be an animal*: and this repugnance of propositions is that the one necessary ought to be true, and the other false: true, as *it is necessary for a man to be an animal*: false, as *it is contingent for a man to be an animal*.

Question IV: On the Conversion of Propositions

Conversion of propositions occurs when the subject is changed into the predicate — as *no horse is a man*, *no man is a horse*.

That conversion is threefold by common account:

First is called *simple* and *per se* — preserving the same quality of proposition as was converted, as in the example given above.

Second is *per accidens* — occurring when, with the same quality of proposition preserved, the quantity is changed — so that a universal affirming is converted into a particular affirming: *every man is an animal*, *some animal is a man*.

Third is *by contraposition* — which occurs when, with the quantity retained and the quality changed into the opposite, a proposition which was affirming with one finite terms is converted to one with infinite terms — as *every man is an animal*, *every non-animal is a non-man*.

Question V: On Equipollence of Propositions

Article I: On the Equipollence of Modal Propositions

The meaning is: how, given one proposition — *it is possible for a man to be just* — the three other equipollent propositions in the other modes — of impossibility, of necessity, of contingency — can be assigned. In order to understand this,

Note first that in each of the four artificial words introduced for placing the equipollence before our eyes — *purpurea*, *amabimus*, *edensuli*, *illaec* — there are four syllables, these four modal propositions designating in this order: the first designates the proposition of contingency; 2. of impossibility; 3. of possibility; 4. of necessity.

Note 2. that in the syllables of those four words all the vowels A, E, I, V are found — and the vowel A found in each syllable indicates the proposition to be affirming by part of mode and of dictum; E, affirming by part of mode and negating by part of dictum; I, negating by part of mode and affirming by part of dictum; V, negating by part of mode and of dictum.

With these diligently considered, it will be easy given one modal proposition to assign three equipollents. Let this be given: *possible est hominem esse iustum* — which is of the possible, and affirming by part of mode. We seek which word has the vowel A in its first syllable — such designating a proposition of the possible — since by what has been said, the first syllable designates a modal proposition of contingency: the vowel A indicates it to be affirming both by part of mode and dictum. That word will without question be *amabimus*. With that word found, we proceed as follows: the second syllable has the vowel A — being of contingency — since it truly includes A, I — it designates the proposition to be affirming by part of mode and dictum: *it is contingent for a man to be just*. The third syllable designates a proposition of the impossible, and in it is found the vowel I, which designates a proposition negating by part of mode and affirming by part of dictum: *it is not impossible for a man to be just*. Finally the fourth syllable of that word designates a necessary proposition, and the vowel V, which designates a proposition negating by part of mode and dictum: *it is not necessary for a man not to be just*. So that these equipollent propositions may be seen more quickly all together, we place them in the following order:

A — *It is possible for a man to be just*. ma — *It is contingent for a man to be just*. bi — *It is not impossible for a man to be just*. mus — *It is not necessary for a man not to be just*.

Third Part of the Dialectical Work

On Argumentation

Preface

Argumentation is the principal instrument of investigation — widely and primarily considered. It can be considered *materially*, as analytic or probable or sophistical — or *formally*, insofar as it is constructed by certain defined modes and specific figures. Aristotle treated argumentation in the formal sense in the books of the Prior Analytics; in the material sense in the books of the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the Refutations. Following his footsteps, we distribute this third part into two general tractates: the Prior on Argumentation according to form, especially the Syllogism; and then the subsequent on Argumentation according to matter — analytic or probable, and sophistical.

Tractate I: On Argumentation According to Form

Sections I and II: On the Name and Existence of Argumentation, Principally the Syllogism

Argumentation, also called *reasoning*, is simply *a discourse inferring one thing from another* — from which it follows that a man is rational, having an intellect that proceeds from prior to posterior conclusions.

It operates in two modes: mentally and vocally.

Mental reasoning is that accomplished in the mind without any verbal prolation.

Vocal reasoning is the verbal expression of that same reasoning, in words.

Mental reasoning is itself twofold: *formal* and *objective*.

Formal mental reasoning is the third operation of the mind — inferring one thing from another — just as in the example: *man is rational, therefore he is also possessed of intellect*. Here we judge that the man is possessed of intellect by means of the preceding judgment that he is rational, and what follows is the subsequent judgment. This third operation of the mind — this mental course — is distinguished from angelic cognition, which cognizes all things in a single act without proceeding from one cognition to the cognition of another unknown, as the Theologians teach with St. Thomas.

Objective mental reasoning is an artificial product of our mind, arising from a preceding judgment and a subsequent judgment — just as an objective enunciation is an artificial product formed from subject, attribute, and their copula.

Section III: On the Essence of the Syllogism

The definition of the syllogism as given by Aristotle and received by common tradition is: *A syllogism is a discourse in which, certain things having been set out, something different necessarily follows from those very things.*

First is placed *discourse* as genus — since argumentation, the proximate genus of the syllogism, along with other species of argumentation — enthymeme, induction, example, chain-argument — are each immediately divided from it.

Added is *in which certain things having been set out* — that is, in which certain things are well-disposed, as [Giles of Rome] explains, or conceded, as [Aphrodisias] wishes them to be conceded.

Added third is *something else follows* — that is, a conclusion.

Adjoined fourth is *necessarily* — the particulars of which must be explained.

Note that the conclusion follows from a syllogism in two modes: *by necessity of consequence*, and *by necessity of the consequent*.

Necessity of consequence (which is otherwise called *necessity of form*) means the conclusion is said to follow necessarily from the premises by the force of form and the disposition of terms, even if materially the conclusion does not follow. As in this syllogism:

Every animal is a stone. Every man is an animal. Therefore every man is a stone.

Here the conclusion — which is entirely false — is necessarily deduced from the premises by the force of the syllogism's form.

Necessity of the consequent means the conclusion is said to follow necessarily from the premises not by virtue of form alone, but on account of the necessary connection among the terms themselves. As in:

Every animal is living. Every man is living. Therefore every man is an animal.

This conclusion is admitted only because it is materially true — not because it is rightly deduced from the premises in a valid syllogistic form, since it is in the second figure with both premises affirming, which is invalid.

Last Section: The Affections of the Syllogism

The affections of the syllogism are: that it truly infers or falsely directly concludes; that it is disposed in this or that mode — and several others, which depend entirely on the knowledge of figures. Full understanding of this section requires the following questions.

Question I

What is the Ratio of Figure? Whence Occasioned by the Material of the Syllogism?

Note first — or rather, from the Compendium, to be recalled — that the material of a syllogism is twofold: one proximate, namely a proposition; the other remote, namely simple terms — of which three compose the syllogism.

Note second that in the complete structure of a syllogism three terms are found — *middle*, *major*, *minor* — of which the middle is joined with the major; and the minor, coupled with the middle in the minor premise, is joined with the major in the conclusion. As appears in this syllogism:

Every animal is a body. Every man is an animal. Therefore every man is a body.

Animal is the middle; body, the major extreme joined with animal in the major premise; man finally the minor extreme, since it is joined with the middle in the minor premise.

We assign the following characteristic of the middle: it is placed once in the major and once in the minor, never entering the conclusion — differing from the major and minor extremes, which have their place in the conclusion.

With these things established, we say that the *ratio of figure* arises from the placement of the middle relative to the major or minor extreme — so that the whole variety of figures depends on that variety of placement. In order to confirm this further, we must discuss the number of figures.

Question II

On the Number of Figures

The First Figure is when the middle is *the subject* in the major premise and *the predicate* in the minor — as appears in this example:

Every animal is a substance. Every man is an animal. Therefore every man is a substance.

For animal, which is the middle, is the subject in the major and the predicate in the minor.

The best and most noble of this figure — and indeed of the whole first figure — is the mode known as *Barbara*, concerning which it should be stated that its conclusion is a universal affirmative.

The four *direct* moods of the first figure are known by the artificial words *Barbara*, *Celarent*, *Darii*, *Ferio*; the five *indirect* are *Baralipton*, *Celantes*, *Dabitis*, *Fapefmo*, *Frisefomorum*. In all these, three syllables are to be considered: the first represents the major, the second the minor, the third the conclusion. If there are more syllables, they are placed only for the sake of the verse.

Also to be considered are the four vowels A, E, I, O: A designates a universal affirmative proposition; E, a universal negative; I, a particular affirmative; O, a particular negative.

The Second Figure is when the middle is *predicated* in both premises:

Every liberality is virtue. No prodigality is virtue. Therefore no prodigality is liberality.

In this syllogism, virtue — which is the middle — is predicated in both the major and minor. This figure contains four moods: *Cesare*, *Camestres*, *Festino*, *Baroco*.

The Third Figure is when the middle is *the subject* in both premises:

Every animal is living. Every animal is a substance. Therefore some substance is living.

In this syllogism, animal — taken as middle — is the subject in both the major and minor. Six moods are found in this third figure, expressed by these six words: *Darapti*, *Felapton*, *Disamis*, *Datisi*, *Bocardo*, *Ferison*.

There is a difficulty among physicians and Aristotelians about whether a **fourth figure** — accepted from Galen and sometimes called *Galen's Figure* — must be added to these three. In Galen's figure, the middle is *predicated* in the major and *subjected* in the minor — the reverse of the first figure. An example:

Every horse is living. Everything living is a substance. Therefore every horse is a substance.

The overwhelming judgment of serious Aristotelians is that this figure, though it sometimes concludes validly, is entirely superfluous and always reducible to the first figure — in which the natural order is for the major extreme to be placed in the major and the minor in the minor.

Question III: On the Reduction of Indirect Modes of the First Figure — and of All Modes of the Second and Third Figures — to the Four Perfect Modes of the First Figure

Reduction is nothing other than the demonstration of the validity of some imperfect syllogism by means of a more perfect one.

It is done in several ways: first, by *simple conversion*; second, by *accidental conversion*; third, by *transposition of premises*; fourth, by *reduction to the impossible*; fifth, by the *expository syllogism*.

For the four prior reductions to proceed efficiently, it helps to have the words for all figures constantly before one's eyes — by which all figure-modes are designated:

Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapefmo, Frisesomorum, Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco, Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

Note that all these words in their first syllable have one of four consonants: B, C, D, F.

Note also all the vowels appearing in these syllables — A, E, I, O — indicating respectively: universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative, particular negative.

Question IV

On Finding Middle Terms to Prove Any Conclusion — Popularly Called the "Bridge of Asses"

The technique of finding middle terms to prove any given conclusion is popularly called the *Bridge of Asses* — not because many middles cannot be invented for any task, but because middles so efficiently present themselves that all must pass through them.

Note first that any conclusion to be proved is either a universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative, or particular negative.

Note second that in proving a conclusion, the terms of that conclusion have the ratios of *antecedent*, *consequent*, and *repugnant* with respect to each other.

Note third that *consequent* is said of what follows from and is inferred by another — as *animal* follows from and is inferred by *man*, and so animal is called consequent to man. The converse does not hold, since from animal, man does not follow uniquely. Things that mutually imply each other — as *man* and *rational animal* — can each serve as both antecedent and consequent to the other.

Note finally that *repugnant* is said of what cannot belong to a thing nor be predicated of it — as stone is repugnant to man, since it cannot belong to man or be predicated of him.

Given these notes, the rules are as follows:

First Rule. *To prove a universal affirmative conclusion, take a middle term that is consequent to the subject and antecedent to the attribute.* For example, to prove *every man is a substance* — take *animal* as middle, which is consequent to man (the subject) and antecedent to substance (the attribute). The argument in *Barbara*:

Every animal is a substance. Every man is an animal. Therefore every man is a substance.

Second Rule. *To prove a universal negative conclusion, take a middle term that is consequent to the subject and repugnant to the attribute, or contrariwise repugnant to the subject and consequent to the attribute.* For example, to prove *no horse is a tree* — take *animal*, which is consequent to horse and repugnant to tree. In *Celarent*:

No animal is a tree. Every horse is an animal. Therefore no horse is a tree.

Third Rule. *To prove a particular affirmative conclusion, take a middle term that is consequent to the subject and antecedent to the attribute.* For example, to prove *some man is a substance* — take *animal* as middle. In *Darii*:

Every animal is a substance. Some men are animals. Therefore some man is a substance.

Last Rule. *To prove a particular negative conclusion, take a middle term antecedent to the subject and repugnant to the attribute.* For example, to prove *some virtue is not contemptible* — take *liberality*, which is antecedent to some virtue and repugnant to being contemptible. In *Ferio*:

No liberality is contemptible. Some virtue is liberality. Therefore some virtue is not contemptible.

These are the general rules for finding middle terms.

Tractate II: On Argumentation According to Matter

Disputation I: On Demonstration

Section I: On Prenotions and Praecognita

Question I: On the Name and Various Acceptations of Prenotion or Foreknowledge

A *prenotion* clearly signifies some preceding knowledge — whether it contributes toward the cognition of something else, or merely occupies a logically prior role without directly causing it. The prior case is called *per se*; the latter is *by accident*.

Question II: On the Existence of Prenotions

Article I: Whether Prenotions Are Necessarily Admitted in Any Cognition, and In Which

This question is proposed under other terms as well — namely, whether any act of knowledge must proceed from some previously existing intellectual cognition.

First Proposition. *The cognition of first principles — such as "anything either is or is not" — does not arise from any prior intellectual cognition.*

For first principles are self-evident; they are intelligible merely from the exposition of their terms. Therefore not every act of the intellect — not every second operation of the mind — must arise from some antecedent intellectual cognition.

Reply, granting the major and denying the minor. However clear the principles may be, they cannot be evident to anyone unless the terms are first intelligently understood. "The whole is greater than the part" cannot be evident to one who does not know what *whole*, *part*, and *greater* mean. The self-evidence of an axiom depends on the understanding of its terms — and therefore even first principles always arise from some antecedent cognitive act, namely the understanding of the terms.

Sixth Proposition. Discursive cognition — the third form of cognition — arises from some pre-existing cognition: namely, from the cognition of the propositions that compose it. Without knowing the propositions of which an argument consists, how could that argument — that discourse — be known?

Reply: granting the major and granting the minor absolutely.

Article II: How Many Prenotions There Are, and of What Kind

We discuss here only prenotion *per se* — that which contributes to the cognition of some subsequent science — and we divide it into three kinds: *preparatory*, *directing*, and *efficient*.

The *preparatory prenotion* is nothing other than the prior sensory cognition that opens the way for the intellect to receive intellectual cognition. As we said, nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.

The *directing prenotion* is the prior cognition of one of the terms in some proposition being proved — as the intellect, in order to prove *man is an animal*, must first know what *man* and *animal* mean. This prenotion directs the intellect so that it clearly knows what it is about to prove and demonstrate.

The *efficient prenotion* is the cognition of the premises of some demonstration — from whose force and efficacy the cognition of the conclusion is proximately drawn.

Article III: Whether and How Many Prenotions Are Given Concerning the Subject of Demonstration

Observe first that by the name *subject* here is meant that which is taken as the entity being demonstrated — placed as the minor extreme in the direct modes of the first figure, and as the subject in the conclusion. If someone proposes to demonstrate that man is capable of laughter, *man* will be called the subject of that demonstration.

Observe second that the subject assumed in a demonstration can be either the total object of a particular science — as natural body is the total object of Physics — or only a partial object — as the heavens taken to demonstrate their capacity for motion.

First Proposition. *The subject of demonstration — whether total or partial — must be foreknown in its nominal definition*, that is, what the name signifies.

Proof. It is impossible to demonstrate something about another if we are ignorant of what the name of that thing signifies. Since a demonstration predicates an attribute of the subject, the subject must first be foreknown at least nominally.

Second Proposition. *The attribute of demonstration is not to be foreknown as actually existing — only as potentially existing*.

Proof of the prior part. An attribute that does not actually exist can be demonstrated — as *risibility* of man considered as a potentiality, not a current actuality — for a demonstration about impossible things would be pointless. It does not require foreknowing the attribute as actually existing.

Third Proposition. *The attribute of demonstration must be foreknown as to what it is — its essential nature*.

Proof. The attribute of the conclusion to be demonstrated is predicated in the major premise of the middle term. Since the middle terminates the subject toward such a conclusion, we know that the predicate has the ratio of form, and the subject the ratio of matter in the enunciation. The attribute thus functions as a formal determinant of the subject, and its essential nature must therefore be known.

Articles IV and V: On the Prenotions of Attributes and Principles

A *principle* is either simple or complex.

A *simple* or *incomplex* principle is twofold: one of the *thing itself* — entering into its nature, as matter and form in natural things, essence and existence, act and potency in metaphysics — another of *cognition*, which are effects or properties through which we are led to the knowledge of causes.

A *complex* principle is nothing other than some axiom or common proposition — either the demonstration itself, or one on which all demonstrative propositions depend. This is itself twofold: the *most common* kind (the *metaphysical* axiom) — such as *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be simultaneously* — and a *peculiar* kind, proper to some particular science — such as *the whole is greater than its part*, or *the nature of a moving thing is its principle of motion*. Regarding complex principles or general propositions, we ask what must be foreknown of them.

First Proposition. *Of a principle, what must be foreknown is its nominal definition — what the name means.*

Proof, against Aegidius and Cajetan. It is impossible for us to know that principles are true unless we already know what their names signify. But we must foreknow that principles are true, as will be shown below. Therefore of principles we must foreknow the nominal definition.

That Aristotle makes no mention of this prenotion is because he took it as entirely obvious — that principles cannot appear to be true unless their terms are first explained.

Second Proposition. *Of a principle, what must be foreknown is that it exists* — that is, that it is true.

Proof. Of principles, foreknown must be that they are true — therefore also that they exist. The inference is clear: that a principle is true implies that it is. If someone argues that Aristotle makes no mention of this prenotion either — it is because he presupposes it as most evident: principles cannot appear true unless their terms are first explained.

ON DEMONSTRATION (p. 155)

Physics, having many distinct habits, constitutes itself; therefore total science cannot be one simple habit, but must consist of several partial habits aggregated together.

This latter consequence is true, but the minor is proved by the topical syllogism. Many optimal things can be held in the habit of Physics, and if they assent to these, by considering the principles and causes of natural things, while truly ignoring those things

which are comprehended in the total science of the same discipline — namely motion, place, heaven, soul, and so on — therefore in total science, for example in Physics, many and equally distinct difficulties arise.

It is confirmed by a nearly similar reason, but led from absurdity. If total science — Physics, for instance — were one simple habit, through which the intellect would be inclined to assent to all the propositions of Physics itself, nothing rational could be said to constitute the habit of science, unless it held all the conclusions themselves, and possessed the facility of assenting to them. But this cannot be said of one who easily and readily assents to Physics conclusions, yet who ought without doubt to possess the habit of Physics — whichever endows them with such facility. Therefore total science, namely Physics, is not one simple habit, but exists only through the aggregation of many partial habits.

Objection: If total science is not one simple habit but exists only through aggregation, then total science will not be a true species of quality — which ought to be one entity per se — and that is absurd.

I respond: That such a consequence seems true, nor does the absurdity that would follow from it actually appear.

In sum: to say that total science is a true habit species, I respond that total science is truly an intellectual habit through the aggregation of many partial habits — not, however, a true species in the strict sense, but all its peculiar habits composed together are true species of that genus.

If you urge: Therefore, in one total science such as Physics, there will be many sciences — therefore not one Physics, but many. I reply that in the same total science, such as Physics, many partial sciences are given, yet they are not on that account to be called many Physicses, due to the coordination which all partial habits of Physics have toward constituting one Physics. Just as it is permitted that individual cities are parts of a city, yet on this account the city is not called multiple but simply one, by reason of the coordination which all the cities have toward constituting the same city.

Again it is objected: One faith — even the simplest — is sufficient for assenting to the many conclusions of faith; therefore one simple habit of science is sufficient to incline the intellect to apprehend many scientific conclusions.

The consequence is to be denied, on account of the notable disparity seen between the habit of supernaturally infused faith (about which the objection speaks) and the habit of acquired science. The latter always has the same medium, the same reason for assenting to all conclusions about faith — namely divine revelation — by which alone it suffices to assent to all these conclusions of faith. The habit of total science, by contrast, obtains many and diverse media for its conclusions: for example, to demonstrate that the sky is movable, it assumes a natural body as medium; to prove that man is capable of laughter, it recurs to rational medium, and likewise observes this in all its other conclusions. Hence there is no one medium which suffices, by itself, for the intellect to assent to all conclusions contained in Physics itself.

Third Proposition

It is necessary to explain the mode by which all partial habits concur to the constitution of one total science — namely, according to the formal order of their object — so that total science may uniquely be called that which is composed from all those habits which tend toward the same object under the same formal reason considered. For example, Physics becomes one total science, composed from all those partial habits which are ordered to the knowledge of natural body, which is its natural object, whether demonstrating principles and causes, or demonstrating parts and properties.

The same may be said of other sciences.

Others explain in another way the mode by which a total science is composed of many partial ones: namely, insofar as those partial sciences converge in the same abstraction from matter — so that Physics becomes one total science from many partial habits, because it always has one and the same abstraction from matter in individual things — which they call the most proper abstraction from singular matter.

DISPUTATION I

...total science could be said to be composed from all those partial habits which converge in the same abstraction from matter. Thus Physics and Medicine would be one and the same total science, because they have one mode of abstraction, namely from singular matter. Likewise all mathematical disciplines would coalesce into one science, since to all of them one and the same abstraction is attributed from matter, sensible and intelligible, which are however absurd.

It is asked: In the same total science, are there as many partial distinct habits as there are conclusions?

I respond negatively, and I prove: habits are never multiplied except on account of difficulties encountered in the operation. For to assent to many conclusions, no multiple difficulty occurs, except when from one thing another is deduced — for example, if someone knows this conclusion, *every man is risible,* easily and without any notable difficulty one can perceive this other: *every man is capable of wonder, every man is naturally rational,* and if these are consequences from the first. Therefore in total science there are not as many partial habits as conclusions.

There occurs in Suarez, in the second volume of the Metaphysics, Disputation 44, section 11, number 46: that the singular conclusions differ in diverse modes of knowing, and through the diverse complexity of terms, even one following from another — for example, to connect these terms so that this conclusion is perceived, *man is rational,* is different from that perception, *man is risible and rational* — therefore the assenting

habits of these diverse conclusions are difficult to distinguish, and consequently diverse habits are required.

I respond: Of these conclusions, one follows from the other, even if the term complexity is diverse; from the diverse connection of terms no diverse difficulty of assenting to those conclusions that follow from one another arises — because distinct habits are not required, but one suffices — by which the instructed intellect, once having perceived one conclusion, can render assent to the other; for example, once the conclusion *the sky is a movable body* is perceived, this other is thereby assented to: *the sky is a natural body*.

What pertains to the posterior difficulty, whence arises the unity and specific distinction of sciences, it is often sensed that the specific distinction is to be sought not simply from the diversity of specific formal objects, but from the essential order of diverse formal objects, and therefore this essential distinction is to be said: as for true sciences, inasmuch as they are sciences, they do not have an order essential to the object — whether speculative or practical consideration — but only an accidental one; because in those sciences per accidens it belongs to be speculative or practical, since their speculation or practice is accidental.

And I respond to the antecedent, that the specific distinction of total sciences is not simply to be sought from the diversity of specific formal objects, but from the essential order of the diverse formal objects which those subjects have. Therefore this essential distinction is to be said: as for true sciences, inasmuch as they are sciences, they do not have an order essential to the object, whether speculative or practical, but only accidental. Because in those sciences per accidens it belongs to be speculative or practical, since their speculation or practice is accidental. And I respond that the generic difference, which could be cogitated among the sciences, by reason of speculation and practice, is always accidental.

ARTICLE III

On the Subalternation of Sciences

Subalternation, as in other things, is in sciences a certain subordination of inferior science under superior. The superior is called *subalternating*, the inferior *subalternated*, from the subject matter.

Moreover, subalternation of sciences arises from a triple source, and arises first from principles: when the superior science, or subalternating, ministers principles to the subalternated — either the most universal ones, by which all subordinate sciences are peculiarly subordinated to Metaphysics — or peculiar and accommodated principles which are in Physics itself for its conclusions.

Second, subalternation of arts arises from the end, when the end of one is referred to the end of another — how the art of bridle-making is subordinated to equestrian art, this to military art; as Aristotle says in the first chapter of the first book of Ethics.

Third, subalternation arises from the object: when the object of one science is contained under the object of another, by reason of which Music is subalternated to Arithmetic, because its object — namely *sonorous number* — is contained under *absolute number*, which is the object of Arithmetic. By the addition of this accident of sonority it is contained.

Likewise the visual line, which is the object of Optics, ought to be referred to the line absolutely taken, which is the object of Geometry. And in this way the subalternation of sciences is properly described.

From all this, those sciences which are subalternated are easily apprehended. For first it is said that all sciences subalternate to Metaphysics, by reason of principles, insofar as Metaphysics ministers its general principles to all those sciences.

Adding also the reason of the object, because all those scientific entities are, which is the object of Metaphysics — they are comprehended. On the same ground, and even more powerfully, Music, Arithmetic, Optics, Geometry, and Medicine are subalternated to Physics. For the object of Arithmetic is number taken absolutely, under which sonorous number — which is the object of Music — is contained. The object of Geometry is line, under which the line as taken absolutely, which is the object of Optics, is comprehended. Moreover the object of Physics is established as natural body, under which the sensible body, which is called Medicine's object, is contained.

Also by another title Medicine is subalternated to Physics, namely by reason of principles, since Medicine's principles derive from Physics, as has been said.

Finally, Logic and Moral Philosophy are not subalternated to Physics, but are called subalternated by reason of the object: since the object of Physics comprehends the operations of intellect and will absolutely taken, under which are contained the actions of intellect directed to truth, and the actions of will directed to the good — of which the former pertain to Logic, the latter to Moral Philosophy.

The difficulty is: whether the subalternated sciences themselves are truly and properly so called. Some affirm, others deny. To settle that contention,

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DISPUTATION I

First, note that subalternated sciences can be viewed in two ways — first, insofar as they themselves are cut off from their subalternating sciences; second, insofar as they are conjoined with the subalternating sciences.

Second, note that the subalternated science can be separated from the subalternating one, even though its conclusions — which as subalternated are principles — can be held through experience and from the posterior; for example, Medicine can be separated from Physics, to which it is subalternated, while the conclusions of Physics itself, such as *body composed of four elements is corruptible,* in Medicine itself are not known through experience and effects. Hence:

First Proposition

If a subalternated science is thus separated from its subalternating one — so that the subalternated science has no evidence and certitude of its principles demonstrated by the subalternating science with which it is conjoined, nor through experience or effects — then the subalternated science will not be science, but merely opinion, or human faith. I maintain this conclusion from the first sentence — that science should hold its conclusions only if certitude is had, both moral and testificatory, when it has no evidence of its principles, neither through demonstration made in the subalternating science with which it is conjoined, nor through experience and effects.

It is proved from the antecedent: the conclusions deduced from principles are never more certain and more evident than the principles themselves. But the principles of subalternated science are not certain, except with a moral and testificatory certitude, when the subalternated science itself does not have evidence and certitude of those principles, either through demonstration made in the superior and subalternating science with which it is conjoined, or through experience and effects — therefore it is not science properly said, which ought to have its conclusions entirely certain and indubitable, but only opinion, or human faith.

This is proved from the antecedent: never do conclusions deduced from principles have certitude and evidence greater than the principles themselves. And the principles of

subalternated science are certain only with moral and testificatory certitude, when the subalternated science itself does not have evidence and certitude of those principles, either through demonstration made in the subalternating superior, with which it is conjoined, or through experience and effects, for the reason that no other way can it hold those as certain — only with some moral certitude and testification, when its subalternating superior does not have evidence and certitude of those principles, whether through demonstration made in the subalternating science with which it is conjoined, or through experience and effects. Therefore it is not science properly said, which ought to have its conclusions entirely certain and indubitable, but only opinion or human faith.

Second Proposition

A subalternated science is truly and properly so called, if or when it is conjoined with its subalternating science, or if it has explored its own principles through experience.

It is proved. By both modes it will have its most certain principles; and therefore it can easily through true demonstrations deduce its most certain and scientific conclusions; and that it is possible to compose from these, both Medicine — which composed with Physics is said above — and a body composed of four elements is corruptible, which Medicine proves through experience and effects.

ARTICLE VI

On the Comparison of Sciences among Themselves

Sciences can be compared among themselves in many ways. First, according to the order of dignity, which is to be preferred to the other. Second, by order of time, which came first in time. Third, by order of nature, which is prior by nature and which posterior. Finally, by reason of method, by which they ought to be explained. All these we shall briefly expound in the following propositions.

First Proposition

Speculative sciences, generally speaking, are more dignified than practical ones.

First, because as Aristotle teaches in the second chapter of the first book of the Metaphysics, and elsewhere more fully, when he says the most noble is contemplation.

Second, because among speculative sciences is placed Metaphysics, which is the apex and queen of all the sciences of nature. Finally, because speculative sciences do not per se in the knowledge of things advance, nor those things promote; the practical indeed per se promote the knowledge of things not to advance, but only to communicate the mode of operation.

Second Proposition

Metaphysics holds first place in the order of dignity among all the sciences of nature.

It is proved. Science is most noble which treats of the most noble object — and the object of Physics, namely natural body, is more noble than the object of Mathematics, namely quantity. And so on.

You may doubt about the Mathematical and practical sciences — namely Logic and Morals — which of these others excels. This doubt is resolved thus: by adding another proposition.

Fourth Proposition

Mathematics holds second place in the order of dignity — and Logic and Morals are prior to these by reason of the dignity of the more noble action, since truly the object of Mathematics — quantity — is far more ignoble to the intellect and will, of which Logic and Moral Philosophy are the object.

Fifth Proposition

By order of nature, speculative sciences in an imperfect state are prior to the practical ones, but not in a perfect state.

It is proved. That which is prior by order of nature is presupposed — but the speculative sciences in an imperfect state are presupposed by the practical ones, because the object of practical science is cognized relatively and in relation to work; practical cognition is relative and presupposes absolute cognition — in a perfect state no science is held without Logic, which is the most practical of all, so that it can be proved in the Prelude to this science. And so on.

Sixth Proposition

By order of time, speculative sciences precede the practical ones. First, because Aristotle teaches expressly in the first book of the Metaphysics, that first the sciences useful for life were devised and for their convenience those practical ones. Second, because at least in a perfect state no science can be obtained without Logic, so that therefore speculative science can be said prior to practical ones at least in temporal order.

Last Proposition

By order of doctrine, practical science holds first place; then follow the mathematical ones, then the physical, finally the metaphysical.

The first part is evident. Logic, which is a practical science, must be compared with all the others — therefore some practical science ought to be said prior to the speculative ones by order of doctrine.

The other parts of this proposition — that order of doctrine of mathematical sciences is followed by physics, lastly by metaphysics — are clear.

For since the object of mathematics — namely quantity — is nearer to sense than the object of physics, namely natural body, it is recognized more quickly, and therefore ought to be taught first. And comparatively the object of physics, namely *being* as abstracted from all sensible matter and sensible accident, differs more from the senses than the object of physics — surely natural body is added and handed down before metaphysics.

ARTICLE V

On the Comparison of Science with Opinion

First, note that Opinion and Science differ greatly in that opinion does not remove all fear of erring, but aims only at the probable — of the sort which is that opinion which one has of the friendship of two persons who are contracted together, because they frequently converse with each other. But science must expel all fear of error, since it is most certain and most evident.

Second, note that fear of error arises in some cognition in two ways.

First, from the side of the object, when the object itself is only probable and contingent to be apprehended.

Second, from the side of the subject, when the object itself is indeed necessary and the medium necessary, but the subject does not advert to the adequacy of those objects and media — and from this kind is born opinion, when we know a probable thing through a probable medium, and when we know a necessary thing, though by a necessary medium, we do not hold it as necessary.

Third, note that science and opinion differ bifariously: first, in what the habitual is, second in the actual.

Habitual opinion is some habit inclining our intellect to eliciting a probable judgment about some probable thing, through a probable medium, whether the thing itself, or only in apprehension.

Actual opinion however is the actual probable judgment itself, through a probable medium about a proposed thing. This is thus noted.

The question is: whether in the same intellect simultaneously science and opinion can exist? And I say that in many things they are most certain — let me briefly run through these.

The first thing is: that the habit of opinion and science can exist about diverse objects in the same intellect — for it can happen that one knows many scientific things about Physics, and yet holds many things probably about morals.

The same can be said about the act of science and opinion on a parity of reason.

Moreover it is certain that, by diverse times about the same thing, acts of science and opinion can exist by the same medium.

It is proved. It can happen that things which were previously known through a necessary medium, and so judged scientifically, later at another time are judged only probable, and the medium which previously indicated necessity, after it is known, now only seems probable. And so on.

Now those of greater difficulty let us expound in the following propositions.

First Proposition

It is impossible at the same time, about the same object, through the same medium, for there to be science and opinion, or the act of each, or concerning the habitual.

It is proved: it is impossible at the same time in the intellect that there exists a ratio of knowing with certainty, and of not knowing with certainty — for it would be in the same intellect to be inclined to apprehend a thing with certainty and to be inclined to cognize it with uncertainty — therefore through the same medium the same intellect cannot hold both simultaneously with full certainty, and with some fear of error.

Second Proposition

It can exist in the same intellect, about the same thing, and at the same time, both the act of science and of opinion, or vice versa, the act of opinion with the act of science, through diverse media.

It is proved. When we experience two media occurring to us, by which we are led to the cognition of some thing — of which one appears most certain; the other only seems probable, and is held by opinion alone — therefore.

Third Proposition (p. 160)

It can exist in the same intellect, with respect to the same object and at the same time, the habit of science together with the act of opinion, or vice versa, the habit of opinion with the act of science.

It is proved. In the same intellect, with respect to the same object and at the same time, the habits of science and opinion can exist through diverse media — because this does not more repugn in habits than in acts — therefore one habit can operate without the other, because one is not compelled to act through the other. Therefore one habit, namely that of science, can be given together with the act of the other, namely opinion, or on the contrary, the habit of opinion with the act of science.

ARTICLE VI

On the Comparison of Science with Faith

Faith has something in common with science and opinion — namely that it is a cognition of the intellect — and has something by which it is greatly distinguished from them.

For science and opinion rely on reasons: the former on necessary and analytic ones, the latter on probable and topical ones; faith rests only on the authority of the one speaking.

Moreover, faith is of two kinds: one *divine and supernatural*, by which we hold the mysteries of our faith, assenting to them because of the revelation made to us by God, either immediately through itself, or mediated through a Church which made revelation. The other *human and natural*, by which we assent to those things which are reported to us, or by the testimony of human authority.

Moreover faith is received bifariously: as *actual*, as science and opinion are said; and as *habitual*. Now the question is how science can coexist with faith.

First Proposition

About diverse objects, in the same intellect, whether at the same or diverse times, acts of science and of faith can exist. Surely anything which can be held by faith, can at another time be known by science.

Second Proposition (p. 161)

Through the same medium, neither habitually nor actually can science and faith exist in the same intellect — because always the medium of faith is divine revelation or authority, which is not always an evident and demonstrative ratio — and these things are diverse media.

Third Proposition

The acts and habitual states of faith can simultaneously exist together with the acts and habitual states of science in the same intellect, at the same time and through diverse media.

It is proved. It can happen that the intellect is inclined to assent to some conclusion both by reason of some demonstrative ratio, and by reason of divine authority which cannot deceive or be deceived — for example indeed, to assent even to this conclusion: *God is one alone, the First Mover is one, therefore God is one alone* — by which demonstrative reason, and in addition by the authority of God who revealed this to us, we assent and so on.

Last Proposition

The habit of science can remain in the same intellect, at the same time with faith, whether human or divine, and vice versa — the habit of faith with the act of science: because the one habit can operate without knowing God, for example with the science that God is one, yet by adding a demonstration superior to the one proposed, and so faith can remain while the habit of science remains — or conversely, with the same science it is so.

It is objected. The same intellect cannot clearly and obscurely see the same thing — therefore it cannot from the same thing have the act of faith and of science, because that one is clear, while this is obscure.

I confirm. According to the holy Fathers and the most holy Theologians, faith has no merit where human reason affords experiment — if human reason alone is the unique and total cause why we assent to it, this is true; but false if it is not the total cause of assenting. But the assent arises most plenarily from divine revelation, by the testimony of God revealing. Read these things about the second book on the Doctrine of Demonstration.

SECOND DISPUTATION — ON THE TOPICAL SYLLOGISM, PRINCIPALLY OF TOPICAL PLACES

The triple matter from which the syllogism is constructed, triplicate, puts the species of syllogisms — one of which is *necessary*, or *demonstrative*, about which we have spoken; one *topical* or *probable*; and *sophistic* or *fallacious*, about which afterwards. Moreover since few things concerning the nature of the topical syllogism occur to be expounded, the whole disputation is turned toward assigning, explaining, and indicating the places from which Topical arguments draw their arguments.

We shall say briefly what the *probable* is, and what the *probable syllogism* is from there.

The probable is said generally speaking, that which more easily brings assent, than those who deny it, whether meanwhile it was necessary or not.

The probable is established in double difference: one *per se*, the other *by vision* — one *per aliud* and *by another*.

Probable per se, by its own nature, that is which prompts the intellect to assent to it of itself, with no assistance of reason required, except that it is found among those who have completely solid minds: those things we generally call probable, such as *parents are to be honored*, *the republic is better administered by the good and wise men*, and so on.

Probable by another, however, is called that which earns assent not by its own reason, but needs external support of reasons to bring faith to it: so many things are probable in philosophy, both in Theology cited on both sides, which are deduced and formed by reasoning, and are supported and shaken as in Logic there is *science*: or *every motion of the mind is collected simply*: in Philosophy this is probable; in Theology, *whether a vision can be made by an impressed species of divine essence without a person* — and similar dogmas: which although they are greatly alien from the common view of many, nevertheless the weight of reasons probability persuades one to sustain them, such as *what is expedient for the republic to be exposed for it*, and so on.

So far about the probable, from which it is easily understood what makes a topical syllogism probable — namely that one who proceeds through probable propositions, or intellect inclined to assenting things, yet not constraining them, as the Topical places remain — so that we can make a copious supply of places, first about the Topical places in common, namely about the dialectical problem and dialectical proposition, then about the singular places and Maxims in their order.

Section I — ON TOPICAL PLACES IN COMMON

Article I — On Topical Places in Common

Question I — On the Dialectical Problem and Dialectical Proposition

Aristotle in the first book of the *Topics*, chapters third and fourth, distinguishes the dialectical problem from the dialectical proposition — in that the problem proposes both parts of contradiction indifferently: *whether every man is an animal, or not;* or (following Aristotle's example) *whether an animal that walks on two feet is fit for definition as a definition of man, or not.*

In the dialectical proposition however, one of the two is uniquely proposed: *whether an animal that walks on two feet is fit as a definition of man?* Of the problems Aristotle makes four species — namely they reduce the problem to *genus*, with which it reciprocates: *proper*, *accident*, and *definition*.

That number is collected from the various modes by which a problem is proposed: for it is asked whether some thing is a genus, or not — for example, *whether animal is the genus of man*, and consequently whether it is his generic difference — *whether visible is the property of man, or not?* Or it is asked whether some accident is, or not — *whether science is an accident of the soul, or not?* Or finally whether it is a definition or not — *whether an animal that walks on two feet is the definition of man, or not?*

Moreover that quaternary number of dialectical problems is confirmed by Aristotle from this, that if any part of contradiction is abstracted by dialectical proposition — for example on account of the problem *whether animal is the genus of man, or not* — it becomes a dialectical proposition, if the second part is retained — *animal is the genus of man* — and this becomes a posterior proposition. So if you take from the problem *whether an animal that walks on two feet is the definition of man, whether not* — the second part — *it is the definition of man* — this becomes a posterior proposition.

The difficulty however is, since these four kinds of problems are necessary, and since problem of genus, species, definition, and many other problems obviously convene in those, therefore besides these four kinds many others appear to be admitted — namely the species: *whether Socrates is a man, or not?* The specific difference: *whether rational is the specific difference of man, or not?* And if you want to reduce these to species, as Aristotle reduced the generic difference to genus by ascending, *whether something transcending in respect of substance is, or not?*

It can be responded with difficulty, that all the problems from the four listed are to be recalled — namely to the problem of genus, because in all of these the same treatment of the problem, the same mode, and the same arguments run through.

For convenience however it is easier to make these distinctions of problems — namely genus, difference, whether generic or specific; species; proper; accident; definition — to which every description is reduced, and the degree of transcendence — because in all of these the distinct propositions are taken, from all of which dialectical arguments are drawn.

The common response is, that the consequence is to be denied — the reason is, that the dialectical problem requires only truth likeness, which can certainly retain certitude and even that certitude which it has, they say commonly non-necessary — so that those accidental necessities which appear in the dialectical problem are solved, from the College of Conimbricenses, or at least so it is sufficiently deduced in the first chapter third article, first question, verse of the ending.

SECTION POSTERIOR — On Topical Places in Particular

Article I — On Places from Definition

Question I — On Places in Particular

Aristotle in the whole sixth book of the *Topics* treats this problem of definition, from which he deduces many most useful logical Maxims, together with others.

First Maxim: *What agrees with the definition agrees with the defined thing*.

Second. *What agrees with the defined thing agrees with the definition* — this Maxim illustrated in example: *Living, sensible,* is the definition of *animal, animal* however follows that *living sensible* belongs — therefore *man* — who is animal — is *living sensible*.

Third. *Of whatever the definition is predicated, of whatever is predicated and conversely*. Hence it follows, man is predicated of Peter — therefore animal rational is predicated of Peter — or conversely, animal rational is enunciated of Peter, therefore man is enunciated of Peter.

Fourth. *What repugns the definition, repugns the defined thing, and conversely:* for example, it repugns a stone to be rational animal, therefore it repugns a stone to be man.

Fifth. *What is predicated from definition, is predicated and from the defined and conversely:* for example, substance is predicated of animal rational, therefore and of man; or on the contrary, of man, therefore of animal rational.

Sixth. *The definition ought not be redundant:* it is said redundant when by one part removed from the whole the rest remains intact — how the definition of man *homo est animal rationale mortale* (man is a rational mortal animal), when *mortal* is removed, the total integrity remains — *man is the definition of animal rational.*

Seventh. The definition, as far as can be done, *ought to be brief*, unless perhaps brevity itself creates difficulty.

Eighth. The definition ought to reciprocate with the defined thing, and conversely: *animal rational* is reciprocated with *man*, and *man* with *animal rational. The true definition ought to be per se entity, and of one nature:* hence aggregated ones are rejected equally.

The last definition only can be of universals. Three of these Maxims will be examined inferiorly, where we treat of the conditions required for the object of definition.

ARTICLE II

On Places from Description and Notation of Name

Definition, description, and notation of name are distinguished in this — that *definition* expresses the nature of a thing through essential principles: *description* deals with it through properties and accidents: *notation* finally of *name* by etymology is deduced.

Now what pertains to description, the first Maxim from it is: *Description is preferable to negation*. Hence, as far as possible, we should study affirming descriptions to be condensed.

Second: *Description ought to convey the thing most especially*.

Third, in description, only those things ought to be used which are proper to the described thing — as when man is described, *animal risible, and capable of learning disciplines,* or *to which only accidents are attributed, so many deepened things are to be found in no other place, otherwise the description does not sufficiently notify the thing,* so it would set it apart from others. What pertains to the notation of name, no other Maxims are produced, except those derived from the very etymology itself — for example, *who is not fit to rule, is not fit to be a philosopher*, and similar things propounded in infinite, derived from the etymology of words.

ARTICLE III

On Places from Genus

All Maxims of Genus are sufficiently understood from the Porphyrian institution, which Aristotle expended in his fourth book of the *Topics*. The first Maxim is: *Genus ought to agree with many things essentially, and with that in which it is predicated*.

Second. *Who agrees with a genus, some species of that genus ought to agree:* for example, since it has agreed to Peter that he is an animal, it is agreed that what is man should agree to him, who is a species of animal.

Third. *Genus is affirmed of all of its species*: for example, animal is affirmed of man — since it is from all particular men, of which man is predicated.

Fourth. *Species ought to be outside the concept of genus, or ought not pertain to the essence of it*.

Fifth. *Genus ought not in its formal concept contain the differences.*

Sixth. *Differences ought not contain in themselves the common concept of the genus,* as rational and irrational contain the concept of the animal. These two Maxims derive from what is said about Genus, in the Introduction of Porphyry. They are twofold — *genus and difference ought to be proposed oppositely,* as they are rational and irrational — *genus ought to respond to matter, and difference to form,* and similar.

ARTICLE IV

On Places from the Proper

Aristotle treats the problem of the Proper in the fifth book of the *Topics*, from which many Maxims can be derived.

First. *Proper ought to agree with the subject and reciprocate.*

Second. *Proper is predicated of the subject in the second mode of saying per se,* as we indicated in the Disputation on Demonstration.

Third. *The proper flowed from the essence of the thing,* as risibility flows from the essence of man — from which it follows, *proper is posterior to its subject in the order of nature.*

Fourth. *Subject and proper exist simultaneously.*

Fifth. *Proper and subject differ in genus.*

Sixth. *A proper is better known than its subject through what is natural to it.* This Maxim is explained in the cited place of demonstration.

Seventh. *The same proper can be in those which in some third agree:* for example, because man and horse agree in that third — namely they have a common quantity of body — which is a common property of bodily matter.

Eighth. *Opposite properties ought to be attributed to opposite things;* from which Maxims several others are deduced.

Ninth. *If one opposite is a property habit, the other is the property of privation:* because habit and privation are opposed.

Tenth. *If affirmative is property, the affirmative will be property of the negative.*

Eleventh. *If a conjugate is not a property of a conjugate, neither will the other conjugate be a property of the other conjugate:* for example, if temperance is not a property of fortitude, it will not be a property of the conjugate of temperance.

Twelfth. *If what more appears proper is not proper, neither will that which less appears be proper.*

Thirteenth. *If several properties are posited, it is necessary to put one down for another.*

Last. *In expressing the proper, one must not use the subject,* — for example, who wishes to express what risibility is, ought not bring forward man, but animal, which is the genus of man — *one should say capable of laughter, man is an animal apt for laughter.*

ARTICLE V

On Places from Common Accident

Aristotle explains the problem of Accident in the second book of the *Topics*, from which many Maxims are gathered, as from Porphyry in his Introduction is clear.

First. *Accident is what is absent and present without the subject's destruction.*

Second. *Accident is what can be in the same thing at the same time.*

Third. *Accident ought to be predicated in quality.*

Fourth. *Accident is predicated accidentally.*

Fifth. *Proper is not reciprocally predicated.* All these in the place of Porphyry are explained.

Sixth. *Accident is first said of individuals, and of the subjects which it contains,* following Porphyry, in his tenth chapter of his Introduction, this Maxim was expounded in the chapter on common accident.

Seventh. *That thing itself is an accident whose essence it is,* and so on.

Last. *Which is predicated like genus of accident, accident is not predicated of genus categorically* — for example, since science is predicated as a genus of Logic, and Physics, the genus accident is not predicated categorically, because it is predicated essentially of Logic itself, and Physics: — but accident can be categorically predicated from subject, *ex dictione de accidente*.

ARTICLE III

On Places from Comparison

After the problem of Accident, Maxims from Comparison are added — because Aristotle in the third book of the *Topics* further treats them, and explains in the second book the problem, because the comparison pertains to the problem of Accident, since those which compare appear in some way more and less, which only belongs to accident.

First from Maxims of Comparison is derived. *That which is considered better, whose genus is better; corruption is worse.*

Second. *That which is better according to its use is better.*

Third. *Things more rarely highly praised than trite ones.*

Fourth. *What is arduous and difficult of acquisition, once acquired, is had more than what is easily acquired.*

Fifth. *That which is absolutely better than another, which in excess is even better in excess.*

Sixth. *Common good apart from private is better, and on the contrary:* so in nature, elements, and common good procure private good.

Seventh. *That which is more durable for good is more desirable — that which is good less durable, for the other goods, if they unite in the others.*

Eighth. *That which has a reason of end, is better than that which has a reason of means.*

Ninth. *That which is sought for itself is more desirable than that which is sought only for the sake of another.*

Tenth. *That which is so, and that more so:* for example, because propter fire is more valuable, being more potent for warmth — because fire is closer to earth, but nevertheless stronger working on land, it acts more in the air.

Eleventh. *Cause per se of goodness is a better cause than accident.*

Twelfth. *That which has more causes of its own goodness is considered better.*

Thirteenth. *Goods of the soul are better than goods of the body.*

Fourteenth. *Things of more noble nature are more probable.*

Fifteenth. *Glory exceeds external goods in nobility.*

Sixteenth. *That good is to be placed before another, from which greater goods follow.*

Seventeenth. *That is rather to be chosen from which fewer evils follow, than that from which greater ones follow.*

DISPUTATION II

Eighteenth. *Good together with another is better than separate.* 10. Ethics, ch. 2.

Nineteenth. *More desirable things are those whose goods are joined with pleasure, which are not joined with pleasure,* ibidem.

Twentieth. *Life is more pleasant and agreeable joined with prudence than any other,* ibidem.

Twenty-first. *Pleasures from honest things are more desirable than those from disgraceful ones,* same lib. ch. 3.

Twenty-second. *What is greater is greater, and it is even greater to the lesser,* so that Caesar is greater than Scipio, Scipio is greater than Hannibal — therefore Caesar is more perfect.

Twenty-third. *Whatever has fewer of the opposite joins, that more the contrary there is* — as that which less has of blackness, that more of whiteness.

Twenty-fourth. *If something appears more proper, yet is not proper, that which less appears so will not be.*

Twenty-fifth. *If some probable proposition is true, another equally probable will be true or false.*

Last. *What appears to be able to be less, that which appears to be more able will be.*

ARTICLE VII

On Places from Same and Diverse

Same and Diverse are taken in many modes from the Metaphysics, but for our purposes, it will suffice to constitute Maxims for those which are *Same*, from which the Maxims of the seventh book of the *Topics* are drawn.

First. *What are the same in number, they come together simultaneously and have the same causes.*

Second. *Those which are most properly the same are those which are not distinguished by number.*

Third. *What is constituted under the same species, those are of the same species.*

Fourth. *When many species are not different, and thus are not placed under different species, they are the same in species.*

Fifth. *Those are the same in genus, which belong to the same genus.*

Sixth. *Those which do not differ in genus, and thus are not constituted under different genera, are of the same genus.*

Seventh. *If one conjugate is the same as another conjugate,* the other of that conjugate will be the same as the other — for example, if justice and fortitude are the same, the just and the strong will be the same.

Eighth. *Those which are the same essentially, have the same essential definitions and the same essential attributes.*

Ninth. *Those which are the same, also have contraries.*

Tenth. *Those which are the same in some third, are the same in that.* Theologians dispute about the Trinity, because at first glance this seems to militate against the truth of the Trinity — that of those three who are the same in divine essence, they are totally the same among themselves — and thus it would be said that the axiom does not hold in divine persons — having dealt with many interpretations of this axiom, it would be long to list them — but to conclude: we do not reject this interpretation; if not so ancient, at least not the lesser one — which is: this axiom does not hold in divine persons, because each one of those that are the same in that thing are *incommunicable*, and not supposed for the substance as multiple — as three persons are the common, and in them it can be common, any one person is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which cannot be admitted without confusion of the Trinity.

Those divine persons are said to be the same with divine essence, because they are one and the same thing, and substance and accident are said to be the same with being taken most universally — from which they are not distinguished by containing, and the same thing therein contains not essentially, as one is *being*, as *substance*, and *accident*.

Eleventh. *Those which are the same formally, have the same essential difference.*

Twelfth. *When two are the same, whatever is said of one, must necessarily be said of the other.*

Thirteenth. *Those which are the same ought to remain the same, if the same is removed from the one.*

ARTICLE ON PLACES — FROM CAUSES

Some things are to be premised before we present the Maxims from causes. First (which we have already indicated elsewhere) the cause is fourfold: *material, formal, efficient, and final.*

Second, matter is threefold, *in which, from which, and about which.* Matter *in which* is that in which the composition of a thing is achieved — and this matter is first — as form substantial constitutes the whole natural composition.

Matter *from which*, that is what is of the composition of a thing — which is the same as first matter, as form substantial constitutes the whole natural composition.

Matter lastly *about which,* that is in which some potential subject is occupied, or habitat of the intellect in Logic, and the corpus naturale in Physics.

Third, premissed form to be triple — *accidental,* as the soul is in respect of fire: *external* to be understood as external example, as it is formed from the artificer by imitation of his models. From these premises, in the singular causes Maxims are proposed.

MEMBER I — On Maxims from Material Cause

The first Maxim is from material cause — *What is suitable to the matter, the same must be suitable to what is constituted from it,* namely quantity is necessary.

Second. *What does not belong to the matter, also does not follow from it,* namely quantity. Hence if you will demonstrate that Angels are experts in quantity, it is sufficient to have demonstrated that they lack matter.

Third Maxim is from material in which: *What is received in matter or subject, is received according to the mode of the receiving subject,* which is not to be intelligent that the recipient and the thing received undergo the same mode — but this is to be understood that the rational soul, although it requires some respondent in quality and received things, which are also in the rational soul in matter extended, is lacking extension — nevertheless received things in the rational soul are manifested, and even extended beyond virtue of the encompassing.

Fourth Maxim: *From the same matter in which the definition is formed: Matter is by nature avid, hungry, and naturally desirous,* Physics cap. 9.

Fifth. *Matter is incapable, incorruptible.*

Sixth. *Matter of one is contrary of another,* Physics cap. 6. All these Maxims in Physics are explained by God.

Seventh is taken from matter *about which*: *Faculties and habits are more perfect the finer the matter they have,* as sight is more noble than hearing, because the visible is more noble than the audible — and Metaphysics is pre-eminent over the other sciences insofar as its object is most noble of all, which vindicates it.

MEMBER II — On Maxims from Formal Cause

The first Maxim on formal cause is: *That which is more excellent formally, has the more dignified substantial form.*

Second. *Form desires natural union with matter,* from which Theologians infer the necessity of the future resurrection of bodies — so that the appetite of souls may not be rendered vain in eternity.

Third. *Form has certain terms, which ought not be transgressed* — and this is commonly reprehended of those who extend the terms of their art beyond the debit, so

that who transgresses the limits of their art, their fineness to the nature, or to Theology's arcana too curiously wishes to examine.

From accidental form are no other Maxims than those which we have handed down above in the problem of Accident.

Fourth Maxim is added from external form or exemplar. *What approaches nearer to its exemplar, is considered more perfect.* And thus the most perfect creatures have the most closely approaching the divine, that is the most absolute, most great — its perfections refer not to the Deity in image, but are formed according to its similarity, and thus by order of creatures the more noble is the next — namely God — therefore with no doubt of greater worth and estimation.

MEMBER III — On Maxims from the Efficient Cause

The first Maxim: *The efficient cause is from which the action proceeds.*

Second. *The more proper the efficient cause, the more powerfully it operates* — because quamvis the sole is more remote from the earth than from the air, nevertheless more powerfully in land it acts, than in air.

Third. *The effect is weaker than its cause as a rule,* as it is contrarily established, so the hand is stronger than its cooperating — *because the hot by its cause being closer, is more potent in heating — a stronger fire is closer.*

Fourth. *When a cause is good, those effects are good; when it is evil, they are evil* — for example, if a judge is good, his sentence is good — but the parricidal without doubt an evil judge, whose sentence brings death to the condemned.

Fifth. *Whose cause is evil, it itself is evil,* so are those who kill Christians in the name of religion — they say they are doing well — but on the contrary they are martyrs of Christ himself, or athletes, who are judged the best.

MEMBER IV — On Maxims from the Final Cause

First Maxim: *End is the cause of causes,* from the parts of animals, cap. 1.

Second. *That end prevails, which is aimed at the end.*

Third. *Not having the end, things have been done in vain.*

Fourth. *Between end and medium there ought to be due proportion.*

Fifth. *End is first in intention, last in execution.*

Sixth. *That goal whose end is good, appears good* — for example, the end of dialectics is to direct the operations of the intellect, the good end — therefore dialectics itself is good.

Last. *Whose goal is evil, that appears evil,* for example magic, which more greatly has an evil and abominable end — therefore magic is evil and abominable.

ARTICLE IX

On Places from Effect and Use

First Maxim is of effect: *An effect which is good is that which arises from some good cause; an evil effect arises from an evil cause*.

Second is derived from use: *Whose use is good, that thing itself is also good* — for example, the teaching of morality — namely to live well — is good teaching; therefore moral doctrine is considered to be good.

Third. *Whose use is evil, that thing is also considered evil:* For this reason the sophistical art is considered evil — because its use is evil, namely to deceive and lead into fraud. Understand this of the use by the person who possesses the thing itself — because men very frequently make the worst use of the best things, and vice versa.

ARTICLE X

On Places from Antecedents and Consequents

First, note that Antecedent and Consequent are used bifariously here — first *Antecedent* is that which is prerequired as foundation for another, and its parts toward the whole — that on the other hand which is required for something is said *Consequent*, as a building, and the whole, not what is necessarily consequated, since by positing the parts not necessarily does a building follow, since positing the foundation, a building need not follow.

Second, Antecedent is taken in another mode as what is not necessarily required to go before another, but from which, by any mode, the human follows — as man is Antecedent to animal, and therefore by the positing of man, animal is posited, and the consequence runs.

On Antecedents and Consequents second consideration the following Maxims are provided:

First: *Positing the Antecedent, the Consequent is not immediately posited* — for example, positing the foundation, the building is not posited.

Second. *Removing the necessary Antecedent, the Consequent is removed* — for example, removing the foundation, the building.

Third. *Positing the Consequent, the Antecedent is necessarily posited,* as positing the building, the foundation is posited.

But as for Antecedents and Consequents in the second consideration, the following Maxims hold:

First. *Positing the Antecedent, not immediately is the necessary Consequent posited* — for example, positing man, animal and positing vulnerability in the heart, death.

Second. *Removing one Antecedent, the Consequent is not removed* — for example, removing man, animal is not removed, as has been said.

Third. *With all Antecedents removed, the necessary Consequent is removed* — as man and beast being removed, animal is removed.

Last. *Positing the Consequent, not necessarily is the Antecedent posited* — for example, positing animal, man is not necessarily posited.

ARTICLE XI

On Places from Opposition

Of Opposition there are four species: *contradictory, privative, contrary, and relative.* From Opposition these Maxims are handed down.

First. *Opposites have opposite Consequents* — hence from it can be inferred that pain should be fled, and therefore pleasure is to be sought.

Second. *Between them they fight, so that two perfects at the same time cannot be.*

Third. *Contradiction through divine power cannot be true.*

Fourth. *From privation to habit there is no natural return,* this Maxim's exposition can be found in the *Postpredicament.*

Fifth. *Two contraries in intense degree cannot be in the same part of the subject:* from this it has been quoted.

Sixth. *Contrary of contraries is the same,* understood as Topical — Physics treats of place and likewise of vacuum — and Morals treats of good and evil.

Seventh. *Contraries by nature are not sought at the same time,* contraries, but by chance and fortuity. Ethics cap. 8.

Eighth. *From contrary things in no way can one and the same thing be demonstrated,* Topics cap. 4.

Ninth. *Contrary to contrary is more easily known from its absence,* from the third problem, question 8.

Tenth. *Contraries are by themselves efficacious,* from the third problem, section 3 — problem, question 15.

Thirteenth. *Contrary is contrary by note,* section 10. Problems, question 15.

Fourteenth. Relating to relative Opposition. *Relative have no contrary.*

Fifteenth. *They do not take more and less.*

Sixteenth. *They reciprocate between themselves.*

Seventeenth. *They are simultaneously by nature,* understand as relata, or by reason of foundation, as we expounded dealing with relatives.

ARTICLE XII

On Places from Conjugates

First Maxim: *Whose one conjugate is fitting, the remaining must also be fitting in its mode* — for example, he who is praiseworthy is strong, therefore it is fitting to praise one who is strong, and to act from fortitude.

Second, the opposite: *Whose one conjugate is not fitting, the remaining in like manner is not fitting* — for example, since it is not fitting to cowardice to be praised, therefore neither is the coward to be praised, nor is it fitting to act timidly.

Third. *If the conjugate is not a property of a conjugate, neither will the other conjugate be a property of the other,* this Maxim is illustrated in the problem of the Proper with an example.

ARTICLE XIII

On Places from Whole and Parts

The Whole is triple: *essential,* as man consists of soul and body and from a composite; *integral,* as the human body, insofar as it consists of head, arms, and legs, thus all parts coalesce. *Potential* finally, or *universal,* which contains many potential subjects — as man contains individual men in potential. Of the whole essential and its parts, the following Maxims hold:

First Maxim. *Positing the whole essential, all essential parts are necessarily posited* — for example, positing man, soul and body.

Second. *Removing the whole essential, the parts are not necessarily destroyed:* for example, Petrus dies — soul and body are dissolved, yet are not destroyed, since the matter is incorruptible, when the soul also.

Third. *Removing one essential part, the total essential is removed* — for example, removing soul, man is removed.

Fourth, which is first from the total integral, and from its parts: *Positing the total integral, all its integral parts are posited.*

Fifth. *Positing all parts integrating it, the total integral is necessarily posited.*

Sixth. *Removing any integral part, the whole integral is not absolutely removed* — for example, removing an eye, the whole human body is not removed, or a hand; yet immediately the whole absolute is not removed.

Seventh. *Removing the most powerful part of the total integral, even the total itself is removed* — for example, removing removing the head, there remains no longer the human body.

DISPUTATION II

Eighth Maxim, and first from the total universal, and the universal parts. *Positing universal total actually, not necessarily are all its actual particular parts posited:* for example, positing man actually, all the particular men who are individual humans are not necessarily posited, just as a species is preserved in one individual, as we said dealing with genus.

Ninth. *Positing actually total universal, some of its actual particular parts are necessarily posited.*

Last. *Removing actually all universal total, all even its actual particular parts are removed* — for example, removing actually animal, all its species and individuals are removed.

ARTICLE XV

On Places from Circumstances

Circumstances are called by Cicero *adjuncts,* because they adjoin circumstances of things themselves. These in Morals we have enumerated: *person,* or rather *personal quality, quantity of thing, place, time,* and similar — and in particular many Maxims can be assigned from them, all however contained under this general one.

Single Maxim. *What are the circumstances of a thing, it is probable that thing will be,* for example, if someone has been sufficiently educated, it is probable that it will be his own probity in the future. Consult the circumstances of human actions in Morals — as we have said — and the judgments handed down there are gathered.

QUESTION II — On Inartificial Places, or Assumptions

Inartificial or *assumed places,* from those dictated, are those which are not taken from the art itself, and the question proposed — from which *assumptions* are called as if taken from another place — they do not come to be through art, but are called *inartificial* — drawn from testimony and authority — whether divine, or human. The divine authority in particular this Maxim contains: *What is held by divine testimony, firmly and without any hesitation it is to be held.*

If you ask, how is it known that something is held by divine testimony? I respond: that it is known from the sacred letters of the Old and New Testaments, from the traditions of the Apostles, and from the statutes of Ecumenical Councils, and from the common teaching of the Church.

But this place of *human authority* is twofold comprehended. **First Maxim:** *It is to be spoken as many,* **Second.** *It is wise to follow few, or, in common usage of words the custom of the wise ought to be a standard — in the common use of words the judgment of the wise ought to stand.*

Moreover, this place with artifice is so compared, that the artificial, being supported by reasons, either make a thing necessary or probable — so that they persuade and force from stubbornness. These however, the inartificial, if they are from divine ones, make faith of things from divine testimony, if from human ones, make them probable — *because divine testimony is held firmly and without any hesitation.*

You ask how does Aristotle at the end make use of these probable syllogisms in handling the general Maxims of almost the total work of the *Topics,* and shall we follow him in this matter?

I respond: the institution of Aristotle can never be sufficiently praised. For by general pronouncements which by their order we have related, the material is supplied for almost all questions to be handled — on both sides: for example, when one presents the Maxims of definition — and the same to treat in both sides of the question relating to definition — whether it is good, you have from those there to show — demonstrating all the conditions of a legitimate definition to be present: and the same from the opposite side to impugn it, readily a mode will occur, showing that some of the required conditions is lacking.

Hence since it seems easier to demonstrate a definition to be good, than to prove all to be present — Aristotle in the seventh book of the *Topics* teaches that Problems of definition are more easily impugned than proved.

But it is not necessary to place any effort in those which are contained in the third book, since it is sufficient in those to know only how many ways by Aristotle, speaking as is

common, namely how the syllogism responds to parts — whether conceding, or denying, or distinguishing propositions, or saying *passes, is so*, if the proposition does not appear to be of the proposed. I add what...

DISPUTATION III — ON THE SOPHISTICAL SYLLOGISM

Just as above on the Topical Syllogism, so here on the Sophistical is to be done. Namely it must be said briefly what the sophistic is, before we expose the various fallacies of the Sophists, and we reveal what is chiefly our intention to be in this disputation.

Sophistical syllogism is therefore called that reasoning constituted of no premises of true necessity, but of those which are apparent and plausible, either necessary or probable appearing apparent. The first example of a prior syllogism is: *All lines drawn from the same point to the same point are equal. And curved line from the same point to the same point is drawn. Therefore they are equal.* Which is necessary to be admitted — *all lines from the same point to the same point are equal* — provided that straight lines are conducted this way, not if one straight line is drawn, the other oblique — as in the cited fallacious syllogism is received.

Of the posterior's syllogisms — namely those which fluctuate around apparently probable propositions — an example is this: *Whatever feet the mountains have, they move. And the mountains have feet. Therefore the mountains move.* — the greater proposition appears only probable; what the syllogism does in the former, the minor is necessary.

The diversity of the Sophists' ends is to be disclosed, and the fallacies to be detected, which we chiefly intend, and the captious turns by which they can be considered from propositions, and the errors easily drawn into fraud, as Amplification, Restriction, Status, Distraction, Alienation, and Appellation of Terms.

SECTION I

Of the Various Ends and Captious Turns of Sophists

QUESTION I — On the Definition and Captious Turns of Sophists in General

Throughout the whole art Sophistic is malignant, so that it leads the unwary into error — therefore proceeding in many ways toward this consequence. First it pretends the faith of its wholeness; totally depletes the school; it is full of dissimulation; in its questioning it makes the greatest arrogance; it provokes dissension to anger; it implies everything; and it does not know what it means to signify. All these things it does — first so that it may rumple those going around, then so that a dissension so disturbing may not discern the true, and lure it into envy.

These five ends are commonly enumerated among Sophists:

The first is called *Reproof,* when the Sophist compels the respondent to grant what he previously negated, or on the contrary to negate what he previously conceded: for example, to admit this proposition he had previously denied of the dialectical argument: *All dogs are able to bark, some dog is domesticated therefore it is able to bark.* This Sophism dissolves, or by the negation of the major, or by the distinction of the minor — *domestic dog* and *barking dog* — those two being the argument of different genera.

The second end of Sophists is called *Falsity,* when the Sophist strives to respond to the respondent with admitting something false: for example, this proposition *the meadow is green, and the meadow is pleasant for man,* by this captious Syllogism, *Whatever sees the meadow and its pleasantness. The meadow is green and pleasant. Therefore the meadow is pleasant.*

Solve this Sophism — if the major is denied as simple — or it is distinguished — from laughter properly taken, concede — from the same properly together taken, metaphorically accepted, negate.

The third end is called *Inopinable,* when the Sophist so presses the respondent, that he must confess something which is absolutely not false — from common consent or the view of community it rejects — for example this fallacious reasoning: *Nothing of good produces evil. Veritas est aliquod bonum* (Truth is some good), *odium vero non parit odium* (hatred does not beget hatred.)

Solve this Sophism by distinguishing the major — *good does not produce evil* per se — concede — per accidens, negate — and so by the same distinction to the minor responding with the consequence, by truth not per accidens producing hatred.

The fourth end is *Useless negation,* when the same word by line necessarily is repeated — as if someone should so argue, *Every habit is good who has a good end. This habit here is a habit. Therefore here is a good habit.* — This Sophism in the reference to be avoided, the word has been put in both times, only once between refutations in response.

The last end is *Solecism,* when the malicious Sophist compels the respondent to commit Solecism, so that if this man in his mode of reasoning, *all man is body, woman is man, therefore woman is body*. A fallacy manifests that if this is noted by the Grammarians, man is a common genus, of masculine and feminine. And so also he draws these Sophistic ends — their receptacles have certain things from which captious turns can deprive them. Hence six places are drawn from words: *Homonymy, Ambiguity, Composition, Division, Accent, and Figure of Diction:* and they are said to be drawn outside of diction: *Fallacy of accident, from what is said in a relative sense to what is said simply, Ignorance of the list, Request for a principle, Fallacy of the consequent, not cause for cause, and complex interrogation as one.*

QUESTION II

On Captious Turns in Particular

ARTICLE I — On Captious Turns which arise in diction and voice

The First Captious Turn arises from *homonymy,* under which the fallacious reasoning whose deceit operates from the multiple intentional use of some term is comprehended. Examples are already in the two former ends of Sophists. A third I add: *Every animal is a genus. Every man is an animal. Therefore every man is a genus.*

This Captious Turn arises from this — that *animal* is multiplied. In the major, secondly more intended *for generality*. In the minor truly first intended by nature, and essentially of the nature of animals. To decline this Sophism, apply the distinction to the minor, *homo est animal* (man is animal) — if animal is the first truly intended, it is true — if secondarily intended, false.

The second captious turn is *amphiboly,* when some proposition endures a double interpretation — as *what the intellect understands, this understands,* but *the intellect understands a stone, therefore the stone understands.*

This captious turn arises from the greater proposition bifariously — For either sense is that which the intellect understands, this very thing is understood by the intellect, and then it is true, and the conceding proposition follows — but if it is understood that through the intellect the intellect understands from itself — and in this mode it is false — and conceding the proposition, it is a Sophistic solution.

The third captious turn is *Composition,* when those things which are not divided joined, are joined together — as *Possible is that sitting ambulatory. Sed praceptor ambulat.* (It is possible for one who is seated to walk. But the teacher walks.) *Therefore, the one seated in the chair is able to walk.*

This captious turn arises from the greater — and therefore it is to be distinguished — the seated can walk — in composed sense — I say, supposing that he does not sit, concede — in the composite sense, or supposing the seated to sit, negate.

The fourth captious turn is opposite to the superior — *Division,* when those which are only joined, taken separately, are separately distributed — as *Two and three are even and odd. Therefore the quinarius number is both even and odd.*

This captious turn arises from quinarius number — since the ternary arises separately as odd and binary as even, yet the connected number should by the sole number, who is called quinarius, be accepted, which is only odd.

The fifth captious turn is *Accent,* When a term is interpreted using different accents—such as with the words for 'wit' and 'hare,' or 'hunger' and 'fame'—the following occurs: 'Every virtue has wit; therefore, virtue cannot perish from hunger.'

This captious turn arises from the diverse terminus of this second, *leporem* (cleverness/hare) — signifying an animal in a one second syllable; but being indeed the same long shows beauty — and the Sophism by distinguishing these signs called the least double meaning is dissolved.

The last captious turn arises from *Figure of Diction:* when on account of the various word signification, a transfer is made from one genus to another — as What you have eaten-sent out, you have eaten, you have bought raw meat.

This captious turn arises from the ambiguity of this word *quod,* which in the major supposes on the side of substance, and is not as it is affected of the quality of rawness — for if the major is granted according to substance, what you bought, you ate — secondly, concerning the quality of rawness — negate — you will say, that a transition was made from the genus of substance to the genus of quality.

ARTICLE II — On Captious Turns which consist in things

The First is *Accident,* when the cause is rendered per accident — *What incites conflict and war between cities, is to be destroyed by the republic. Wine is such. Therefore wine is to be destroyed by the republic.*

Solve this Sophism — if you concede the major cause per se, negate as cause per accidens — and thus say to the minor that wine does not incite and cause battles per se, but per accidens — namely drinking.

The second captious turn is said *from what is said according to something, to what is said simply* — as *Aristotle is a great philosopher, therefore simply he is great.* Solve this Sophism by negating the consequence — because it proceeds from a thing said *secundum quid* to said *simply.*

The third captious turn is called *Ignorance of Reproof,* when the Sophist compels the respondent to admit some proposition, or as the same contradiction — Peter is small in respect to the mountain, but great in respect to the fly. *Therefore Peter is both small and great.* — Solve this Sophism by holding the whole argument together, and by contending there is no contradiction.

The fourth captious turn is called *Petitio principii,* when the Sophist, merely changing the words, assumes the same things as premises — as if one argued to prove that the soul is immortal, The human soul is immortal, because it is not extinguished when the

body is extinguished. — Solve it, by negating the principle, since the same thing repeated through itself is proved.

The fifth captious turn is *Consequent,* which bifariously occurs. First from the position of the consequent we posit the position of the antecedent — as from the position of animal, man is posited — and from negation of the antecedent is inferred negation of the consequent.

Primo positing animal, man and positing vulnerability in the heart, death.

Second. Removing one antecedent, the Consequent is not removed — for example, removing man, animal is not removed, as has been said.

Third. With all antecedents removed, the necessary consequent is removed — as man and beast being removed, animal is removed.

Last. Positing the consequent, not necessarily is the antecedent posited — for example, positing animal, man is not necessarily posited.

The sixth captious turn is called *non causa pro causa,* when something is assigned as cause which however is not a cause — as if someone impiously wished to impugn the priesthood, on the grounds that some priests live disorderly — being a cause of disordered life, it is not per se of the priesthood.

Solve this Sophism by negating the consequence — for it brings not a cause for the cause.

The last captious turn is *complex interrogation as one* — if you respond to the Sophist's affirmation *whether being strong is timid* — if affirmatively, the Sophist adds — *therefore strong and timid;* if negatively — presses similarly — *therefore timid.* — This Sophism, since other similar ones of the same kind are, if the singular parts of the question are wisely distinguished, and proper responses are assigned.

POSTERIOR SECTION

On Supposition, Status, Distraction, Ampliation, Restriction, Alienation, and Appellation of Terms

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Aristotle provided occasion for dealing with all these affections of terms in the first book of the Elenchi, because from the various common use of men a captious turn arises — but so that more clearly and distinctly we may proceed through the singular affections of terms, we shall briefly run through them by the following questions.

QUESTION THE FIRST — On the Supposition of Terms

Supposition of term here is taken for the usurpation of the name to signify some thing — in what sense the name of *man* is supposed to supply a human nature by nature — because that signification from the imposer is ordained. In general, that supposition of the term is double — one *moral,* when the term is taken for the thing itself, as I say *horse is a name* — the term *horse* is taken pro itself and its name.

The other *formal,* when the term signifies the thing — as I say *animal,* this *equus* takes the place of *animal* for the nature of equine itself, to which animality belongs — and not for any voice alone.

Moreover *formal* supposition — yet another *proper,* yet another *improper*. *Proper,* when the term is taken for the thing which it properly signifies — as when I say man is a species — the term *man* supposes immediately for man in common, not for particular men — since species cannot be immediately had as singular.

Personal supposition is said when the voice does not take the place of what immediately it signifies, but of mediates, or of some mediator — for example, this voice *homo,* the immediate signification is human nature in common — the mediates are Peter, Paul, and all other humans individually. When therefore the name of man is accepted not for man in common, but for some of his individuals — then the supposition is said to be *personal,* as is viewed in this proposition, *s*ome man plays — because then man is not supposed for man in common, but for some particular.

Absolute finally, *supposition,* when the name takes the place of what immediately and without mediates signifies — if to man in common, and to individual men — as in this proposition *homo est animal* (man is animal) — man is common simply animal, or the sole individual humans — and all his individuals are animal.

To better know hereafter — when is supposition simple, or *personal*, or *absolute,* this is to be noted — if the attribute connected with the common voice is descending to the inferior of this voice, the supposition is simple — for example *homo est species* (man is a species) — since species, which is the attribute, cannot descend to inferior of man, the supposition is simple: *homo est animal* (man is animal) — the attribute here is animal — since it is able to descend to the inferior of man, the supposition is ...per se (personal) — for it is the nature of those most particular men, whose immediate community covenants — then the supposition is said to be *personal.*

DISPUTATION II

Yet it also denotes the attribute which is coupled with the common voice is not able to descend to the inferiors of this voice, and then the supposition is simple — for example *homo est species* (man is a species) — since species, which is the attribute, cannot go below to the inferiors of man (his inferiors are not species) in that proposition, the supposition is said to have *simple supposition*: but the attribute which is joined with the common voice can, then since the common voice has *personal supposition*: as is the attribute *animal,* as in *homo est animal* (man is animal).

Suppositio absoluta is said, when a name takes the place of absolutely and immediately, and without mediates signifying — if both for man in common, and for individual men — as in this proposition *homo est animal* (man is animal) — man is supposed to be animal in common, or solely the individual humans and all their individuals are animal.

Hereafter these remaining suppositiones they call *naturalis* or *essentialis* — they name two prior suppositiones as *accidentarias* — because the attribute which is joined with the common voice does not go down essentially, but accidentally only to the individuals — as to be *homo est species* (man is a species) is individual — thus first they divide the proper supposition into formal and personal — the latter with particulars seems to coincide, as the two simple and absolute belong under the common supposition.

Fourthly, the division of supposition is made in many members — into *Distributive, collective, determinate, confused.*

Distributiva is said when the term with common voice is taken through all the inferiors mediately signifying — as in this proposition *homo est animal* (man is animal) — the supposition is distributive of this voice *hominis,* because it supposes for individual men one by one — so it is *Petrus est animal, Paulus est animal,* and so on.

It is said *In place of the classes of each,* when the generic term supposes for all its species, and for the species individuals — as animal for all of its species — and for the species individuals — and in this proposition, animal is living.

Second is said *In place of the classes of each,* when the universal term does not suppose for individuals of all species, but only for individuals — as in this proposition every animal was in the Ark of Noah — animal distributive supposes for the individuals of the individual species, not for the individuals of all the species.

Third, when the universal term supposes for many singular things, to all nevertheless it does not extend — as when I say the sky covers all things — that term *all,* supposes indeed for many, but not for all, since the sky itself is not said to cover itself.

Supposition *collectiva* is said when the term of common voice is taken through multis collectiue taken as one — as when I say *Apostolos esse duodecim* (the Apostles are twelve) — that term *Apostoli* supposes for all aggregately.

Supposition *determinata* is said, when some term supposes for a certain and determinate singular one — as in this proposition *Philosophus octo libros de natura conscripsit* (The Philosopher wrote eight books on nature) — Philosophus supposes for a certain and determinate man, namely Aristotle who wrote these books on Nature in them.

Finally supposition *confusa* is said, when the term supposes for some certain singular one — but uncertain and indeterminate — as in this proposition *Oculus est ad videndum necessarius* — the eye supposes for any given eyes — who one is, whether right or left, is not determined.

QUESTION II

On the Status of Terms

Status of some term is said perfectly, when the term takes for all those things which exist in any temporal difference — namely what is denoted by the principal verb — namely *copulative verb,* the attribute with the subject connecting — for example, when we form this proposition *man sees*, man is said to have a perfect status, if it is supposed for every man who exists at the time he indicated by the *principal verb*, namely *sees*.

Status of terms is triple — by triple temporal difference, which is denoted by the principal verb:

First is the status of present time: as *qui sedet scribit* (who sits writes).

Second is of past time: as *qui sedit scripsit* (who sat wrote).

Third is of future time: as *qui sedebit scriberit* (who will sit will have written) — because all the status of the present time are the same as ours now.

The status of the term is distractus, because the status is when the term is taken for the opposite of what is signified by the principal verb — as the status is contracted when the term has the *copulative verb,* the attribute with the subject connecting, at the same present time — for example, when we form this proposition *man sees* — man is said to have a perfect status, if it is supposed for every man who exists in the time of the *verb*, namely *sees*.

First is the status of present time: as *qui sedet scribit*.

Second of past time: as *qui sedit scripsit*.

Third of future time: as *qui sedebit scriberit* — because all the status of the present time are the same as ours now.

QUESTION III

On the Distraction of Terms

Distraction of a term is opposed to its status — because status is said when the term is taken for all things which exist in the time difference of the principal verb — and *distraction* is when the term is drawn from the time of the principal verb — but taken for another time — as the status is contracted when the term connects the attribute with the subject simultaneously — as in this proposition *a just man is pleasing to God* — this particular *just,* to man at the addition reduces signifying all men who exist in the present time — and it was contracted from signifying all men to only those certain ones — namely those whom God by his grace has made just.

However for the diversity of those particles — which to the common voice adjoining can contract and restrict to an inferior signification — distraction is said to occur to the term to view — so that this proposition seems ambiguous. A '*man who was not, is not, and will not be*' can still exist. This is because the term '*man*' can suppose for all who have been, all who are, and all who are merely possible. However, the addition of the qualifiers '*was not, is not, and will not be*' restricts the term to signify only those men who are possible but non-actual.

QUESTION IV

On the Ampliation of Terms

Ampliation of terms occurs when terms are extended to time periods beyond what is denoted by the principal verb. For instance, in the statement 'the timid will be bold,' the term 'timid' is said to be amplified because it is extended to the past and present. The sense is: he who was timid or is now timid will be bold. Even though the principal verb 'will be' only denotes future time, the subject is extended.

Ampliation is of three kinds:

First, when the term is extended to past, present, and future time—as in the example: 'the timid one will be bold.'

Second, when it is extended to the past, present, and future—as in 'whoever studies will die.' This means: whoever studied in the past, studies now, or will study in the future, will die.

Third, when the term is extended to the past, present, future, and the possible—as in 'man is an animal.' The sense is: he who was, now is, will be, or is possible to be, is an animal. To this type of ampliation belongs, first, the statement where possible existence is claimed of the subject—as in 'man is able to exist.' Since the principal verb 'is able' denotes the present, it is extended to the future and the possible; thus, whoever will be in the future, or is able to be, is included.

To this same ampliation belongs, secondly, the statement where the possible existence of a real thing is denied—as in 'a chimera is not able to really exist.' Since the principal verb denotes only the present, this statement includes the present, past, and possible; for the sense is: a chimera cannot exist now, nor could it have, nor will it ever, since the chimera is simply unable to exist.

DISPUTATION II

QUESTION THE FIFTH — On the Restriction of Terms

Restriction of the term is said, when by reason of some particle of dictated more general signification is contracted and narrowed — as in this proposition *a just man is pleasing to God* — this particular *just* reduces to man by addition, to signifying all men who exist in the present time — and it was contracted from signifying all men in the present time existing — and it cannot be accepted except for those certain men — namely those whom God by his grace has made just.

However for the diversity of those particles — which to the common voice adjoining can contract and restrict to an inferior signification — restriction is said to occur to the term by viewing — so that this ambiguous proposition *Man who never was, nor is, nor will ever be* — because with man it could suppose for all those who were, who now are, and who are only possible — but by the addition of those particles *never was, nor is, nor ever will be,* it is restricted to signifying only those men who are possibly.

QUESTION VI — On the Alienation of Terms

A term is said to be *alienated,* when by the addition of some particle from its proper signification to an improper and equivocal one is transferred — in what sense in this proposition *homo mortuus iacet* (the dead man lies) — that term *homo,* is said to be alienated — because by the addition of that particle *mortuus* (dead), from its signification of the living man is transferred to signifying a dead body — in the same way in this proposition *homo pictus arrigitur* (the painted man is erect) — the term *homo* (man) is alienated — because by the addition of the particle *pictus* (painted), the signification of the living man is transferred to the image in a painting — while however it ought to convey the nature of the living man to be properly signified — yet the same sign must by the positing of the living man in the image be taken.

QUESTION THE SEVENTH AND LAST — On the Appellation of Terms (p. 176)

Appellation of terms is said, when one imparts its signification to another — the thing calling in this way *appellans,* or *denominans* is said; the thing, indeed, to which the signification is applied or attributed, is called *appellata,* or *denominata*. The whole example illustrates this — when we form this proposition *Caesar est magnus Imperator* (Caesar is a great Emperor) — that voice *magnus* imparts its signification to the other, namely *Imperatoris* — because we signify the magnitude of the Imperatorial Caesarism in Caesar — therefore *magnus* is called *terminus appellans,* or *denominans*. *Imperator* however is the *appellatus,* or *denominatus*. And these things are sufficient about the total sophistical syllogism.

General Appendix to Universal Dialectics on the Instruments of Knowing

The science of all things effective is Dialectics, since its own end is to be achieved — which is mainly intended in the fabricating of different modes of distinguishing, and knowing. So that before our task is sufficiently done and the absolute work of Dialectics is left to us — we must briefly open those instruments of knowing in particular and in general.

Prior section of this Appendix — on the instruments of knowing in common

QUESTION I — On Name

In the same way that in the art of painting a pencil is the instrument — because from the painter it is assumed for depicting images — so also in this the instrument of knowing that is called which by the intellect is assumed for the operations of science to be rightly and felicitously executed.

Moreover, this instrument of knowing is bifariously used — widely for any cognition — and precisely for the sure and evident cognition, instrument of knowing. This can be taken properly and per se.

First, widely for the cognition certain and evident, either per itself — *or* compared through causes.

Second, more widely for any cognition certain and evident of the thing per itself cause — whether it is or not. So also the instrument of knowing, this is certain and evidently to know things — This can be taken in two ways: First for the instrument of knowing only through cause — *Second, more widely for whatever instrument of knowing, whether through cause or not.*

QUESTION II

On the Existence of the Instrument of Knowing

The instrument of knowing is proved by common consent of the Philosophers, and vindicates their necessity for all comparing sciences, testifying their use in all the sciences and disciplines in general. The question is only of their number, and how they are to be dissolved.

Distinction must be used: if the "instrument of knowing" is taken to mean any instrument of knowing, then four things result, which are the four stated instruments: definition, division, argumentation, and method. All of these serve as instruments by which the intellect is aided in truly perceiving cognition. By definition, the proper nature and essence of a thing are opened; by division, the parts of the whole are explained; by argumentation, truths are tracked down by causes, or causes by effects; and finally, by method, those things that are suitable are arranged.

If, truly, the "instrument of knowing" is taken for the instrument of knowing things certainly and evidently through cause—satisfying that experience—then only three instruments of knowing constitute knowledge: namely definition, division (or analytics, or demonstration). Method, truly, is rejected, because it is not that by which things are known certainly and evidently; rather, it is sufficiently apt for the arrangement of things—it rather arranges things toward their cognition than serves as a proper instrument of knowing.

Third, if the "instrument of knowing" is taken for the instrument of knowing things certainly and evidently through cause—satisfying those who admit only one—then that one is demonstration. This is because only by its benefit—either essentially and by its effect, or the property through the effect as cause—is something of the operation and property known to us through the essence as the cause of cognition.

QUESTION III

On the Essence of the Instrument of Knowing

The instrument of knowing can thus be defined: *The instrument of knowing is the action of the mind, which promotes from the more known to the more obscure things certainly and evidently to be known.*

First, it says action of the mind, because those instruments through which the intellect assists in truly perceiving cognition are indeed actions of the mind—namely definition, division, and argumentation**.**

Second, it says promoting us from the more known to the more obscure, because by the benefit of these instruments of knowing we proceed from one cognition to another. For example, from the cognition of the 'one capable of laughter,' we proceed to the cognition of the 'rational.' We also note that certitude is added, and from this, those instruments of cognition are distinguished—by which cognition is compared through certain things.

QUESTION IV

On the Affections of the Instruments of Knowing

Here only the worth of the work of the instruments of knowing is to be conferred — to assign each the degree of honor due to it.

Some of the more recent thinkers attribute the first honor to definition; next, according to the degree of dignity, demonstration follows; and last, division yields. More probably, however, Philoponus, Ammonius, Simplicius, and others seem to feel that demonstration is to be preferred. This is because its use is in every intellectual business; it opens the property through the essence, and vice-versa, and therefore satisfies the intellect more than definition. While definition manifests only the naked essence of a thing, demonstration acquires cognition through effect. It is sought 'because of why': since demonstration shows not only what the thing is, but the property through the essence—just as definition shows. Yet this is not equally valid for both; for by demonstration, not just the quality is shown regarding demonstration, nothing further is to be said, since it has been most fully explained before. Therefore, we must briefly distinguish individually between definition and division, which are the proper instruments of knowing, and the method, which contributes most extensively toward the attainment of science.

ALTERNATE SECTION — On the Instruments of Knowing in Particular

QUESTION I — On Division

We follow the order of doctrine, and following that first about division, then about definition we dispute.

Division taken *proprie* (properly) is nothing other than the *distribution of some whole in its parts* — and constituted by *one reality,* which realiter distributes the whole into its parts — as distributing a heap of stones into all the stones from which it is composed.

Another *mental,* by which the whole intellect's totality by its benefit is distributed — as distributing Petrum, Paulum, and other men.

Moreover *divisio mentalis* (mental division) is double — another *formalis,* another *obiectiva*.

Formalis (formal) is the act of the mind distributing some whole into its parts.

Obiectiva (objective) is the very whole which into its parts is divided — the whole itself what is divided, the parts into which, distributed, are the *dividentia,* or members of the division is called.

Objective mental division is double — another *formalis,* another *obiectiva*. *Formalis* is the action of the mind of some whole into its parts.

Third, division *obiectua* is another *nominis,* or *vocis* (of name, or of voice) — and it is a voice in its significations distributed. Another *rei,* that is some nature in its parts. The matter is on account of the diversity of this real total — which is diversely parted — this division is multiplex. Another is said of the total universal into its subjective parts — as *animaliu in hominem, et brutum* (of animals into man and beast): another of total essentiales into essential parts — as *hominis in animam et corpus* (of man into soul and body) — another of the total integral — as *corporis humani in caput, manus, pedes, et ceteras partes* (of the human body into head, hands, feet, and other parts). But here we deal only with the mental division — which can thus be defined: *Division is the action of the mind, which appropriately and congruently distributes the total in its parts*.

First it says *actio mentis* (action of the mind) — because it is argued whether it is first operation — since in division a judgment is given — for example, when dividing animal into man and beast, we affirm that the animal is another human, another beast — therefore it is not able to pertain to the first operation of the intellect, but to the second.

Second it says, *quae apte et conuenienter totum in partes diuiditur* (which aptly and congruently distributes the total into parts) — because ordinated to all parts explaining

the total — so what the most proper mode is of effecting division infinitely. Who is that apt mode of division, the legitimate laws of division exhibited will open.

First is, that the members of the division lay broadly separately from the total whole taken — so that the members be no more extensive, nor narrower — hence good division of animal into man and beast is taken separately or the beast separately taken, together man and the beast aggregate just as wide, and just as wide as the animal itself.

Second law is, that one member of the division does not contain another — as is inept the division of the human body into head, forehead, ears, and eyes — because forehead, ears, and eyes in the head are contained.

Third law is, that as far as possible the division be made into immediate members — and thus it would be a bad division of substance into rational and irrational are not immediately contained under substance, but under animal.

Fourth law is, that in division nothing is superfluous — and thus a bad division would be of animals into man and beast — since man is apt for reasoning, and beast which is reckless of reason — since these which are added for man, *man* and *beast* are useless to be added for the division.

Fifth is, that members in division should be as few as possible.

Sixth, that as much as possible, a positive member be expressed. I say 'as far as can be done' because it can sometimes happen that one member of a division is positive, yet is nevertheless expressed by a negative name—as seen in the division of 'animal' into 'rational' and 'irrational.' In this way, the rational is distinguished from the irrational, or the 'reason-lacking.'

DISPUTATION II

QUESTION THE SECOND — On Definition

Definition is so named because it fences a thing in, binds it with limits, and determines it. It is twofold: one of the thing, the other of the name. By the former, it assigns the thing itself; by the latter, names are defined.

Definition of the thing is also twofold: one essential, the other accidental.

Essential definition is that which explains a thing by its essential grades in two ways: either by assuming the superior grade (corresponding to the genus) or the inferior grade of differences. This is seen in the definition of substance, which is: "a being subsisting

through itself." "Being" is the superior grade corresponding to the genus; "subsisting through itself" is the inferior grade, the difference.

Another type is metaphorical, such as when the intellect defines the soul as the "eye of the soul," or Logic as the "guide of the human mind." Another is proper, which is traced through accidents—whether proper or common—but is not metaphorical.

There is also positive definition, which attributes qualities positively, such as: "a point is that of which there is no part." This is positive, though it expresses attributes that are not essential. These constitute a double difference between the metaphorical and the personal.

To return: definition of a thing is twofold: essential and accidental. Essential definition explains a thing by its essential grades—either through the superior grade (genus) or the inferior grade (difference). This is seen in the definition: "Substance is a being subsisting through itself." "Being" is the superior grade; "subsisting through itself" is the inferior grade of differences. Accidental definition, however, does not explain the thing essentially through grades, but is given through accidents—such as the definition of Logic as the "guide of the human mind."

Definition is a statement expressing the nature of a thing. In this "statement," the action of the intellect is understood. This is not a confused action, since definition necessarily pertains to the intellect. Some refer it to the first operation of the mind, others to the second; we conclude with the latter, demonstrating our conclusion. The second operation of the intellect is that by which we affirm or negate one thing of another. Since in a definition we affirm one thing of another—as when we say of man, "man is a rational animal"—definition pertains to the second operation of the mind.

It is objected that definition is the instrument by which the first operation of the mind is directed, and therefore must pertain to it. I respond by distinguishing the consequence: I concede that definition pertains to the first operation as an instrument by which it is directed, but I negate that it is a *species* of the first operation.

Furthermore, it is objected that one cannot assign definitions to things unto infinity, and therefore to define is futile. I respond by negating this: when a thing has an essence, it can be excellently explained by definition. This does not lead to an infinite progression. While the common essence is expressed in a definition, no definition can be given for singular individuals, because no definition can be given for singulars in a general form.

I respond, first, that this does not extend to beings of reason; since we deal with definition from higher categories, nothing stops them from being defined. **Second**, it does not extend to accidental beings, because these involve multiple essences rather than a unique one. **Third**, it does not extend to equivocal and analogous terms, since they do not signify a unique essence, but multiple ones. **Fourth**, it does not extend to singulars, because the legitimate definition of which we speak concerns only necessary things—which are not singular. **Finally**, definition extends to beings that are in themselves univocal and universal, which follows from the points above.

QUESTION THE THIRD AND LAST — On Method

Method is understood in several ways. First, it refers to any order established for a goal to be achieved. Second, it refers to a specific structure observed in both things and words. Third, it refers to the art of Dialectics itself, which prescribes the laws of teaching. Last, it refers to the coordination of things themselves as transmitted within a discipline—ensuring that what ought to precede does so, and what ought to follow comes after. This is called the method of disposition. The method of invention is presupposed by this, as disposition necessarily requires the prior discovery of materials.

Furthermore, the method of disposition is sometimes called the method of nature or of perfection, which follows the natural order of things. Another is the method of doctrine, which establishes the order of necessary and instructional things. In this method, the sequence is: first, division; second, definition; and third, demonstration. This is proven by the fact that demonstration—at least the most powerful kind—presupposes definition as its middle term; therefore, definition comes later. Furthermore, a thing is not defined in a confused way, but only after its parts have been explained through division and all obscurity is removed; therefore, definition requires prior division. Thus, in the order of instruction, the sequence is division, definition, and finally demonstration.

There is another method observed in universal science, which is established as twofold. One is the method of resolution, and the other is the method of composition. The resolution method is observed when one progresses from the whole toward the parts, or from the end toward the means. This pertains to the method Galen calls definitive, according to which the whole is defined first, followed by its essential parts.

The method of composition, however, occurs when one progresses from simple elements to composites—moving from principles, causes, and parts toward the whole, or from the means toward the end. This is observed in Physics, which treats the principles, causes, and effects of the natural body all at once, then moves toward the species that explain them. The essence of this method is clearly expressed by this definition: Method is the order of transmitted things, conveniently adapted to the subject matter. Its effects are what make it a "parent of clarity" and an "aid to memory," and other similar intelligible benefits.

This concludes the discussion of method, which universal philosophy—namely Dialectics—imposes. This is the same teaching which, for the sake of God, we publicly taught in the schools of our Plessis during our fifth year of profession, to the singular joy and wonderful affection of our listeners three hundred years ago. We leave behind the interpretation of the Aristotelian text, which has been handed down most successfully by others from the beginning; to include it would have made the work grow to too great

a magnitude. As for the study of philosophy—for whose sake and the pious prayers of many this work was published—this shall suffice.

(*This whole work, whatever it is, we humbly refer to God as received from Him, and dedicate it to His divine majesty and name — and we humbly submit it to the sound judgment of the Holy Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church.*)

FINIS

SUMMA TOTIUS PHILOSOPHIÆ

VOLUME II – ETHICS

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Preface

Man is the world's summit and its whole. The sky of this world is his soul; the earth is his body. The sun of this sky is the intellect; its moon is the will. The ray of this sun is Logic; the light of this moon is Ethics. By Logic's ray the intellect grows bright and casts brilliant flashes more resplendent than the sun's light. By Ethics' splendour the will, illumined, steers its course through the immense sea of all affairs without shipwreck or loss, right into the harbour of divine salvation.

The intellect, suffused with Logic's light, sees everywhere and investigates hidden truth wherever it lurks. The will, guided as if by a resplendent lighthouse of Moral Philosophy,

discerns virtue in every walk of life, pursues and attains it, safely passes the Scyllas and Symplegades — that is, the reefs of every vice — so happily that it seems not merely to have avoided them but never to have noticed them, and at last, under these happy auspices, is brought to the harbour of eternal happiness.

Let us now begin the work: the mistress of right living, the science of morals, understood and known in mind and intelligence, and let us express it in our life and conduct. We shall distribute the whole forthcoming treatment into two parts: the first on the Good, the End, and Beatitude, toward which every human action tends and is directed; the second on the means by which the path to Beatitude itself is made easier. But first we must lay some groundwork concerning Moral Philosophy itself.

Preambles on Moral Philosophy

Preamble I — On the Names of Moral Doctrine

The discipline we now take in hand has received names of two kinds: some proper, drawn from its own nature — as when it is called 'Moralis' or 'Ethica' from custom and practice; others descriptive, taken from its various functions — 'mistress of life', 'rule of conduct', 'medicine of the soul', 'lighthouse of the will', and countless other titles easily found in Cicero and other authors

Preamble II — On the Existence of Ethics

Chapter I — Does Ethics Truly Exist? On Its Utility and Necessity

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That Ethics truly exists is first established by the authority of all those philosophers who composed outstanding books about it and gave it its various names of honour. It is further confirmed by the general division of philosophy — into Natural, Moral, and Logical — celebrated by the Platonists and Stoics, as attested by Plutarch, Augustine, and others. We must also examine how Ethics is said to be useful and necessary for a person to live well. Ethics may be considered in two ways. First, in its perfect state, presupposing Logic. Second, in its imperfect state, as it can exist without the help of Logic.

First Proposition: Ethics in its perfect state, considered as presupposing Logic, is not simply and absolutely necessary for a person to live well and happily.

Proof: Before the invention — or rather the recovery — of the art of Logic, many people led well-ordered lives: Socrates, whom Cicero says brought Moral Philosophy down from the heavens; the Seven Sages of Greece, who not only led admirably ordered lives but left to posterity many excellent and useful maxims. Therefore the perfect state of Moral Philosophy, which presupposes Logic, is not necessary for living well.

Second Proposition: Ethics at least in its imperfect state, considered as it can be known without Logic, is simply necessary for a person to live well.

Proof: For right living, knowledge of the precepts of the good life is simply necessary. Such knowledge cannot be had without Ethics, at least in its imperfect state. Moreover,

Moral Philosophy is commonly called the medicine of the soul. Just as medicine is simply necessary for curing the body's diseases, so too Moral Philosophy is simply necessary as the medicine of the soul, to heal its countless diseases — lust, avarice, ambition, and other passions — and to restore that firmness which can be shaken by no temptation or disturbance.

Chapter II — How Many Kinds of Moral Philosophy Are There?

Moral Philosophy is first divided by the Stoics into Dogmatic and Preceptive. The Dogmatic contains the general doctrine of morals — definitions of virtue, its divisions, and other general conclusions. The Preceptive, presupposing the Dogmatic, lays down various rules to educate us in right living.

The second, more familiar division is into Monastic (governing the private individual's actions for his own good), Economic (treating the manner of administering the household), and Political (dealing with the governance of the city-state and commonwealth).

Regarding the order these parts hold among themselves: in order of time, Monastic comes first, Economic second, and Politics last. In order of dignity the reverse holds: Politics is first, Economics second, Monastic last.

Preamble III — On the Nature of Ethics

Chapter I — Is Ethics Properly a Science?

It is certain, first, that Ethics is a true habit of the intellect — a power inhering in it by which it easily judges matters to be pursued or avoided. Second, it is certain that Ethics is neither Understanding (since it does not treat the first, self-evident principles) nor Wisdom (since it does not treat God, separated minds, and the highest things). The whole difficulty, therefore, is whether it is Art, Prudence, or Science.

First Proposition: Moral Philosophy is not Art in the proper sense.

Proof: Art in the proper sense must concern itself with external material, as we noted in the Preambles to Logic. But Moral Philosophy is concerned not with external material but with the internal operations of the will, insofar as they can be directed toward the good.

Second Proposition: Moral Philosophy is Prudence.

Third Proposition: Ethics is truly and properly Science.

Proof: Ethics is one of the five intellectual habits — Understanding, Wisdom, Prudence, Art, and Science. It is not the first four, as has been shown; therefore it must be Science. Moreover, Science is nothing but certain knowledge of a thing through its proper cause; and Ethics demonstrates many necessary conclusions through true causes and most certain principles — for example, that virtue is to be pursued, being in conformity with right reason.

Chapter II — Is Ethics Speculative or Practical?

Ethics is Practical. Proof: Practical science does not rest in the knowledge of its object but passes over into action and gives rules for acting. Ethics is entirely of this kind: it does not rest in the knowledge of the will's action and of virtue but orders this knowledge to action and gives precepts by which the will can act in accordance with

virtue. From what has been said it follows that Ethics, being a practical science, is a part of Philosophy.

Final Preamble — On the Attributes of Ethics

Chapter I — On the Object

We inquire here about the proper object of Moral Philosophy itself — whether it is man, his will, his appetite, virtue, the highest good, or something similar.

First Proposition: Neither man, nor his will, nor his appetite can be the proper object of Moral Philosophy.

Second Proposition: The highest good is not the proper object of Ethics but only a secondary one.

Third Proposition: Virtue itself is not the proper object of Moral Philosophy.

Fourth Proposition: Human action is the proper object of Ethics.

We should note, first, that actions attributed to a person are of two kinds: actions of the human being (which proceed from him naturally and necessarily, not freely — such as nutrition, growth, and the like), and properly human actions (which not only proceed from a human being but are proper to him, done with the full use of freedom — such as love of God, hatred of sin, pursuit of virtue, avoidance of vice). We should note, second, that human action may be either elicited — proceeding from the will in which it resides, such as love, hatred, and every other free act of the will — or commanded — done by another faculty than the will, yet subject to the will's command and dependent on it. Human action considered in the order of morality and insofar as it is free is the proper object of Moral Philosophy.

Chapter II — On the End of Ethics

The proximate end of Ethics is the knowledge of human moral actions; its remote end is the direction of those same actions toward the good and the ultimate end, through the precepts of right living.

Part One: The Good, the End, and Beatitude

Treatise I — On the Good

Sections I & II — On the Name and Existence of the Good

The good is the same as the fitting and the congruent. Its existence is clear: first, from the testimony of Sacred Scripture (Genesis 1: 'God saw all that He had made, and it was very good'); second, from the unanimous view of the philosophers; third, from the innate appetite by which, as Aristotle notes at the beginning of the Ethics, each thing tends toward the good.

The chief divisions of the Good are as follows. The first is into true good — which truly fits, as living well and engaging in acts of virtue — and apparent good, which though not truly fitting is thought to be so, as the poet says: 'I see the better and approve it; I follow the worse.'

The second division is into good through essence (which is God alone) and good through participation (which all creatures are, having received all their goodness and perfection from God).

The third is into the honest (per se befitting rational nature, as virtue), the pleasant (bringing delight), and the useful (conducive to obtaining something else).

The fourth is into what is sought for its own sake (as God and happiness), for the sake of another (as a horse for a journey), and partly for its own sake and partly for another's (as victory, which is an end relative to the contest and a means relative to the peace that follows).

The fifth is into goods of the soul, goods of the body, and external goods. The last division is into transcendent or metaphysical good (which belongs to every being as being), moral good (which follows the dictate of right reason), and natural good (which befits each thing according to the condition of its nature).

Section III — On the Essence of the Good

It is certain that the essence of goodness is not absolute but relative — no thing can be called good or bad except in relation to another, and not absolutely in itself; otherwise the same thing could not be simultaneously called good and bad (as heat is good for fire and bad for water).

First Proposition: The essence of goodness does not consist in appetibility.

Proof: Appetibility is only a property of goodness, presupposing goodness itself; for a thing is appetised because it is good. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in appetibility. Aristotle, at the opening of the Ethics, defined the good by appetibility not per essentiam but per proprietatem — in the same way that a human being might be described as 'capable of learning the disciplines.'

Second Proposition: The essence of goodness consists in suitability and congruence.

Proof: There is no good that is not called good because it is suitable to something else. Whatever is good is either honest, pleasant, or useful, and each of these is called good because it is suitable to something else.

Section IV — On the Attributes of the Good, Especially Appetibility

Question I — Does Appetibility Belong to Good Alone?

The more probable opinion holds that nothing but the good — whether in reality or in appearance — can fall under appetite. This is supported by the Fathers: Dionysius says no one acts intending evil, and Gregory of Nyssa states that no one falls into vice except led by some appearance of goodness. If evil were appetised as evil, it would be appetised only as a privation, which is unreal, and it is not probable that a privation and unreality can fall under appetite.

Question II — Does Appetibility Belong to Every Good?

Yes. Proof: It is proper to goodness to be suitable and congruent; and whatever is suitable can move the appetite. The definition of good is to be something congruent and suitable; therefore, since a definition must belong to every instance of what is defined, every good must have the property of being suitable, and thus of being appetible.

Final Question — Toward What Good Do All Appetites Tend?

Every thing tends toward its own connatural good, and desires it with a natural or rational appetite if it is rational, with a sensitive appetite if endowed with sense, or finally with an innate and natural appetite. Whatever is good is appetible in only three ways: through reason, through sensitive judgment, or because it is suitable to the nature of any thing whatsoever.

Appendix — On Evil

Evil may be taken in two ways: materially, for the thing itself that is called evil; formally, for the obliquity and deformity itself by reason of which a thing is called evil. In the former sense we acknowledge that evil is some real and positive thing. In the latter sense we deny it, following Gregory of Nyssa: 'There is no other substance of evil than the separation from good.' Privation — such as blindness or deafness — is not some real thing; for every positive reality is good, since being and good are convertible.

Treatise II — On the End

Section I — On the Name of End

The word 'End' (finis) is a metaphor drawn from the boundaries and limits of fields: just as the limit of a field is called its 'end' because the field is finished and terminated there and extends no further, so among philosophers the End is called that which terminates and, as it were, brings to a close the intention of the agent. Hence the End is generally defined as that toward which something tends, or for the sake of which an agent acts.

Section II — On the Existence of the End

Question I — Does an End Exist, and Do All Things Act for It?

First Proposition: An end truly exists.

Proof: The end is the cause of causes, i.e., all other causes depend on the end. Remove the end and there will be no efficient cause; remove the efficient cause and there will be no formal cause; remove the form and matter cannot naturally exist without it.

Second Proposition: All natural agents act for some end.

Proof: If natural agents did not produce their effects with a certain natural intention and for some end, everything would come indifferently from everything, and — as Lucretius's absurd verse has it — men might arise from the sea and scaly fish from the earth. All natural agents therefore act for an end, in accordance with Aristotle, who everywhere teaches that nature always acts for an end and does nothing in vain; this is also the teaching of Thomas Aquinas and of all major philosophers, against Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Epicurus, and others.

Third Proposition: It belongs to rational creatures to act for an end in a way different from other things — namely, by moving and directing themselves toward the end.

Fourth Proposition: It does not befit God to act for an end in respect of His immanent acts, even if He is determined to produce an external work.

Question II — How Many Kinds of End Are There?

From the Dialectical Preambles: the end is divided into the end to be made (which is intended to be brought about) and the end to be obtained (which already exists and is only to be acquired). The second division is into formal end (the agent's very operation itself) and objective end (the object about which the agent is occupied through the operation). The third is into ultimate end and non-ultimate end. The fourth is into ultimate end simply speaking (to which absolutely everything is referred, namely God) and ultimate end in a qualified sense (a certain specific end within a domain).

First Proposition: Every human action, whether good or bad, is in reality intended for the ultimate end in general, if not by explicit then at least by implicit and interpretive intention.

Second Proposition: Not every human action is for some ultimate end in particular and determinately.

Third Proposition: Every agent's action is referred to the ultimate end, at least from the intention of the first agent — namely God.

Final Proposition: A person cannot at the same time and in the same moment have more than one total ultimate end.

This proposition is gathered from Sacred Scripture, especially Matthew 6: 'No one can serve two masters'; and Isaiah 28: 'The bed is too narrow for both, and the blanket is too short to cover both.'

Moral Digression — On the Perfect Love of God

From the doctrine that there is only one ultimate end — God, the most good and most great — we are taught to love Him with our whole heart, and not in part. This is attested by the words of Christ in Matthew 22: 'You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, with your whole soul, with your whole mind.' The repetition is like a carpenter who strikes a nail again and again until he judges it firmly fixed; so God, wishing to join us to Himself with the nail of love, strikes three times — 'with your whole heart' (first stroke), 'with your whole soul' (second stroke), 'with your whole mind' (third stroke).

Augustine expressed this perfectly in his Confessions: 'He loves You less, O Lord, who loves anything else along with You that he does not love for Your sake.'

Section III — On the Essence of the End

Question I — On the Definition of the End

The End is most commonly defined, especially by Aristotle (Physics II, ch. 3), as 'that for the sake of which something is done, and toward which the agent's very operation tends.' Since the end sometimes participates in this nature even if it does not exist in reality (for health as yet to be recovered is an end, according to the philosopher), the greater contention is whether in this definition the end is expressed as a truly real and actual cause.

We conclude briefly, following Aristotle's own text, that the end expressed in this definition is indeed a real cause. Proof: A real cause is one that is really a cause; and the end is entirely of this kind, since it really and in fact moves the agent to act.

Question II — By What Means Does the End Move the Agent to Act?

First Proposition: The root and foundation of the End's moving power is the End's own intrinsic goodness.

Second Proposition: The goodness of the end moves the appetite not as it is merely intelligible or intentional, but as it is real.

Third Proposition: The real being by which the end moves the appetite is not present but future or possible.

Treatise III — On Beatitude

Sections I & II — On the Name and Existence of Beatitude

Beatitude, according to Boethius as cited by Thomas Aquinas (I–II, q. 3, a. 2), is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things. Its existence is established by the consensus of experience, by the natural desire by which everyone tends toward Beatitude, and by its various divisions, the first of which is into objective and formal Beatitude. Objective Beatitude is the thing itself whose possession makes a rational creature happy, such as God. Formal Beatitude is the very attainment of objective Beatitude — for example, that vision by which the blessed in heaven clearly behold the divine essence.

The second division is into natural and supernatural Beatitude. Natural Beatitude is that which can be obtained by the powers of this mortal flesh. Supernatural Beatitude is that which cannot be had by nature's bare powers but is obtained by a most special gift of God.

Section III — On the Essence of Beatitude

Question I — On Objective Beatitude

Article I — Objective Beatitude Is Not Pleasure

Let Epicurus go with his followers, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure. This opinion is refuted as unworthy of a human being by many most weighty arguments.

First argument: Beatitude does not bring harm to the soul, since it is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all goods. But pleasures most greatly harm the soul, as Seneca testifies (Letter 28): 'Some immerse themselves in pleasures which they cannot do without once they have grown accustomed to them; they are enslaved to pleasures, they do not enjoy them. Their worst evils, worst of all, they love.' Pleasures also wage war against the soul — when the soul wishes to rise to greater things, they drag it down to base and ignoble ones.

Second argument: Happiness cannot be an occasion of sin, for then it would be something to be fled rather than sought. But pleasure is an occasion of sins. Proof from Cyprian (Letter 2): 'The smiling face of evil's allure is hidden poison; you see what is drawn, but not the calamity hidden within.'

Third argument: Beatitude satisfies the appetite, so that the will rests in it; but pleasure does not do this, as Ambrose teaches (On Luke VI): 'Nothing given over to pleasure is ever enough for it; it always endures hunger for itself, not knowing how to be filled with perpetual nourishment.'

Fourth argument: Beatitude must be firm and constant; but pleasure is not of this kind. As Gregory states, distinguishing bodily from spiritual delights: 'Bodily delights when not possessed engender a heavy longing, when had they are immediately turned into distaste; but spiritual riches when not possessed are distasteful, when possessed are eagerly desired.'

Moral Digression — On Despising Pleasures

Augustine in his Confessions: 'I admit that I have an innate love of my body, I admit that I carry its guardianship — but I deny that I must indulge it; I deny that I must serve it.' And still more forcefully in Letter 65: 'I am too great and born for too great things to be a slave of my body.' If you love your soul, flee the pleasures that kill it; if you love your body, do not love the pleasure that oppresses it with so many evils. The old epitaph reads: 'Better to die than to be defiled.'

Article II — Objective Beatitude Does Not Consist in Honours

Aristotle uses two arguments against those who place Beatitude in honours. First: honour is not in the honoured person but in the one who confers it — how then can it be the honoured person's Beatitude? Second: Beatitude is sought for its own sake alone and not for the sake of another; but honour is sought only for the sake of another, as a testimony to virtue.

A third argument: Beatitude must be firm and constant; but honour is not such. Sacred Scripture attests this (Daniel 4): 'Cut down the tree and scatter its fruit; let the beasts

that are under it flee, and the birds from its branches.' And the Psalms: 'I have seen the wicked exalted and lifted up like the cedars of Lebanon; and I passed by, and lo, he was not.'

Moral Digression — On the Neglect of Honour and the Cultivation of Honour

Honour is twofold: divine and human. Divine honour is owed to God by nature. Human honour is arrogated by men to themselves. The human type is again twofold: eternal (the life of eternal life) and temporal (of the present life). The latter in turn is twofold: true honour — which follows from virtue — and spurious honour — falsely rendered as testimony to virtue. From this four types of honour are constituted: divine honour (due to God alone: 'To God alone be honour and glory'); Beatitude (conferred on the blessed in heaven: 'Your friends are greatly honoured, O God'); true but temporal honour (rendered for virtue: Cicero calls it 'the prize of virtue'); and spurious honour (desired by those who cover their vices with the garment of virtue).

Article III — Objective Beatitude Does Not Consist in Riches

Human Beatitude does not consist in riches, as is demonstrated by the same sorts of arguments.

First: riches, like pleasures, do not satisfy thirst but inflame it, as Sacred Scripture attests: 'The rich have been in want and have gone hungry.' And Bernard (Sermon 21 on the Canticles): 'The miser hungers for earthly things like a beggar; the faithful man scorns them like a lord. The former begs in possessing; the latter saves in scorning.'

Second: riches are referred to another purpose — a pleasant life — which is contrary to the nature of Beatitude, which must fill the appetite and be desired for its own sake and not for another's sake.

Third: riches are burdens that weigh down the soul and drag it to earth.

Moral Digression — Against the Thorns of Riches

Riches are compared to thorns. First, because just as thorns inflict pain when they are stuck in, greater pain when they remain stuck, and fiercest pain when they are pulled out, so riches are acquired with great labour, preserved with greater solicitude and anxiety, and left behind with unspeakable grief. Second, because just as thorns cannot be gathered without wounding the hand, so riches can scarcely be collected and acquired without wounding the soul. Third, because just as thorns have their stings only at their tips, the rest of their body being smooth and tractable, so riches seem to have no stings and to be sweet and tractable throughout the whole span of life, but at its very end to prick sharply. Fourth, because just as thorns wound only when the hand holds them tightly and compressed — not when held loosely and with an open hand — so riches tightly and greedily grasped wound the spirit with deadly stings; but if you hold them with an expanded and generous hand and distribute them to the poor, they will not harm you but will help you to merit.

Article IV — Objective Beatitude Does Not Consist in Bodily Goods Nor Generally in Any Created Thing

That bodily goods — health, strength, beauty, and the like — are not human happiness can be shown by the same arguments. First, the appetite does not rest in them. Second, and chiefly, they are not firm but exceedingly inconstant, as ordinary experience proves.

More generally, that Beatitude does not consist in any created and worldly thing is demonstrated with equal ease, because the world cannot satisfy the appetite so that nothing more is desired — since the soul is capable of infinite good, while the world is finite. As Augustine says on the Epistle of John: 'The world passes away, and its concupiscence. What do you want? To love temporal things and pass away with time, or to love Christ and live forever?'

Brief Moral Digression — On the Contempt of the World

Augustine exclaims: 'See how ruined the world is, and yet it is loved! What would you do if it were pleasant? What would you do if it were sweet?' And in his Confessions he introduces two soldiers exhorting each other to leave military service to the world and to serve under Christ as leader: 'Tell me, I beg you, whither do we aim by all the labours that we pursue? What do we seek? Whose sake do we serve as soldiers? Can our hope in the palace be greater than to be friends of the Emperor?'

Bernard writes in his Epistles: 'A strange abuse: the house is on fire, the flames press from behind, and the one fleeing is forbidden to go out — by those who are themselves in the blaze.'

Article V — Objective Beatitude Is Found in God Alone

This article is a Corollary of the preceding ones and follows evidently from them. Since Beatitude is placed in no created thing, it must without doubt be sought in God alone. This is confirmed by the testimonies of Sacred Scripture (Genesis 15: 'I am your protector and your great reward'; Psalm 72: 'What do I have in heaven, and what do I desire upon earth beside You? God is my portion for ever'; John 17: 'This is eternal life: that they know You, the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent') and by the voices of the Fathers (Augustine in the City of God: 'There will all virtue be, to see what you love, and the highest happiness will be to love what you see, and there in that source blessed life will be drunk, where the vision of truth shines most clearly').

Question II — On the Formal Essence of Beatitude

Article I — On the Existence of Supernatural Beatitude in This Present Life

The formal supernatural Beatitude of this life does not consist in the sole contemplation of God.

Proof: The supernatural Beatitude of this life must be a proximate way to the supernatural Beatitude of the next life; but the contemplation of God is not of this kind, since it can be found in pagans who have no path to that supreme and heavenly Beatitude.

The supernatural Beatitude of this life consists in the acts of Faith, Hope, and Charity — especially in acts of Charity.

Article II — On Natural Beatitude

First Proposition: The formal natural speculative (or contemplative) Beatitude consists in the contemplation of God insofar as He can be known by the powers and light of nature.

Second Proposition: The practical natural Beatitude consists in the love of God insofar as it can be obtained through nature.

The reason is ready at hand: the ultimate end of the active and practical natural life is the formal natural practical Beatitude; and that ultimate end is the love of God as it can naturally be obtained. To confirm this: in this life it is fitting to cultivate virtue and to engage in earnest activity, so that with all disturbances of the soul quieted we may please God in all things — which cannot be had without love of Him. Therefore the natural end prescribed for the active and practical life of man is the love of God as obtainable by nature's powers.

Article III — On the Formal Essence of the Beatitude of the Future Life

We must suppose first that the formal Beatitude of the future life is not something created, such as that vision by which God beholds Himself. This conclusion, held by Capreolus, is most true and common. Proof: The formal Beatitude of the future life must be something inherent in the blessed person, by which he is formally called blessed. But the divine vision cannot inhere in the blessed, both because it is infinite while the blessed are finite, and because the divine vision is a substance — indeed God Himself — and therefore cannot inhere in the blessed person.

We must suppose second that the immediate inpouring of the divine essence into the soul of the blessed cannot constitute his formal Beatitude.

We must suppose third that formal Beatitude is not the substance of the blessed person, nor his natural potency, nor any habit inherent in it.

We must suppose fourth, as evidently following from the above, that supernatural formal Beatitude consists in some human operation — not a transient one that passes outside the person, but an immanent one remaining in the blessed person himself.

First Proposition: If Beatitude is taken in the former sense — for all that is found in formal Beatitude itself — it does not consist in the act of the intellect alone (the vision of God) but also in acts of the will, namely love of God and delight. This proposition is taken from various places in Sacred Scripture, in some of which the vision of God is placed in Beatitude, in others love or delight. The same doctrine is confirmed by reason: Beatitude taken in this way must embrace every perfection toward which the soul in life was striving and which it was asking God for with the highest desires and prayers.

Second Proposition: If formal Beatitude is taken precisely for what is essential, it consists in the act of the intellect alone.

Proof: The more probable opinion is that the formal essential Beatitude consists in the clear vision of God alone. Proof of the antecedent: once the blessed person has clearly seen the divine essence, God can prevent him from eliciting any act of the will — by withholding His concurrence without which no action can be exercised; but with the vision of God removed, no Beatitude would remain, because there would not only be no knowledge of God but no act of the will could be exercised either.

However, even the opinion that formal essential Beatitude consists simultaneously in acts of intellect and will — vision and love of God — is not improbable, and it easily resolves the objections raised against our opinion.

Section IV — On the Attributes of Beatitude

Question I — Does Rectitude of Will Belong to Beatitude as a Precondition?

The response is affirmative: the soul can never attain Beatitude unless it is entirely upright and purged of every stain and blemish of sin. This proposition is gathered from Sacred Scripture: Matthew 5, 'Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God'; Psalm 24, 'Who shall dwell in your tabernacle? The one who walks without blemish'; Isaiah 33, 'The way of holiness shall be there; the unclean shall not pass through it'; Apocalypse 21: 'Nothing defiled shall ever enter into it.'

From all of which the existence of Purgatory is not obscurely gathered. No one enters the kingdom of heaven unless freed from every debt of sin and purged of every vice. Since few depart this life so purged, either few will be saved (which should shake the confidence of the adversaries) or there must be some place of purgation.

Moral Digression — On Purgatory

Because this Purgation is so greatly displeasing to the heretics of our age, for whom the external form of things has always been more important than their substance, I shall form four arguments for Purgatory based on the testimonies of Sacred Scripture.

First argument: If beyond Paradise and Hell a third place is admitted where souls exist after separation from the body, then certainly Purgatory exists or the heretics must assign this other third place. The major premise is clear from the location of Paul (Philippians 2) and from John's confirmation by Psalm 113: 'The dead shall not praise You, O Lord, nor all who go down into hell.'

The resurrection of Lazarus must be carefully noted. Lazarus is called the same after death and after burial. Is he supported as one who is in Paradise? Certainly not, for he is supported who tends toward a goal; but whoever is in Paradise has already attained his goal. Is he one who is in Hell? This is certainly absurd, for the damned in Hell are so abandoned by God that He never extends helping hands to them for rising again; 'in Hell there is no redemption.' Therefore there appears sufficiently to be a third place after death, distinct from Paradise and Hell, in which souls receive assistance. Furthermore, the death of Lazarus is called sleep — and sleep is an image of death — yet in Paradise there is neither death nor the image of death, but perpetual life. Nor can this sleep be said of those who are in Hell, since in Hell death is eternal. Therefore this third place after death — namely Purgatory — must be admitted.

Second argument: If a distinction between temporal punishment and guilt is found in Sacred Scripture, then Purgatory is well-founded in Scripture. Such a distinction is evidently found there. The major premise is clear: if such a distinction exists, men may depart this life in three ways — without guilt or debt of any temporal punishment (to whom Paradise is owed), with guilt and debt of every punishment including temporal (who are to be dragged to Hell), or finally without guilt but with a debt of temporal punishment (about whom I ask whether they fly immediately to Heaven). If the latter is affirmed, divine justice is violated, giving the same reward to those who die without any debt of punishment and those who died still owing a temporal punishment. Or they must be cast into Hell — which would make God crueller still, who sentences to the

same eternal punishment those who die in the debt of temporal punishment and those who die in mortal sin.

Third argument: If a distinction between mortal and venial sin is found in Sacred Scripture, Purgatory exists. Such a distinction is indeed found there (Luke 6: the speck and the beam in the eye; Matthew 5: different sins deserving judgment, council, and the fire of Gehenna).

Fourth argument: If prayer for the dead is found in Sacred Scripture, Purgatory exists. Such prayer is found there (2 Maccabees 12: 'It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from sins'). This text is so explicit and clear that the heretics prefer to cast this book out of the canon of Sacred Scriptures rather than elude so open an authority. But it is truly canonical. Even if it were not found in the Hebrew canon, it would be wrong to reject it — otherwise we should equally reject the Gospel of Matthew, which Jerome testifies was written in Hebrew yet is not found in the Hebrew codex.

Article II — Does Rectitude of Will Belong to Beatitude as a Concomitant?

First Proposition: The blessed have, in their Beatitude, such a rectitude of will that they can in no way turn from the good or commit sin.

Second Proposition: The blessed obtain from the very force of their Beatitude their rectitude and impeccability of will.

Proof: The blessed, by the force of their Beatitude, have God present to them and set before them under every aspect of goodness and perfection, excluding every aspect of evil. Therefore the blessed who thus behold God are drawn by such necessity into love of Him that they cannot commit any evil whatsoever.

Final Proposition: The blessed cannot cease from the love of God.

Question II — Does Security Belong to Beatitude?

It is certain that there is no fear in the blessed about the loss of their Beatitude — otherwise they would not be perfectly at rest but might desire still more that security which would expel all fear. The difficulty is from where they receive such security.

Scotus responds most aptly (IV Sentences, dist. 49, q. 3): the blessed have such security from the revelation made to them by God, by which it is established for them concerning the perpetuity of their Beatitude. From the fact that by such revelation they understand that they will always remain in their Beatitude, they begin to be secure.

Moral Digression — On the Excellent Perfections of Beatitude

A beautiful reading of Psalm 74 ('The cup is in the hand of the Lord, full of mixed wine'): the cup signifies nothing other than the divine governance of the whole universe — kept with three fingers, that is, three virtues by which He governs the three kingdoms of the universe: with Goodness and Love He governs the first kingdom (the heavenly); with Justice, the second (the infernal); with Providence, the third (the earthly). In Heaven pure wine is found; in Hell its dregs; on earth a mixed wine.

The excellent perfections of Beatitude briefly listed: Life without death — 'the just shall live forever'; Day without night; Light without darkness — 'let perpetual light shine upon them'; Joy without sadness — 'God will wipe away every tear from their eyes'; Purity without defilement; Fullness without hunger; Abundance without want; Health without sickness; Peace without war; Rest without labour; Honour without disgrace; Every good without any evil.

Augustine (Soliloquies, ch. 35): 'Enter into joy without sadness, which contains all joy. There will be every good and no evil; there will be whatever you will and whatever you do not will will not exist; there will be a life that is vital, sweet, and loveable, ever memorable; there will be no attacking enemy, no enticement; but certain and supreme security, secure tranquillity, tranquil gladness, joyful happiness, happy eternity, eternal Beatitude, and the Beatitude of the Trinity, and the unity of the Trinity.'

Question III & Final — Does Beatitude of Soul Overflow into the Body?

All theologians agree that the body shares in merit with the soul and so shares with it in the reward. The soul's reward is the vision of God, from which love and delight follow, as stated above. The body's reward consists in four perfections which are commonly called the endowments of the glorified body: clarity (by which bodies will be so illuminated that they will not only rival but far surpass the brightness of the stars), impassibility (the quality by which the body will be able to protect itself from every injury), agility (the quality inhering in the glorified body by which it will swiftly move from one place to another), and subtlety (which gives the body the power to penetrate another or to exist in the same place with it).

The Posterior Part of the Moral Work: On the Means Conducing to the Ultimate End

Preface

After labour there is rest; after agitation, tranquillity; after storm, calm; after conflict, victory; after victory, the verdant palm of glory. The life of man is perpetual labour, a continual storm, an ever-present tumult; yet the victory is doubtful while the palm of victory once won is most certain. Therefore in forming the image of supreme Beatitude above, we have placed our labour in the service of those who labour and contend in the tempestuous sea of the passions — so that, toiling now in the contest against the monsters of the vices, we may strive to demonstrate more care than others, and that we may at last win that victory which has been the cause of victories won by others, and secure for them and others the common palm of victory and glory forever.

Because this part's doctrine is copious, for the sake of clarity we shall divide it into two general treatises. The former will be on the principles of human actions — the intellect and the will — and the human actions and passions themselves. The latter will contain the disputations on habits and virtues.

Prior Treatise — On the Principles of Human Actions, Human Actions, and the Passions

Disputation I — On the Principles of Human Actions: the Intellect and the Will

Section I — On the Name and Existence of Intellect and Will

The existence of the intellect and will is admitted by all, as experience proves. Properly speaking, the intellect is distinguished from the will in that the intellect is the faculty ordered to perceiving truth, while the will is destined for the goodness proposed to it by the intellect. Other differences between these faculties will become clearer below.

Section III — On the Essence of Intellect and Will

Question I — On the Essence of the Intellect

The intellect may be defined as follows: the intellect is the spiritual faculty of the rational soul, occupied with the intelligible. It is placed first as a genus under which the intellect agrees with the will and other sensitive faculties. 'Spiritual' is added to distinguish it from the sensitive faculties in man, such as sight, hearing, and the like. Finally, 'occupied with the intelligible' is placed to declare the proper function of the intellect, which is to be occupied with every intelligible thing, whether singular or universal, true or false. Just as the will is occupied with good in pursuing it and with evil in fleeing it, so too the intellect is occupied with the true in assenting and with the false in dissenting.

Question II — Is There Truly and Properly Free Will?

This question is treated in various places: in Logic on the book of interpretation regarding future contingents; in Physics toward the end of the books on the soul; and here in Ethics, insofar as freedom is proper to all actions that merit praise or blame. In order that its proper nature may appear, we must first see how it is distinguished from the voluntary and the spontaneous.

The voluntary and spontaneous are used in many ways. Most broadly: whatever proceeds from the natural inclination of anything (and thus is found not only in brutes but also in inanimate things, inasmuch as they by a certain natural weight incline toward their own good — as a stone toward the centre, fire toward the concave of the moon). In a stricter sense: whatever proceeds from the will, whether or not it is for the time being determined to act. In the strictest sense: what proceeds from the will when it is indifferent and can turn itself to either side — in which sense an action is called voluntary because the person can from innate freedom perform or not perform it.

From this it follows that there is freedom of choice, against Luther and his followers. It is certain that we do many things which, from our innate freedom, could have not been done by us. If freedom were removed, virtues ordered to determining the will to elicit honest acts would perish; all counsels, exhortations, laws, rewards, and the like would collapse — things which are admitted only insofar as they are useful for moving the will

to determine itself to this or that, to which it was previously indifferent and perfectly free.

First Proposition: The will is not free with the freedom of contrariety.

Second Proposition: In the will there is no freedom of contradiction regarding the good proposed to it according to every aspect of goodness.

Final Proposition: The will remains free with the freedom of contradiction regarding every created good and whatever in itself does not encompass every aspect of goodness.

Section IV — On the Attributes of Intellect and Will

Question I — On the Attributes of the Intellect

The principal attribute of the intellect is that it moves the will. From this arise two chief difficulties. The first: whether for the intellect to move the will is for it to concur efficiently toward producing the act of the will. The second: whether it is sufficient for the intellect to move the will merely to propose to it the nature of the object speculatively, or whether the proposal must be practical — that is, showing the object's goodness and suitability.

First Proposition: For the intellect to move the will is not for it to concur efficiently toward producing the act of the will.

Second Proposition: For the intellect to move the will is not merely to propose the nature of the object speculatively but practically — showing its goodness and suitability.

Third Proposition: It is sufficient for the intellect to move the will that it proposes the object to it conditionally as to be embraced.

Final Proposition: In the given sense, the will can remain indifferent with respect to some good proposed to it practically by the intellect, insofar as another practical judgment of the intellect not to pursue this same object may come to it while it is suspending its act from the prior practical proposal; for then it may follow that newly arriving judgment.

Question II — On the Attributes of the Will

The first and chief attribute of the will is that it always tends toward the good and cannot desire evil as evil. Other attributes of greater moment follow.

The first is whether the will wills only the end or also means. The response, with Thomas Aquinas (I–II, q. 5, a. 2): the will can tend both toward the end and toward means — it can simultaneously will the end and the means.

The second attribute is whether the same act of the will by which it tends toward the end and means is the same, or whether it wills means and end by the same volition. After careful consideration, the response is: it is certain that the will can will an end without the volition of means (as when a sick man has a simple affective desire for health but does not yet will the necessary means to recover it). It is also certain that the will can have a prior act for the end and then a subsequent one for the means. In the efficacious volition of the end, at least virtually and interpretively, there is included the volition of means.

Disputation II — On Human Actions

Section I — On Human Actions in General

A human act in the broadest sense includes every action that proceeds from any faculty of the human being at all, whether it proceeds from the will as eliciting or commanding — such as all acts of the will and all those done by its command (the movement of a foot, the raising of a hand, and the like) — or those that are not done by the will and are not subject to its command, such as nutrition and growth in man.

Again, an act elicited from the will may be necessary (which is done without deliberation and necessarily, such as the love of God in the blessed) or free (which is done with deliberation and indifference, such as an affection for disciplines).

On the Moral Goodness and Evil of Human Actions

Two kinds of goodness are to be considered in human actions: entitative goodness (which belongs to all things insofar as they are beings) and moral goodness (which belongs to things conformed to right reason and to actions exercised according to the rule of right reason). Actions are called morally evil when some perfection is lacking which should be present according to right reason.

First Proposition: Human actions do not derive their moral goodness from the object considered with respect to its entitative goodness but only with respect to its moral goodness.

Second Proposition: The moral goodness and evil of human actions are derived from the same circumstances.

Section II — On Human Actions in Particular

Question I — On Voluntary and Involuntary Action

Voluntary action sometimes is taken so broadly as to signify every action proceeding from the proper inclination of a thing (as the descent of a stone toward the centre). Sometimes so narrowly as to designate only free action. Sometimes, properly, for that action done by the will without any force or compulsion — in which sense the action by which the blessed love God can also be called voluntary, because the blessed are not compelled by anyone to elicit such an act of love; and to this voluntary action its opposite — involuntary — is opposed, which Aristotle (Ethics III, ch. 1) defines as that whose principle is external and not in the one who acts. Aristotle constitutes two kinds of involuntary action: one from pure coercion (done by force and violence inflicted), and one from ignorance (when something is done from ignorance). On both kinds of involuntary action certain difficulties are briefly to be addressed.

First Proposition: No violence can render an elicited act of the will involuntary.

Second Proposition: Acts commanded by the will, as commanded, cannot be involuntary.

Third Proposition: Sometimes concupiscence or passions of the appetite do not make an action involuntary — indeed, they more often on the contrary increase the voluntary.

Fourth Proposition: Violent passions that disturb the free use of reason sometimes make an action involuntary in a qualified sense.

Fifth Proposition: Antecedent ignorance, altogether invincible and the cause of the act done, makes the act completely involuntary.

Sixth Proposition: Ignorance that is antecedent to an act and vincible makes it not voluntary but still not simply involuntary, because though it does not make the act proceed from deliberate will, it does not make it contrary to the natural inclination of the will.

Seventh Proposition: Ignorance of perverted disposition that is willed and consequent can be said to be quasi-subsequent to the will's affection, and makes the act voluntary.

Final Proposition: Antecedent and crass ignorance does not make the act simply voluntary because what is done from ignorance is not judged to be from deliberate will, but it makes it voluntary in a qualified sense.

Disputation III — On the Passions or Disturbances of the Soul

Section I — On the Passions of the Soul in General

Question I — On the Name and Various Acceptations of Passion

The word 'passion' derives from the fact that passion makes its subject to suffer. It is used in many ways. First: for any property, in which sense we say that risibility — the capacity for laughter — is a passion proper to man. Second: for that light and transient quality that affects a subject and brings about equality in it, which is of the same nature as the passive quality. Third: for the reception of some form in a subject from which the subject is said to suffer, as wood from the reception of heat. Fourth and most relevant to our purposes: for the emotion of the sensitive appetite, which when so taken is also called 'perturbation,' and is defined by John of Damascus (Of the Orthodox Faith, II, ch. 22) as a sensible motion of the soul from the imagination of good or evil — that is, a motion by which a good perceived by the imagination is sought as fitting, and an evil apprehended by the imagination is rejected.

Question II — On the Existence of Passion and Related Matters

The existence of passion is supposed, as experience sufficiently proves. As for the efficient cause of the passions, the response is: the soul is the principal cause; the sensitive appetite is the instrumental cause, excited to love of a thing by its beauty as proposed to it; the cause moving is the good perceived in the thing to be loved; and the conditional cause is the very apprehension of that good.

Regarding how these passions arise: the heart of the animal is set in perpetual motion of contraction and dilation, and passions arise with various transmutations of the heart — when it does not preserve the due mean and measure but departs from it, either by excess (when it dilates or contracts more than is right) or by defect (when it dilates and contracts less than it should). Joy arises when the heart dilates much; sadness when it contracts much; anger when there is a great ebullition of blood around the heart. The passions are divided according to the twofold appetite: the concupiscible (directed toward good absolutely taken) and the irascible (occupied with good that is arduous and difficult). The six passions of the concupiscible appetite are: Love, Hatred, Desire, Flight, Joy, and Sadness. The five passions of the irascible appetite are: Hope, Despair, Fear, Boldness, and Anger.

Questions III — On the Essence and Attributes of the Passions

The Stoics defined passion variously: as a commotion contrary to the nature of the soul; as a disturbance adverse to right reason; as a violent and turbulent motion of the soul. From these they inferred that the passions cannot fall upon the soul of a wise man. More appropriately it is defined as follows: passion is an action of the sensitive appetite regarding good and evil perceived by sense and imagination, with some deformation of the body.

The first attribute of the passions is their moral goodness or evil. It must be noted that we are speaking of transcendent goodness, which belongs to every being as being — it is certain that the passions are good in this way as beings; but only of moral goodness and in the order of right reason, whether the passions are good as conforming to right reason or evil as dissenting from it. The response: passions excited in the sensitive appetite can have some moral goodness or evil extrinsically by reason of the will consenting to them. This response combats the Stoics, who entirely defended that these passions are evil and should be expelled from the souls of the wise; it is, however, in agreement with Augustine's doctrine (City of God XIV, ch. 8): 'Both the good and the bad desire, fear, rejoice, and grieve — but the former do so well, the latter badly, just as a person's will, whether upright or perverted, is.'

Section II — On the Passions in Particular

Question I — On Love and Hatred

Article I — On the Name and Various Acceptations of Love

The name of love is ambiguous; and so to be understood, it must first be distinguished from those with which it is linked by bonds of affinity — namely friendship, affection (dilectio), and charity. From friendship, in that friendship is a habit arising from confirmed love between two, while love is an act of the will by which one tends toward the thing loved. From affection and charity, in that love is broader, since affection presupposes election (as the name implies) while love does not presuppose it; and charity indicates not love but the perfection of love, or that the thing loved is dear and held in great esteem.

Again, the name of love is taken in two ways. Broadly: for any natural inclination toward good, in which sense three types are identified: natural love (which belongs even to inanimate things insofar as they tend toward the good connatural to their nature), sensitive love (common to all animals), and rational love (in rational creatures insofar as they tend toward good apprehended as congruent and suitable). Strictly: for sensitive love alone, which resides in the appetite — and it is in this sense that we use it here, as the first of all the passions.

Article II — On the Existence of Love

That love exists, experience attests by the countless people who have felt its power. The celebrated division of love among theologians — especially Thomas Aquinas (I–II, q. 25, a. 4) — is into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. Love of friendship is that by which we love a thing for its own sake and for its own perfection, in which way the just are said to love God in heaven, following Him with just love for the infinite perfection

they discover in Him. Love of concupiscence is that by which we love a thing not simply for its own sake, but for our own sake or insofar as it seems useful to us — in which way we love a horse because we judge it useful for making a journey.

To this twofold love there correspond two opposite types of hatred: hatred of enmity (by which we pursue something solely from its own displeasure, even though it cannot harm us) and hatred of abomination (by which we wish evil to another because we judge that person to be our enemy and from whom we expect much harm).

On the Causes of Love

Since love is represented by poets as a certain blind divinity, because it casts various and very difficult fires into the minds of men, I think it will be pleasing to everyone if I inquire more diligently into the causes of love, so that having learned through what wounds it usually strikes, we may cure them with appropriate remedies — thus learning how to be healed through what we have learned to love, one hand bringing both the wound and its help.

The efficient cause of love really influencing its production is twofold: principal (the soul) and instrumental (the sensitive appetite excited to love of a thing by its beauty as proposed to it, and likewise the eyes — for 'the eyes are leaders in love').

The moving cause is the good found in the loveable thing, by reason of which it calls and draws the lover — since, as Augustine says (On the Trinity VIII, chs. 3–4), nothing is loved except the good. Of the same genus of cause is beauty, which if more than reasonably separated from good is an error — for good is said to be what is suitable absolutely, while beautiful is what is so suitable that the appetite entirely rests in its contemplation.

The third cause is the knowledge of the loveable object, since it is impossible for the goodness in a loveable object to move the appetite and excite it to love unless it is first known — as the saying goes: 'No desire for the unknown.'

The fourth cause is similarity between lovers, as Aristotle teaches (Magna Moralia VII, ch. 4): 'Like rejoices in like, and man is most pleasant to man.' And Seneca (Letter 96): 'Nature made us related, having generated us from the same elements.'

The fifth cause is love itself, as Seneca elegantly teaches (Letter 9): 'If you wish to be loved, love.' And Scripture confirms (1 John 4): 'We love God because He first loved us.'

Article III — On the Essence of Love

Many have said marvellous things about the essence of love. Some said it was a certain appetition of the good and beautiful; others, that it is concupiscence, which has an easy entry but a slow exit. Most aptly of all love is defined as: a passion of the sensitive appetite by which it tends toward the good proposed to it as suitable through the imagination.

Article IV — On the Attributes of Love

The first attribute or effect of love is that it unites the lover with the thing loved — as Augustine says (On the Trinity VIII, ch. 10): 'Love is a kind of junction, coupling two things or desiring to couple them.' The reason is that when someone is seized by love of another, he seems transformed into his nature — holding him as another self and as dear as half of his own soul.

The second effect of love is that it makes the beloved perpetually present to the lover. Chrysostom (Homily 86 on John ch. 20): 'So great is love that it makes us see daily not only those present but also those absent whom we love — for the great power of love neglects all else in order to gather the soul to the beloved.' If we thus loved Christ, all human things would seem to us shadow, image, and smoke.

The third effect is ecstasy — a kind of being placed outside oneself, or alienation from oneself, so that one is entirely in the beloved, either in thought (when one always thinks of the beloved) or in affection (when the affection of the lover is always drawn toward the beloved). In this sense Dionysius (On the Divine Names, ch. 4) says that the divine love makes ecstasy, and that for love God has suffered ecstasy — because, being by His nature immortal and impassible, by the love with which He has embraced creatures and especially men, He has deigned to die and to subject Himself to the gravest and most bitter passions.

The fourth attribute or effect of love is jealousy — a certain vehemence of love by reason of which the lover strives to remove all things that impede the attainment of the beloved and could be displeasing to it.

The final effect is a certain natural infirmity arising from the fact that the lover, being entirely occupied with the beloved thing, does not take sufficient care to take nourishment to refresh his natural powers — hence pallor, languor, and very many other natural weaknesses. To avoid these, receive these remedies for love: The first is that we resist love at its beginnings (as Ovid teaches in his Remedies of Love). The second is carefully to consider all the disadvantages arising from this passion of love when no measure is set on it. The third is to avert the senses from that object which excites perverted and inordinate love. The fourth is to sedulously take care to keep the mind occupied with serious things and free from idleness.

Question II — On Desire and Flight

Desire (concupiscence) is an action of the concupiscible appetite toward the absent good, but one easy to acquire. Desire is defined as a passion or motion of the sensitive appetite regarding an absent good. It differs from love, which relates not only to absent but also to present good; and from Joy, which relates only to obtained and possessed good.

The causes of desire are: the soul as principal cause; the sensitive appetite as instrumental; the goodness of the desired thing, and the apprehension of that goodness, as conditional and motive causes of the appetite. Regarding the attributes or effects of this passion, they are not unlike those conceded to love above.

Moral Digression — On Fulfilling True Desire

The bride in the Canticles (ch. 7) invites her companions: 'Arise, let us go out and see if the vine has flowered, if the flowers are bearing fruit.' You see not only flowers here but also fruit — why? Because the flowers designate good desires, which are not sufficient unless joined to good works. As a tree that bears only flowers and no fruit after the flowers is reprobate, so is the soul reprobate that bears flowers of desires but does not bear fruits of works. The soul should not be like Martha troubled about many things but like Mary, occupied with the one thing that shall not be taken from her — to desire the one thing, lest the flower be without fruit, so that one must put one's hand to work and join work to desire, so that through desire we carry Christ in our heart and through work bear Him in our hands.

Question III — On Joy and Sadness

Article I — On Joy

Joy, otherwise called delight, gladness, pleasure, and enjoyment, is taken in two ways. Broadly: including every gladness perceived from an obtained good, whether in the will or only in the sensitive appetite. Strictly: only for what resides in the sensitive appetite. The causes of joy are principally: beauty, the good, the variety of things (since nature is said commonly to rejoice in variety), similarity (since 'like rejoices in like'), hope and memory of the good.

Regarding the essence of Joy, it may be explained by this definition: Joy is a passion of the sensitive appetite resting in the possessed good. Properly speaking, to rejoice is nothing other than to rest with satiety in the good.

The attributes of Joy: it moves to laughter (from which laughter is commonly considered a sign of gladness); it preserves the health of the body by expelling cares, anxieties, melancholic humor, and other such things most adverse to good bodily constitution; it serves as a stimulus for desire and irritates thirst — for the joy experienced in the soul (provided it is not altogether complete) is rather an incentive for greater desire and for obtaining more perfect good than a perfect rest.

Article II — On Sadness

Sadness is the opposite of delight. It is taken in two ways: broadly (including sadness in the will and sadness in the sensitive appetite) and strictly (for that particular sadness residing in the sensitive appetite by which the appetite itself avers a present evil, whether in reality or in apprehension).

The various causes of sadness: first, the non-attainment of the good desired or its delay ('Hope deferred afflicts the soul,' Proverbs 13); second, the loss of what was possessed; third, a present evil in act or apprehension; fourth, love itself which, when it does not attain what follows, becomes a source of great sadness; fifth, desire frustrated; sixth, the body's own temperament.

Sadness generally harms both body and soul. The remedies against sadness: First, if oppressed by heavy sadness, give yourself to sleep. Second, think little of what has happened and frequently repeat that verse of Juvenal: 'Pain ought not to be greater than a man, nor the wound to last.' Third, divert thought from the evil causing sadness and turn it to the goods you now enjoy or whose possession you promise yourself. Fourth, consider that the evil which has come has come to provide testimony of the most

illustrious virtues such as patience, constancy, and greatness of soul. Fifth, persuade yourself that the sadness conceived about that evil profits absolutely nothing but rather increases the evil itself and miserably destroys the one oppressed by it. Sixth, premeditate that the evil which has come could have come, and indeed according to God's ordinary providence should have come — and thus you will easily appease your grief at its arrival, for 'the foreseen blow of evil comes more softly' (Seneca, Letter 77), whence the proverb 'Foreseen darts wound less.'

Question IV — On Hope and Despair

Hope is sometimes taken broadly so as to include every affection for future good; sometimes strictly for that passion alone of the irascible sensitive appetite.

The efficient cause of Hope: the soul as principal cause; the irascible sensitive appetite as instrumental; the good apprehended as arduous as the moving cause. The preserving cause of Hope from the side of the subject may be added as the lack of experience in particular undertakings — whence we hope for everything and promise ourselves everything arduous will come to us. Aristotle (Rhetoric II, ch. 12) therefore says that young men are well-hoping, because from lack of experience in particular undertakings they imprudently promise themselves that golden mountains will come to them while they sleep.

Hope has a particular and chief effect: it makes action prompt and eager. If we hope to obtain something, quicker and keener labour is spent in attaining it; but if no hope entices us, we quickly lose heart and neglect to apply any effort.

Despair, opposed to Hope, can be sufficiently understood once it is well explained. One peculiar doubt it has attached to it: whether it is truly of good alone or also of evil. The response: despair is materially of good and formally of evil. It is materially of good because the material of despair is some good to be acquired. It is formally of evil because despair is a certain flight and aversion tending toward evil — namely toward not pursuing, which is a privation of some goodness, namely the pursuit of that good.

Question V — On Boldness and Fear

Article I — On Boldness

Boldness (audacia) is taken in two ways — broadly for every action regarding the acquisition of arduous good (and thus divided into boldness of the rational appetite and of the sensitive appetite), and strictly for the sole action of the irascible sensitive appetite by which it tends toward the acquisition of future good it has hoped for, and therefore wishes to overcome all difficulties impeding the attainment of that good.

Two causes are recognised: first, an abundance of heat in the heart (for those who abound much in heat in the heart are usually more inclined to boldness and to the undertaking of dangers); second, a good hope conceived of attaining the good and winning the difficulties that make it arduous. Hence Aristotle says that those are bolder who undertake dangers for a just cause and are well disposed toward God — because they much more certainly hope that divine help will not be wanting to them, so that what they undertake justly they may gloriously complete.

The effect of boldness is trembling and coldness in the members — experience sufficiently proves this.

Article II — On Fear

Fear is taken in two ways: broadly for every action by which we dread an imminent evil difficult to avoid (pertaining to both the rational and irrational appetite); strictly for the sole action of the sensitive irrational appetite, by which it fears a future and imminent evil — as Augustine says (Book of 83 Questions, q. 33): 'No fear is anything but of future and imminent evil.'

The cause of fear is the thing itself, lest while it is had it be lost, or while hoped for it may not at all be obtained. No one doubts, as Augustine says, that there is no other cause of fear than that what we love, having been obtained, we may lose, or not obtain when hoped for. In this case fear is greatest in those of depraved conscience — they doubt of divine help and undertake nothing without fear, as Job says of the impious man: 'The noise of terror is always in his ears, and though there is peace he suspects ambushes.' And Cicero (For Milo): 'Great is the force of conscience — in both directions, so that those who have committed nothing fear it, and those who have done wrong see punishment always before their eyes.'

The remedies for fear: First, diligently lay aside or at least diminish the opinion of future and imminent evil — persuading yourself that the evil from which fear was conceived is

not a real evil but only an imagined one, or at least not as great as we apprehend it, or if it is great, perhaps it will not come. Second, unite ourselves as much as possible in spirit with God, for all security is born from there, as the Psalm says: 'Those who trust in the Lord shall be like Mount Sion: they cannot be shaken.'

Moral Digression — On Fear of God

Vanity drives you to fear everything — even the shadows of trees! Fear one thing, God — and beyond this you will fear nothing. 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. The fear of the Lord: every man' (Ecclesiastes 12: 'Fear God and keep His commandments, for this is every man's duty').

The philosophers labour to assign the essence of man. To place it in beauty — this is not right, for man's beauty will never equal the beauty of the peacock. To place it in strength, as soldiers do — this is inconvenient, for man's strength will never be equal to the strength of the lion or the elephant. To place it in riches, as the wealthy do — this is absurd, for even if men should abound in riches as much as possible, their riches will never be comparable to the riches of the earth. To place it in length and duration — this agrees little with reason, for this life will never be compared in duration to that of the crow or the stag. Where then is it to be placed? In that which is rational animal, says the philosopher. And I say more: in that which fears God — 'Fear God and keep His commandments, for this is every man's duty.'

Final Question — On Anger

Anger is taken broadly for every action concerning vengeance, and it thus includes both the rational and the irrational appetite. Strictly: for the sole action of the irascible sensitive appetite desiring vengeance. Taken in this latter sense, anger has three species: 'fel' (anger that immediately blazes up), 'mania' (anger that is inveterate and fixed in the appetite), and 'furor' (anger that denies all rest until vengeance is taken for the injury suffered).

The effects of anger are many: delight if joined to vengeance; palpitation of the heart, ebullition of blood around the heart, tremor of the body, impediment of the tongue,

flushing of the face, aggravation of the eyes, and others. As Chrysostom rightly says (Homily 3 on John): 'As soon as anger has seethed around the heart, it emits fire; the whole face is inflated; hands move in an undignified manner; feet leap ridiculously.'

Remedies against anger: First, when someone is disturbed by anger, let him diligently think that the injury done to him is less than it appears — as Plutarch says (On Restraining Anger): 'Just as objects appear larger through a cloud, so through anger they appear larger than they really are.' Second, think that the injury inflicted redounds more upon its author than upon himself. Third, consider how many labyrinths of misery anger hurls one into, so much so that it takes away our ability to pour forth prayers to God — for the angry cannot safely use these words of the Lord's Prayer: 'Forgive us our debts.'

Final Disputation — On the Virtues

Section I — On Habits

Questions I & II — On the Name and Existence of Habits

The name of habit in this place is used for quality of the first species, which Aristotle numbers in his Categories in the chapter on quality. A habit taken in the sense used here means habilitas — that is, readiness and facility for acting — and is rightly so called, since a habit is ordered to this end: to confer on a faculty promptitude and facility for acting, as will become clear below.

That habits truly exist is established by experience: everyone commonly says they have acquired a habit when they easily and promptly execute something in which they previously experienced some difficulty. It is also established by reason: our faculties are in themselves indeterminate to exercise their acts rightly and easily — for example, the will is in itself indifferent to eliciting rightly, promptly, and promptly the act of temperance, fortitude, or any other virtue. Therefore something must be admitted in them by which they are determined to acting well or badly.

Articles II–V — On the Division, Subject, Efficient Cause, and Corruption of Habits

The first division of habits is into infused (conceded to us by God without our operation, such as faith, hope, charity) and acquired (obtained by our own labour, such as the art of painting and playing the lute).

The second division is into material (which is received in some material and corporeal subject) and immaterial (received in the immaterial potencies of the rational soul — the intellect and the will).

The third is into practical (ordered to a work, whether external or internal) and speculative (referring only to knowledge).

The fourth is into good (virtues) and bad (vices).

The proper subject of habits: the will can be the proximate subject of habits. Proof: what requires no other intermediary subject to acquire facility in acting and is determined by it to acting well or badly is the proximate subject. And the will acquires no other intermediary subject to facility in acting and is determined by it to acting well or badly, as experience teaches. Therefore the will is the proximate subject of habits.

The efficient cause of acquired habits is acts. So Aristotle (Ethics II, ch. 1): 'Just as builders become builders by building and lute players become lute players by playing the lute, so by doing just acts we become just, by doing temperate acts temperate, by doing brave acts brave.' Proof by reason: that which efficiently concurs toward the production of a habit is that which efficiently concurs toward the production of some facility in a faculty. And acts efficiently concur toward the production of such facility for acting in a faculty — as Aristotle's most clear experience testifies.

Corruption of habits: Opposed matters, treated in the same place, mutually explain each other. Habits are corrupted either per se (when corrupted by contrary acts) or per accidens (when the subject is corrupted or when the preserving cause is lacking). Habits are not corrupted by the sole cessation from act, but only per accidens: for if you abstain from the act of some habit (for example temperance) for a long time, it will happen incidentally that room is given to various passions by which at length intemperance will be generated — and consequently the previously acquired habit of temperance will be corrupted.

Questions III–V — On the Essence, Excellence, and Augmentation of Habits

The definition of habit from Logic: 'A habit is a quality joined to a natural potency so that it may operate more suitably and easily.' If such promptitude is communicated to the faculty for acting — which expels all difficulty — that will be habit in the special sense, distinguished from disposition (which confers neither all-round facility for acting nor inheres so firmly in its subject).

Whether a habit is better than an act: The habit and the act mutually surpass each other. The habit surpasses the act in that it is more lasting; the act surpasses the habit in that the habit is ordered to the act as to its end, and the end excels all that is ordered to it. For the rest, the act is also a cause of the habit, and a cause may be nobler than its effect.

Whether a single act suffices for generating a habit: Habits, if taken broadly as including also disposition, can be generated by a single act. But habits strictly as such — as having a most firm inherence in the subject — are not acquired by a single act. As Aristotle testifies (Ethics I): 'Just as one swallow does not make spring, so neither does one act make the whole habit.'

Whether habit is the efficient cause of act: The habit efficiently concurs toward the substance of the act, so that it is produced. This is the teaching of Aristotle and Augustine. Proof: Whatever is efficient toward the production of some facility in a faculty is efficient toward the production of an act; and the habit efficiently concurs toward the production of the facility, as will immediately be proven.

Section II — On the Habits of the Intellect

Question I — On Understanding

Understanding (intelligentia) — called by others 'intellect' — is nothing other than the power by whose benefit the intellect is occupied with the first and most known principles. It is twofold: one simple and non-complex, which is occupied with the first simple principles and essences of things perceived by the first operation of the mind; another called complex, which is occupied with complex principles or general self-evident axioms ('Everything either is or is not').

Whether understanding is distinguished from the intellect itself:

The response, against most, is negative — that Understanding is really the same intellect, insofar as it is occupied with the knowledge of the first principles.

Question II — On Wisdom

The name of Wisdom is sometimes used improperly, sometimes properly. Improperly: insofar as it includes every art and every discipline in some eminent state of possession — in which way whoever is most skilled in his art is called wise in it (a wise painter, a wise architect, etc.). Properly used: Wisdom signifies that habit of the mind which is occupied with the contemplation of the highest things and relies on the firmest and most certain principles — such as Metaphysics, according to Aristotle and all philosophers.

Thus taken, Wisdom is a habit of the mind, distinguished first from Understanding in that Understanding is occupied only in the knowledge of the first principles, while Wisdom is occupied with the highest things to be demonstrated through such first principles.

Question III — On Art

The name of Art is taken by philosophers in many ways. First: for any industry and virtue of making, in which way we say all divine things were constructed by Art. Second: for any certain knowledge conducive to some end useful for life. Third: for any discipline, including the special sciences. Fourth: strictly for the effective art alone, or that which after the action leaves a work — as architecture. Fifth and most properly: the name of Art is taken for that habit occupied with some external and singular material, whether a work remains after the action (architecture) or not (the art of dancing and lute playing).

Question IV — On Prudence

Articles I–IV — On the Name, Existence, Essence, and Attributes of Prudence

The name of Prudence is used in many ways. First: for that sagacity and natural foresight granted by nature to most animals for inquiring into means toward an end — in which way ants are not unreasonably said to be prudent, because they collect grain in summer to feed on in winter. Second: for that sagacity and cleverness one can acquire by diligent effort in finding means to reach some end — and this is either perfect prudence (when the end is good and in accordance with right reason) or imperfect prudence (such as possessed by the thief who prudently knows how to use time, place, and offered occasions for committing theft).

That Prudence exists is attested and confirmed by both prudent and imprudent people, by the honours conferred on prudent men and the losses the imprudent incur. The definition of Prudence from Aristotle (Ethics VI, ch. 5): 'Prudence is a habit with true reason, active regarding things good or bad for man.' 'Habit' is placed as genus; 'with true reason' distinguishes it from habits always false such as error and heresy, and from arts strictly taken which are occupied with making (leaving a work after their action). 'Active regarding things good or bad for man' — that is, regarding those by which man is habitually held morally good or bad.

The integral parts of Prudence: memory (the recollection of past things); understanding (here taken not for the habit of first principles but for the knowledge of singular and doable things); docility (a virtue by whose benefit a prudent man patiently and attentively understands opposing opinions and their reasons, so that after diligently weighing them he may prescribe what is to be done or avoided); shrewdness (the virtue by which a prudent man suddenly devises means for attaining a proposed end); foresight (the virtue by which a prudent man takes care to think diligently about future things, to compare them with present and past things); circumspection (the virtue by which we turn our attention to the circumstances of the proposed matter); and caution (by which a prudent man can remove the obstacles that occur around an undertaking and free himself from them).

On the potential parts of Prudence: Prudence, like all the Cardinal Virtues (Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice), has parts in a triple genus: integrating parts (explained above); subjective parts (which are species of Prudence itself); and potential parts. The latter are three: Eubulia (refers to finding means), Synesis (to judging well of those things determined by some law), and Gnome (to making judgments about those things not determined by any law yet coming into practice — such as whether a sword must be given back to a man who has gone mad, when this is not defined by any law).

Section III & Last — On the Habits of the Will or Moral Virtues

Question I — On Moral Virtues in General

Articles I–III — On the Name, Existence, and Essence of Moral Virtue

Virtue generically (including both Moral and Intellectual) is said by some to be derived from vis (force), because it confers force and robustness on its subject; others believe virtue is named from vir (man), because it generates that constancy and firmness which befits a perfect man.

Moral virtue is used in two ways: more broadly for any habit contributing to the moral good of man (in which sense Prudence is also called a moral virtue); more strictly and properly for that habit residing in the will and inclining it to morally good actions — such as justice and other habits of the will.

First Proposition*: No Moral Virtue is innate in us by nature, but — with us disposed to receive it and carrying its seeds — it is introduced.*

This whole proposition is affirmed by Aristotle (Ethics II, ch. 1) and proved by two arguments. First: what is innate by nature is acquired by no use and no custom, nor can it go to the opposite — as the power of seeing downward in a stone, which no custom can change so that the stone is accustomed to ascend upward. But virtues have their increase from custom and through it are turned to various sides, as is proved by induction. Second: for things given us by nature, the faculties are prior to the acts; but we have acts of the virtues before habits — since every habit is acquired through various and frequently repeated acts.

Second Proposition*: All Moral Virtues reside in the will as in their proper subject.*

The definition of Moral Virtue from Aristotle (Ethics II, ch. 6): 'Moral virtue is an elective habit consisting in the mean relative to us, as the prudent man will determine.' 'Habit' is placed as genus; 'elective' is added to distinguish it from intellectual virtues which are not called elective habits, since they do not reside in the will. 'Consisting in the mean' distinguishes it from vicious habits, which remain in the extremes, whether by excess (as prodigality) or by defect (as avarice). 'Relative to us' is added so that we know the mean of virtue is not arithmetic but geometric and relative to us. Finally 'as the prudent man will determine' is added so that the firmest bond of all moral virtues with

Prudence is recognised.

On whether moral virtue essentially consists in a mean: Aristotle (Ethics II, chs. 7–8) shows by expressing that virtue is always placed between two vicious extremes — liberality between prodigality and avarice; fortitude between timidity and rashness. Virtue is therefore a mean between two vicious extremes, but not in the arithmetic mean of the thing — since as Aristotle testifies (Ethics II, ch. 8), it approaches more one extreme than the other (fortitude is closer to boldness than to timidity). It is therefore the geometric mean, relative to us.

First Proposition*: Justice does not consist in a mean — that is, justice is not a mean between two extremes.*

Second Proposition*: Moral virtue does not consist in the mean of the thing, or the arithmetic mean.*

Third Proposition*: Every moral virtue other than justice consists in the geometric mean relative to us and relative to reason.*

On whether the habit of moral virtue is essentially good: Duns Scotus denies this, contending that the same habit is essentially indifferent — it becomes good when joined with right reason, bad when it rises against the rule of right reason. But we, with Thomas Aquinas (I–II, q. 55, a. 3), defend that the habit of moral virtue is essentially good. Proof from Aristotle's most apt definition: 'Moral virtue is an elective habit consisting in the mean relative to us.' Such a habit is essentially good and ordered toward good — namely what is prescribed by the prudent man through reason.

Article Last — On the Attributes of Moral Virtues

Various are the attributes of moral virtues, such as that they adorn their subject and are appetible to the rational appetite. The peculiar difficulty is about the connection of the moral virtues themselves among themselves.

On whether moral virtues are necessarily connected: Prudence in its imperfect state is not necessarily connected with the other moral virtues. Proof: Imperfect prudence is nothing other than a practical judgment of the intellect about things to be done or avoided; and such a judgment can be given without moral virtues, since these are in the will which can resist the practical judgment of the intellect prescribing according to the rules of prudence.

Moral virtues in their perfect state necessarily suppose Prudence at least in its imperfect state; but those same moral virtues taken in their perfect or heroic state suppose Prudence in the same state, and are thus necessarily connected with it.

Final Proposition: Moral virtues in their perfect or heroic state are necessarily connected with each other. Proof: Every moral virtue in its perfect or heroic state so presupposes Prudence in its perfect or heroic state that it cannot subsist without it; therefore it cannot be had without all the other moral virtues with which Prudence is necessarily connected in that state.

Moral Digression — On the Commendation of Virtue

That well-known saying of Plato, approved and praised by many, was that commonwealths would at last be happy if kings were to philosophize or philosophers were to be kings. Philosophy pertains to the intellect; but what is first and principally desired is the virtue and rectitude of the will. The royal prophet did not obscurely indicate this (Psalm 118): 'Blessed are the undefiled, who walk in the law of the Lord; blessed are those who search His testimonies.' The rectitude of will which virtue induces comes before the science in the intellect for searching God's testimonies; and for no other reason than to give the primacy to virtue. Ambrose (Sermon 1 on this Psalm) aptly observed: 'How beautiful the order, how full of doctrine and grace — not first does he say who searches His testimonies but first blessed are the undefiled in the way. For the good life must be sought before doctrine, since a good life without doctrine has grace, but doctrine without life has not integrity.'

Question II — On the Moral Virtues in Particular

Article I — On Fortitude

Fortitude is taken in three ways: first, for the firmness of the body itself; second, for any virtue insofar as it confers some firmness of soul for acting; third and most aptly, for that particular virtue occupied with enduring labours and undertaking just dangers — commonly called fortitude.

Its existence is attested by countless people who by its benefit, having trampled all difficulties, have left singular renown of their name to posterity. Four integral parts are assigned to it: magnanimity (or confidence, by which the mind prepares intrepidly for undertaking great and danger-filled things); magnificence (or loftiness of soul, by which a person girds himself with a firm mind for the execution of a work with the greatest confidence); patience (by which a person endures labours so constantly that he never seems to weaken or to softly cast away his spirit); and perseverance (confirming the spirit with long-enduring difficulties, lest he basely desert a laudably undertaken intention).

Fortitude is most aptly defined as: 'an elective habit consisting in the mean regarding terrible things.' As a 'habit' it firmly inheres in its subject and confers facility for acting; in 'the mean regarding terrible things' it differs from other virtues which do not strive to observe measure regarding terrible things and in their vicious extremes — Fear and Boldness.

From this it is gathered that fortitude has two acts: one for repressing boldness, another for repelling fear. The first act is the right undertaking of dangers (which Boldness exceeds). The second is the endurance and bearing of difficulties (which Timidity altogether flees). Between these two acts the philosophers hold the latter to be more difficult than the former — since it is far more difficult to preserve the mean in present evils that are endured than in future ones to be undertaken.

Article II — On Temperance

Temperance signifies a certain tempering and moderation. It is taken in two ways: broadly for any virtue that applies moderation in human actions; strictly and properly for that peculiar virtue which moderates the will regarding pleasures, lest being too blandishing they deflect from the right way, or if they are scorned too much, it should fall into stupidity.

From this it is proved that there are two vices contrary to this virtue: Intemperance (which by excess deprives a person of all offices of human society, strips him of liberty, and despoils him of human form) and Stupidity (which by defect alienates a person's mind from moderate pleasure).

Temperance is most aptly defined as: 'an elective habit consisting in the mean among bodily pleasures.' As an 'elective habit' it resides in the will which is the principle of choice; 'consisting in the mean,' because every moral virtue except justice consists in the mean; 'among bodily pleasures' — since that person cannot properly be called intemperate who takes most delight in things pertaining to the mind, but properly the one who is too much urged by bodily pleasures, especially those around touch and taste.

The potential parts of Temperance are many: continence (which by resisting pleasures with great effort is an imperfect temperance); mansuetude (restraining anger and the appetite for revenge); clemency (restraining the appetite for inflicting punishments); studiousness (applying a measure in the desire for knowledge, lest it be too much inflamed or too much languish); modesty (in conforming the decent gesture and motion of the body); festivity (establishing measure in games, lest the will be too occupied in them or too much abhor them); ornamentation (composing the decent dress of the body according to the rules of prudence); and — adding an eighth — humility (depressing human souls from the prescript of reason, so that raised up toward God alone they may despise the other blandishments of the world).

Moral Digression — On Humility

Aristotle observed that Mount Olympus is so high that no force of winds and storms can reach it — whose sign is that the ashes scattered there remain and are seen in the

following year. Surely, for a person to be superior to the world's turbines, winds, and storms, he ought to be as high as Mount Olympus: and the sign of such height in a person will be if he retains his ashes on his forehead — that is, in profound humility thinks himself ash and about to return to ash.

Antaeus, that son of earth in the poets, could never be conquered when wrestling with Hercules so long as he touched the earth; nor would Hercules have overcome him, had he not drawn him up from the earth into the air and there suffocated him with his hands. Antaeus is man, son of earth (formed from earth and to be resolved into earth). Hercules is the devil, who from the beginning of the world has engaged man in war, fights and strives — yet can never overcome man if man touches the earth with the firm thought that he is a creature of earthly clay. But if he draws him from earth (that is, from the humble thought of his origin) to the air of vanity and pride, he will most easily destroy him. Humility alone will be the shield making man invincible against the demon.

The humble spring sends water more vigorously upward, the deeper the source it has: so men breathe and think more loftily and animously the more they depress their soul by the thought of their earthly origin. What a ball is thrown against the earth more forcefully, the more it rebounds and rises higher. So the more a person by humility casts himself down to earth, the higher he is raised. The royal prophet clearly signifies this speaking of Christ (Psalm 109): 'He drinks from the brook in the way, therefore He shall lift up His head.' To drink from the brook is to depress oneself to the earth through humility. Therefore (note this conjunction) He shall lift up His head — in agreement with that saying of Christ: 'Whoever humbles himself shall be exalted.'

Augustine: 'He loves You less, O Lord, who loves anything along with You which he does not love for Your sake.' And in his Confessions: 'Do you think of building some great edifice of loftiness? Think first of the foundation of humility. And the one who desires to ascend to where he wants — let him begin from the grade of humility; for loftiness delights, but humility is the step. What are you stretching your foot beyond yourself? You want to fall, not to ascend; begin from the grade, and you have ascended.'

Article Last — On Justice

Justice is so named because it proposes as its end the rendering of right to each one. Its meaning is twofold: improper (for the concord and consent of things among themselves) and proper (for that peculiar moral virtue inclining the will to render its right to each one — and this is how we use it).

Justice is commonly defined: 'The constant and perpetual will to render its right to each one.' It is said first to be 'constant and perpetual will' because that person is not just who has exercised an act of justice once but who constantly does it on every occasion offered. More aptly it is defined by genus: 'Justice is a moral virtue inclining the will to render its right to each one.'

The various divisions of Justice: First, into general (or legal) justice — which looks to the common good and enacts laws to protect it — and special justice — which takes care of some particular good. Second division: into commutative justice (observed in commercial transactions and exchanges) and distributive justice (which ensures that distributions of rewards and punishments are made according to right). A third division: into political (which refers all things to the good of the whole commonwealth) and economic (which is entirely occupied in procuring the good of the family).

Appendix — On Right and Laws

Regarding right (ius), its name is ambiguous and is used for diverse things. First: for the power to do something. Second: for the science and discipline of right (jurisprudence is the science of the just and the good). Third: for the place where justice is rendered. Fourth: for what is just and owed to another. Fifth: for the law prescribing what is to be done and what not to be done.

Regarding Law: Some say it is derived from legendo (reading), because it must be read and promulgated so that it may bind. Others from deligendo (choosing), because it prescribes what is to be chosen. Others finally from ligando (binding), because it binds and obligates. Whatever the etymology, the proper acceptation of law is for a certain just rule prescribing what is equitable, for the good of the whole commonwealth and of single private individuals.

Law is divided in many ways. The first and most important division is into natural law (which natural law itself demands to be rendered to each one, founded especially on the general maxim drawn from nature itself: 'Do not do to another what you do not wish done to yourself') and positive law (which must be rendered according to legitimately enacted laws — that is, by those who have the power of enacting). Positive law is divided further into divine and human. Divine positive law, both old and new, can be changed by God and cease to oblige. Human law can be changed by interpretation (the declaration of obligation), dispensation (exemption from obligation granted by a superior for a legitimate cause), abrogation (by which the whole law is removed), and irritation (by which it is impeded before it begins to oblige).

The offices of laws are five: to reward good acts, to prohibit bad ones, to permit indifferent ones, to punish those who transgress against laws, and to reward those who fulfil them as is right.

The definition of law from Clement of Alexandria (Stromata I): 'Law is right reason commanding what is to be done and prohibiting what is not to be done.' Better from Thomas Aquinas (I–II, q. 90, a. 4): 'Law is a certain ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by the one who has care of the community.' This definition conveys: 'ordinance' (since law is a work of reason and prudence, the judgment of the practical intellect to whom it belongs to ordain); 'just' (since the spirit of law is equity; an unjust law is not at all worthy of the name of law); 'of a superior' (since law has some directive power by commanding and prohibiting, as well as coercive power by punishing the guilty — which can only flow from a superior, for the common legal rule is that 'there is no authority of an equal over an equal'); 'public authority' (since it belongs to public persons or to that man with whom public authority lies to enact laws that bind subjects); 'with the power of obligating subjects' (to distinguish it from counsel, which only advises and does not compel the one to whom it is given — as Augustine says: 'Where counsel is given, the choice is the offerer's; where a precept is given, the necessity is the servant's').

Conclusion of the Work

These things on Justice, and following its guidance over the Symplegades of tossed moral argument, let us make for harbour. It shall be well with us if what we have handed down in precepts we also follow in deeds, and if we tread the longer road through art of morals more briefly through example — expressing the doctrine of morals in our own moral conduct. Here let the written moral work have its end; in deeds, may it never have an end.

~ End of Translation ~

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